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Abstract 
 
     In 1995 the Progressive Conservative (PC) party of Ontario carried out a series of 
welfare policy changes impacting the operating principles of social assistance.  The PC 
campaign pledged to cut social assistance benefit levels, implement mandatory workfare, 
and crack down on welfare fraud.  Using a qualitative methodology, this dissertation asks, 
“How does Ontario Works, the accompanying discourse and cultural logic of 
neoliberal welfare reform, impact the subjectivities of OW participants?”   A 
governmentality framework informs this research by placing “focus on how we are 
governed and by what practices” (Cruikshank, 1999: 120).  The investigation follows a 
theoretical tradition “direct[ing] us to attend to the practices of government that form the 
basis on which problematizations are made and what happens when we govern and are 
governed?” (Dean, 1999: 28). 
     From an analysis of 24 semi-structured interviews with OW participants in Oxford 
County, I argue that the “regimes of practice” (Foucault, 1991: 73-86) associated with 
Ontario Works and the public “words of welfare” (Schram, 1995) promoted by the 
“common sense revolution” operate on a “discursive field” (Foucault, 2006 [1969]: 30) 
facilitating a form of “prejudice” (Allport, 1954) called classism.  By examining the 
“workings, effects, and the „how?‟ of power” (Foucault, 2003: 274) I show that classism 
survives in the dominant public discourses of welfare reform by way of the “cultural 
categories that undergird the social order” (Schram, 2000: 1): namely, that of “the lazy 
welfare recipient” and “the exploited taxpayer.”  Consistent with Mullaly, I suggest that 
“Culture is not only received by people, it is produced and reproduced by the same people 
in everyday life” (Mullaly, 2002: 72).  Paraphrasing Foucault‟s seminal insights on 
v 
power, I will demonstrate that classism, via the mainstream discourses of personal 
responsibility and excessive taxation, “passes through the individuals it has constituted” 
(Foucault, 2003: 30).   
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“Since persons cannot be free from that about which they 
are ignorant, liberation depends in the first instance on 
recognition of that which imprisons the human mind or 
dominates the human person” 
-- Sabia and Wallulis (1983: 4) 
 
 
“It is acceptable in our so called classless society to look 
down on poor people, to berate them and belittle them and 
tell them that their suffering of hardships is entirely their 
own fault.” 
                                        -- Homan (2007: 56) 
 
 
“Foucault suggests that, by naming something, by constituting  
it in discourse, the possibilities for resistance are created” 
-- McCormack (2002:42)  
 
 
“I know that you are asking today „How long will it take?‟ 
Somebody is asking „How long will prejudice blind the 
            visions of men?‟  I come to say to you, however difficult 
the moment, however frustrating the hour, it will not be 
long.  Because no lie can live forever” 
  -- Martin Luther King, Jr. (MPI Home Video, 1990) 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
Welfare Reform in Ontario:  Political and Policy Background 
 
“I am a firm believer in the principles of workfare.  I‟m a firm believer that individuals 
themselves will get far quicker entry back into the work force if they begin to feel better 
about themselves, get skills, which is part of workfare, get training, begin to contribute” 
                                             -- Former Ontario Premier Mike Harris, (Quaid, 2002: 183). 
 
     In 1995, the Progressive Conservative (PC) Party of Ontario successfully campaigned 
on, and proceeded to carry out, a series of neoliberal social policy changes impacting the 
operating principles of social assistance.  The conservative party‟s political campaign, 
promising a “common sense revolution”, secured political popularity (in part) by pledging 
to cut social assistance benefits, implement mandatory workfare as a condition of 
eligibility for benefits, “crack down” on welfare fraud, and reduce personal income taxes 
by thirty percent.  The eventual 21.6% reduction in social assistance benefit levels, 
enacted in October of 1995, were accompanied by publicly proclaimed advice from 
David Tsubouchi, then Minister of Community and Social Services, on how poor people 
should cope with becoming poorer:  buying food in bulk, bartering with grocers, shopping 
for dented cans of tuna and living on a “welfare diet” of $3.00 per day (Dare, 1997: 21).  
The inference, here, seemed pretty clear:   people on social assistance, at least while they 
were on social assistance, should be doing a better job living leaner and managing their 
personal budgets.          
     During political debate within the provincial legislature, Tsubouchi (1995) posited an 
argument emblematic of the problematizing parameters that were successfully sold as the 
“common sense” of the “common sense revolution” as it pertained to social assistance,   
For the past ten years people have had the opportunity to 
address the real problem.  The Premier [Mike Harris] 
indicated before, and I understand this is the case, that over 
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$40 billion was spent in the social assistance area over the 
last ten years, and the caseloads have gone up over 300%.  
Isn‟t this the real problem we‟re looking at?  This is why we 
are in the middle of transforming this system from one of a 
cycle of dependency to one of self sufficiency (Ontario 
Hansard Issue, 1995:  LO17
1
). 
 
One of the most important, and profound, expressions of power is the power to define the 
problem.  “Ending the cycle of welfare dependency” became a mantra upon which much 
of the political logic (within and beyond Ontario) of welfare reform rested.  Like the term 
“personal responsibility”, the term “dependency” only makes sense according to what it 
distinguishes itself from.  Much of the nomenclature in welfare discourse creates 
dominant conceptual oppositions:  responsible / irresponsible, dependent / independent, 
taxpayer / welfare recipient, worker / „welfare queen‟.  While a detailed review of term 
“dependency”, and its culturally encoded meanings, is presented in chapter two, for 
present purposes it is crucial to understand this term likens welfare receipt to an addiction 
requiring therapeutic (and character building) treatment in order to habilitate people so 
that they can make the transition from being irresponsible and dependent to responsible 
and self-sufficient.     
     While much of my analysis in this manuscript will focus on making visible the class 
based antipathies embedded within the symbols of welfare discourse, on numerous 
occasions throughout this dissertation my argument about classism will be supplemented 
by insights from the well established body of gender scholarship (Gordon, 1994; Hays, 
2003; Lessa, 1999; Swift, 1995; Bezanson, 2006; Fraser and Gordon, 1997; Schram, 
2006: 43-69) showing that, in various ways, “welfare states note only ameliorate social 
                                                 
1
 All citations utilized in this manuscript from hansard debate within the Legislative assembly of Ontario 
were retrieved electroncically from http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca.  
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inequalities, but also act to produce and reinforce them” (Haney and Rogers-Dillon, 2005: 
327) along more than just one axis of domination.  The popular code words of neoliberal 
welfare reform – i.e. “dependency”, “hard working taxpayer”, “self-sufficiency” and (in 
its most patriarchal form) “welfare queen” -- are highly gendered and justify an income 
security system with a patently two-tiered logic (Gordon, 1994) that implicitly defines 
what is considered to be “real work” and thus a “contribution to society.”  As Gordon 
(1994) argues, income security programs largely utilized by men (i.e. worker‟s 
compensation and employment insurance) are considered “contributory” and thus have 
larger benefit levels and fewer stigmas.  Recipients of these programs are generally 
considered entitled citizens.  Social assistance, disproportionately utilized by women, 
provides lesser support and more stigmas.   Neoliberalism is fundamentally about the 
primacy of the market:  because the caring labour of reproduction (Bezanson, 2006) does 
not take place in a market context, it does not entitle one to full citizenship.          
     My qualitative data analysis will highlight select insights posited by some of the 
caregivers in the sample that remained subjugated in the voices of non-caregivers.  For 
the most part, it should be noted, the cultural devaluation of caring labour was not 
questioned (and in most cases, not even mentioned) by most respondents.  This is a 
cultural silence within welfare discourse that is in need of interrogation.  At various 
stages throughout this manuscript, a gender analysis is a necessary supplement to my 
examination of the class based antipathies embedded in welfare discourse precisely 
because “The Ontario Conservative government‟s neoliberal policies exacerbated the 
tension between social reproduction and paid work” (Bezanson, 2006: 4).  A paternalistic 
prejudice about the insignificance and limited value of reproduction – which badly 
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obscures the realities of who is dependent on whom and for what -- is intertwined with 
class based antipathies.                    
     The political logic espoused by Tsubouchi – valorizing “self sufficiency” and decrying 
“dependency” -- was not at all unique to Ontario.  There was clearly an international 
context underlying policy shifts.  Among western industrialized countries there has been a 
widespread move in recent years from so-called “passive” to “active” social assistance 
programmes (Herd, Mitchell, and Lightman, 2005: 96).  In her doctoral dissertation from 
Yale University, Bertram concisely details the “welfare to workfare” shift in the logic 
informing American social policy,  
Through the 1970‟s debates over welfare reform were 
focused on significant measure on the question of how to 
reduce poverty levels.  Even as work requirements were 
added in the 1960‟s, concern over poverty continued to 
guide the policy debate.  By the mid-1990‟s, however, 
liberals and conservatives alike had shifted their focus to a 
different goal.  Poverty received remarkably little attention 
in congressional floor debates, and the debate instead 
focused on the best way to move people off of welfare and 
into work.  In short, welfare was no longer seen as the 
policy response to the social problem of poverty:  it had 
become the problem itself (Bertram, 2005: 18). 
         
     In “Social Economy and the Government of Poverty” Procacci (1991: 159) asks 
rhetorically, “Why does poverty itself, as the effect of social inequality, the existence in 
society of rich and poor, not become the object of attack for this discourse?”  The 
compelling answer posited by Procacci is that eliminating inequality is not the purpose of 
discourse on poverty.  Schram (2006) suggests that welfare discourse is fundamentally 
are re-encoding the poor as the marginal “Other”.   
     Again, this mainstream problematization of impoverishment clearly transcends 
borders.  Irrespective of geographic or political jurisdiction, social policy invariably 
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defines what is problematic by virtue of policy initiatives espoused as solutions.  “The 
Blue Book”, an Ontario PC party publication, summarized a key argument epitomizing 
much of the mainstream logic and public discourse that brought the Conservative party 
into power, 
You have told us that you want to replace welfare with a 
work, education and training social policy that rewards 
individual initiative and demands responsible behaviour 
from recipients of social assistance. 
 
We should prepare welfare recipients to return to the 
workforce by requiring all able bodied recipients – with the 
exception of single parents with young children – either to 
work or to be retrained for their benefits. 
                        (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 1994: 9-10)     
 
While previous governments had purportedly been too generous to people on welfare, in 
now “demand[ing] responsible behaviour from recipients of social assistance” it was 
clearly inferred that individual irresponsibility was a character ailment that new welfare 
policies needed to cure.   The Tories persuasively argued that workfare -- now possible 
because the Canada Assistance Plan (Federal policy discouraging work requirements by 
the possibility of withholding federal funding should a province permit workfare) had 
been replaced with the Canadian Health and Social Transfer
2
 (permitting workfare) -- 
would “break the „cycle of dependency‟ created by the previous administration” 
(Moscovitch, 1997: 89).  Clearly, the new CHST meant there were strong Federal 
influences – most notably pertaining to decreased cost-sharing funding -- impacting 
                                                 
2
 While an extensive historical review of the transition from CAP to the CHST is beyond the scope of this 
manuscript, it is crucial understand that the CAP, at least on paper, accepted the redistributive and 
collectivist principles of the welfare state.  The CHST rejuvenated a spirit of anti-collectivism and personal 
responsibility.   Swanson (2001: 108) argues, “CAP put into law five economic rights:  the right to welfare 
when in need, the right to an amount of welfare that meets basic requirements, the right to appeal welfare 
decisions you disagree with, the right to not to have to work or train for welfare, and the right to not be 
denied welfare because you are from another province.  The CHST abolished the first four of these rights 
and cut billions of dollars from federal grants to the provinces for health, education and welfare.”  
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provincial decisions.  But as Linda Moreau from „End Legislated Poverty‟ explains by 
making reference to the discussions at the Permiers Forum following the CHST, the 
provinces did not have to adopt the “there is no alternative” logic the way that they 
ultimately did, 
The whole premise was that there was nothing we could do 
about the federal cuts to the provinces for health, education, 
and social assistance.  There was a huge range of responses 
the [provincial] government[s] could have taken in terms of 
how to deal with the federal cuts.  But the first and only 
solution was to cut the very poorest (Swanson, 2001: 13).  
         
     The end result of federal and provincial policy decisions had both class and gender 
implications.  While the passage above from the campaign literature of the common sense 
revolution suggests that the Conservatives did, in fact, place the “welfare Mom” in a 
(somewhat) separate category from the “welfare bum”, the caring working that is 
disproportionately carried out by women in the private sphere remains largely invisible 
(Gordon, 1994; Hays, 2003; Bezanson, 2006), and even caring work done in the public 
domain is devalued (Swift, 1995: 30).  The emphasis on “work” glosses over the 
importance of care, and ignores the extent to which care beyond the labour market can 
seriously impede sustained attachment to the labour force.  Class inequalities often 
intersect with both gender inequalities and other axes of domination.  Yet the cultural 
logic of neoliberalism, with its emphasis on the primacy of individualism, not only 
ignores intersections of inequality, but sees inequality as stemming from the natural 
outcome of fair and equal opportunity.  In chapters 5 and 6, we will explore how research 
respondents, in sometimes enigmatic ways, both accommodated and resisted this logic of 
meritocracy.              
The Communitarian Aspects of the Common Sense Revolution      
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     To be sure, there were also communitarian aspects to the PC logic, 
 
We believe that for every life we get back on track we are 
avoiding further costly programs down the road.  In the next 
few months, we will be asking charitable groups and other 
community organizations to meet with us and talk about 
ways in which this vision [of workfare / welfare reform] 
could be realized (Progressive Conservative Party of 
Ontario, 1994: 9).   
 
Similarly, in political debate at Queen‟s Park, MPP Janet Ecker would frequently stress 
the communitarian view that,  
We have a responsibility to people in need and to the 
taxpayers of this province to fix the [welfare] system. It's 
time to provide people with the opportunities they need to 
become self-sufficient (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: 
LO1350). 
 
If communitarianism is a perspective on welfare issues that stresses the common interest 
and common values emanating from communal bonds, then there were clearly 
communitarian elements to the common sense revolution.  For the most part, however, 
the primacy of individualism would supersede an emphasis on communitarianism and this 
reality becomes noticeable in hearing the cultural traces of personal responsibility in the 
views posited by the twenty four respondents of this research.  Paradoxically, the 
strongest common value promoted by the rhetoric of welfare reform is the value of 
personal responsibility.  This logic suggests that a common interest is served – and we are 
all better off – when people take charge of their own lives.  Cloaked in subsidiary notions 
of the community helping people take personal responsibility, this is simply classic 
liberalism with a minor variation. 
“A Hand Up, Not a Hand-out”  
 
“As culturally encoded, personal responsibility encourages individualistic explanations 
for poverty” (Schram, 2000: 34). 
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     Notably, the common sense revolution was politically successful in reducing the 
structural problems of poverty and unemployment to the individual and moral 
shortcomings of the poor and unemployed.  The popular, and frequently cited catch-
phrase, that people on welfare should be “given a hand-up, not a hand-out3” (Progressive 
Conservative Party of Ontario, 1994) seemed to resonate with the electorate who voted 
the Progressive Conservatives into power with a majority government in 1995 and 
returned the Tories to Queen‟s Park with another majority in 1999.       
     The Ontario Works Act (OWA) was officially enacted by the provincial legislature in 
1997 with the explicit purposes of recognizing “personal responsibility” promoting “self 
reliance through employment” and being “accountable to the tax payers of Ontario” 
(OWA, 1997, sec.1).  Clearly, much of the political reasoning that brought the PC party 
into power was written directly into welfare policy by what was indirectly suggested by 
the purposes of the OWA.  As Quaid (2002) reminds us, any social program operates with 
some theoretical notion of cause and effect.  Looking closely at the directives of the 
OWA, in conjunction with the political climate in which it was passed, personal 
irresponsibility had been deemed a cause creating the effect of excessive taxation.  
Foucault, whose work we will explore extensively in chapter 3, has argued that important 
insights can be revealed “on the basis of what the documents say or sometimes merely 
hint at” (Foucault, 2006:7).  During her tenure as the Minister of Community and Social 
Services, Janet Ecker repeatedly argued, from both within and beyond the Provincial 
                                                 
3
 In addition to facilitating symbolic imagery conducive to classism, this statement is also highly gendered 
in that it implicitly suggests, among other things, that the work of production within the labour market is 
worthy of a paycheck, while the remuneration for caring work outside of the labour market (however 
inadequate that remuneration is) is pejoratively lablelled a “hand out.”  In chapter 4, I will present empirical 
data that shows, very clearly, that as children get older and the demands of caregiving lessen, people 
overwhelmingly return to the labour market.  If this data was made more accessible it would assist in 
debunking some of the gender based stereotypes associated with welfare receipt.   
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legislature, that “we owe it to the taxpayers to ensure that the dollars they give us are 
going to help those truly in need” (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: LO1350).  The widely 
accepted inference, here, was that social assistance was going to those who didn‟t really 
need it and that taxpayers were unduly paying the price.               
     Notably, the OWA overturned several policy principles recommended by the Social 
Assistance Review Committee (1988) which had begun to impact Ontario welfare policy, 
in a manner that strengthened the minimum standard provided by the provincial social 
safety net, under the previous New Democratic and Liberal administrations (Moscovitch, 
1997) (although both the NDP and Liberals would later come to embrace much of the 
logic of workfare and this observation is consistent with Jordan‟s (2008) international 
claim that a leaner and meaner welfare state is not the sole province of right wing parties). 
Social Assistance Review Committee    
 
     The Social Assistance Review Committee was assembled by Premier David Peterson 
in 1986 to review social assistance in Ontario.  Over the course of two years, the 
committee heard submissions from over 1500 individuals and groups, including people on 
social assistance, on how to improve welfare services.  The primary recommendations 
culminated in promoting a strong sense of collective responsibility as can be seen in 
SARC‟s statements regarding eligibility, adequacy, and accessibility.  Regarding 
eligibility, SARC asserted that “All members of the community have a presumptive right 
to social assistance based on need” (SARC, 1988: 5).  With respect to adequacy, the same 
report recommended that “All residents of Ontario who are in need must receive a fair 
and equitable level of social assistance, adequate to meet their basic needs for shelter, 
food, clothing, and personal health care” (SARC, 1988: 5).  In reference to accessibility, 
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SARC suggested that “Social assistance must be readily available to all those in need 
within the community” (SARC, 1988: 6).          
     Not only did PC reforms not follow the SARC (1988) recommendations, the welfare 
shifts enacted ran directly counter to what had been recommended:  benefit levels became 
even more inadequate and access even more restrictive.   Part of the political logic 
informing cuts to benefit levels and restricting eligibility was that people should be 
working, government generosity saps the work ethic, and “the simple fact of the matter is 
we can‟t afford it” (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 1994: 11).  The need for 
social assistance was portrayed as a drain on the competitiveness of the Ontario economy, 
and taxpayers, rather than the effect of a global economy that was going from bad to 
worse in terms of producing adequate employment opportunities (Laxer, 1996).  Separate 
legislation was passed, the Taxpayer Protection Act of Ontario (1999), in an attempt to 
protect the “hard working taxpayer” from individuals and governments who were 
exploiting them.   
     In the political discussion of welfare shifts, very little attention was given to the 
economic reality that “the most obvious failure of globalization has been its incapacity to 
maintain employment” (Saul, 2005: 46).  The unemployed, it seemed, were simply work-
shy and something obviously needed to be done about this.  Further, the inordinate focus 
on welfare fraud was justified by the claim that “Every penny that is paid to the wrong 
person through mistake or fraud is food taken from the needy.  Fraud and overpayments 
must be stopped” (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 1994: 5).  So while there 
was an indirect acknowledgement, here, that the needy were going without food this 
problem was attributed to others who were shamelessly scamming the welfare system.  
While the extent and prevalence of fraudulence in the welfare system was grossly 
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overstated, the grounded insights from the Social Assistance Review Committee (1988) – 
that more adequate benefit levels would go a long way toward minimizing the 
fraudulence that did exist – were, again, completely ignored.       
     The opening lines in the inaugural document of the common sense revolution, released 
more than a full year prior to the 1995 election, claimed “The people of Ontario have a 
message for their politicians – government isn‟t working anymore.  The system is 
broken” (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 1994: 1).  Politically, the populist 
rhetoric was a resounding success.  “We need a revolution in this province”, Harris 
asserted, “a common sense revolution” (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 1994: 
8).             
The Research Question 
 
     This dissertation asks “How does Ontario Works, the accompanying discourse and 
cultural logic of neoliberal welfare reform, impact the subjectivities of OW 
participants?”   My inquiry is grounded in a governmentality framework, placing “focus 
on how we are governed and by what practices” (Cruikshank, 1999: 120).  The framing of 
this investigation follows a theoretical tradition that “directs us to attend to the practices 
of government that form the basis on which problematizations are made and what 
happens when we govern and are governed?” (Dean, 1999: 28).  The theorizing from a 
governmentality perspective will be alloyed with social psychological theory on The 
Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954) to explore the cultural impacts of welfare policy.   
     Subjectivity, it should be noted, is a generic and open ended term in that the 
“perspective of the person” is applicable to many different issues. In addressing the 
present research question, I will explore the perspectives of people on social assistance as 
they relate to several issues that were explored during semi-structured interviews:  
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coming to social assistance, life on the system, attempting to exit social assistance, the 
causes of impoverishment, taxes, disability and care giving demands.  There are cultural 
messages implicit in welfare reforms that are emphasized (and in some cases de-
emphasized) on all these matters:  coming to social assistance is irresponsible, life on the 
system is too easy, people could get off of welfare if they just wanted to, poverty is 
attributable to some kind of personal deficiency (usually laziness), taxes are too high and 
the taxpayer is getting „screwed over‟, if a person is truly disabled they should be 
considered worthy of some support, and caring labour does not count for anything (or at 
least not very much).  In addressing the issues respondents deemed important, and in 
exploring the complex ways that respondents both resisted and accommodated the 
discourse of neoliberalism, I will attempt to accomplish the following.   
The Purposes of this Study: 
 
 The three purposes of this study are, 
• First, to examine the impacts that widespread cultural 
beliefs embedded in the public discourses of welfare reform 
and taxation have on the subjectivities of social assistance 
recipients in Ontario.  I will explore “the question of the 
nexus between power and subjectivity [that] has been a 
central preoccupation of philosophy and social theory for a 
very long time” (Adam, 2002: 100-114). 
 
 • Second, to make the counter discourses of respondents 
(who are consistently marginalized in the policy making 
process) visible and connect their voices to others who have 
written about, and understand, poverty from a grounded 
experiential knowledge base – in other words, to promote 
“an understanding of poverty from those who are poor” 
(Baker – Collins, 2005).  In so doing, I will take up 
Foucault‟s (2003: 7) call for an “insurrection of subjugated 
knowledges.”  
 
 • Third, to critically examine and explain the disjuncture 
between respondents‟ counter discursive accounts of “self” 
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and the acceptance of many of the negative stereotypes 
associated with “other” welfare recipients.   
   
The Social Theory Informing This Research 
 
     The first purpose of this monograph -- examining the impact of dominant discourse on 
subjectivity -- is grounded in, and will expand upon, the postmodern policy analyses and 
cultural critiques of American welfare provided by Schram (1995, 2000, and 2006).       
Subjectivity, as I use the term, is tantamount to “the perspective of the person.”  Applying 
a critical insight of Karen Swift‟s Manufacturing Bad Mothers, “the subjectivity of 
individuals is not seen as a private matter but rather is viewed in its relation to society” 
(Swift, 1995: 19).  Just as Schram was standing on the proverbial shoulders of Foucault 
(1980, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) in understanding the latent meaning-making power of 
mainstream discourse to emphasize certain contexts, while subjugating others, this work 
will stand on the intellectual shoulders of Schram and explore the insightful relevance of 
Schram‟s American welfare policy scholarship to the Ontario scene.  Schram gives a 
powerful summation of the theory informing his work, 
My particular approach emphasizes the importance of 
examining the power of discourse to invoke contexts that 
make some actions seem appropriate and others not.  
Discourse situates isolated actions in context so as to give 
them a meaning they would not otherwise have.  Discourse 
invokes context in the way it frames, narrates, and positions 
policy makers, their policies, and the effects those policies 
have on people (Schram, 2006: xi). 
 
I seek not only to utilize, but extend, the theorizing of Foucault and the applications of 
Schram.  Specifically, I will accomplish this by introducing the term “classism” into my 
welfare policy analysis and by pointing out what the increased emphasis on „personal 
responsibility‟, and the subjugation of notions of collective responsibility, ultimately 
amount to.     
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     The second purpose of this study -- making the embodied counter discourses of 
respondents visible -- is propelled by Foucault‟s call to take up an insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges and, similarly, impelled by the interpretive interactionist project 
(Denzin, 1989: 7) that “attempts to make the world of problematic lived experience 
directly available to the reader.”  This endeavour is motivated by the concern that, 
 With few exceptions, governmentality scholars  
  have ignored the direct effects of government as it           
  is experienced by, taken up, or resisted by its  
  objects – real people in their everyday lives.   
  Though they have used empirical data in the form  
  of texts in their analyses, they have remained  
  aloof from the lives of those to whom rule is  
  directed (Power, 2005: 645). 
 
Emphasizing what has been silenced in welfare discourse can partially help to counter the 
harsh reality that “most of what has been said or written [about poverty] has come from 
those who have never personally experienced the negative effects of classism and the 
social injustice of poverty” (Homan, 2007: 4).  Similarly, Schram (1995: xxii) points out 
that “the real world [is] a place where social scientists need to visit with greater 
frequency.”  In light of these concerns, as recommended by Copeland (2005: 6), “this 
research [will examine] the counter discourses of welfare formulated in the wake of these 
shifts toward conservatism in social welfare policy.”       
The third purpose of this study – understanding and explaining the frequent 
disjuncture between respondents‟ accounts of “self” and “other” – will expand upon both 
the existing literature on welfare discourse and adopt insights on the perpetuation of 
oppression (Adam, 1978; Mullaly, 2002) to better understand, what I am calling here, 
“the survival of classism.”4  In understanding and explaining the often enigmatic 
                                                 
4
 This term is paraphrasing Adam‟s (1978) The Survival of Domination:  Inferioriztion  and Everyday Life 
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disjuncture between respondents‟ embodied selves and the disembodied “other”, I will:  
i.) review and expand upon the existing definitions of prejudice and classism as a 
necessary prelude to, ii.) analyzing the latent existence of these phenomena in Ontario 
welfare policy, political commentaries, and the qualitative data provided by respondents, 
and iii.) show that classism survives in, and is reproduced by, the mainstream discourses 
respondents utilize to discuss various topics related to social assistance, and in particular 
to explain why “other” poor people are poor and why the tax system is unfair to the 
“taxpayer”.         
My central argument about welfare discourse and the “survival of classism” will 
invoke classic social psychological insights from The Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954).  
I commend Kenneth Clark‟s assertion (from the preface to 25th anniversary edition of The 
Nature of Prejudice) that “the basic outline for the understanding of this overall problem 
remains essentially the same as it was presented by Allport” (Allport, 1979 [1954]: xi) 
with the important caveat that Allport was writing decades before “the complexity of 
intersectionality” (McCall, 2005) had been seriously addressed in the academy.  All 
twenty four respondents in this study were disadvantaged by their lack of material 
resources and the accompanying cultural beliefs and attributions about the reasons why 
people live in conditions of material deprivation.  But for many, this material 
disadvantage was not experienced as a singular or discrete barrier to employment.          
     Notwithstanding this important caveat,  Allport‟s (1954) theorizing remains invaluable 
for understanding the cultural impacts of welfare reform and explaining why the 
disadvantages directly experienced by respondents rarely were at the forefront of the 
discussion when they spoke of “Others.”  Specifically, The Nature of Prejudice remains 
particularly useful for analyzing:  1) the formation and categorization of in-groups (i.e. 
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„the taxpayer‟) and the concurrent rejection of out-groups (i.e. „the welfare bum‟ or 
„welfare mom‟; 2) the linguistic factors of prejudice including “nouns that cut slices,” 
“labels of primary potency,” and “emotionally toned labels”; and 3.) the resultant 
“scapegoats for special occasions.”  There is intriguing work on categorization and 
linguistics that predates Allport showing that “demagogues thrive on semantic illiteracy” 
(Chase, 1938: 27).  In short, demagogy thrives when the populace uncritically accepts a 
fictional homogeneity inscribed by certain categorical labels and concurrently ignores the 
heterogeneity that is badly obscured by classification.  Abstract but powerful semantics, 
terms with no actual referents (i.e. „dependency‟), usually accompany these categories to 
valorize some group and concurrently vilify another.  Adding to an already compelling 
body of knowledge, there is also contemporary work on categorization post-dating 
Allport suggesting that “each category valorizes some point of view and silences another” 
(Bowker and Starr, 1999: 5).  Swift (1995: 12) has noted persuasively that, “Among their 
more insidious purposes, categories effectively hide the reproduction of social divisions 
such as racism and sexism.”  The categories of welfare discourse, I contend, effectively 
hide the reproduction of classism (in conjunction with other axes of domination).     
     Perhaps the most profound insight that Allport‟s direct legacy provides for purposes of 
this study is concisely stated thus,   
Most people are unaware of this basic law of language – 
that every label applied to a given person refers properly to 
only one aspect of his nature. . . . Thus each label we use, 
especially those of primary potency distracts our attention 
from concrete reality.  The living, breathing complex 
individual – the ultimate unit of human nature – is lost to 
sight.  (Allport 1979 [1954]: 179). 
 
This pivotal insight about “the ultimate unit of human nature” being “lost to sight” will be 
linked to later poststructural theorizing about the latent power of discourse, and 
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subjugated discourse, to arrive at what will be the central argument of this treatise.  Prior 
to examining the principle findings of this research, it is necessary to provide a brief 
background contextualizing the politics behind the transition from welfare to workfare 
and empirically document the outcomes of two key changes in Ontario welfare policy:  
benefit levels and accessibility to support. 
The Transition from Welfare to Workfare  
“The Ontario Works Act would overhaul a welfare system that is 30 years out of date.  It 
would restore welfare to its original purpose:  a transitional program of last resort that 
will provide people on welfare with a stepping stone back into the workforce.  The 
legislation I am introducing today will ensure that this objective remains paramount.” 
--Janet Ecker, 1997 (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: LO1340)    
 
     The Conservative standpoint on the original purpose of the welfare state, in addition to 
overlooking that the fact that the monumental Marsh report was clear that income security 
had to be coupled with a governmental commitment to full employment in order to be 
sustainable (Guest, 1997: 112), is not consistent with the standpoints posited by other 
policy analysts.  For thirty years the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) regulated several 
conditions of provincial welfare and entailed a 50% federal provincial cost sharing 
agreement (Quaid, 2002: 46).  The federal share of provincial social assistance in Ontario 
was reduced from 50% to 28% (Quaid, 2002: 47) so harsh provincial changes for poor 
people were operating under national and international contexts.   
     Morrison summarizes some of the notable features of CAP, 
With its emphasis on the provision of adequate assistance to 
all persons in need in the context of an overarching social 
goal of eliminating the conditions giving rise to poverty, its 
prohibition of residency requirements and workfare and its 
insistence on the creation of a formal appeals process in 
social assistance legislation, CAP signalled a major shift in 
the Canadian welfare state towards an entitlement model of 
social assistance (Morrison, 1998: 2). 
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In short, “CAP clearly dictated that the only condition for welfare eligibility was financial 
need” (Quaid, 2002: 45-46).  It must also be noted that “under the provisions of CAP 
[provincial governments] were not permitted to require employable recipients to work as 
a condition of assistance” (Moscovitch, 1997: 81).  While the CAP directives regarding 
eligibility, adequate assistance, and prohibiting workfare were not stringently followed 
(economic disenfranchisement certainly existed, even in the most generous years of the 
Canadian welfare state) the succeeding federal legislation took a notably draconian turn.  
The Canadian Health and Social Transfer came into effect on April 1, 1996 and replaced 
CAP.  The provinces were provided with more discretion on how to manage welfare 
programs and the prohibition against mandatory workfare was removed.  Ontario moved 
quickly enacting welfare policy changes.  Part of the rationale was that benefit levels had 
become too generous.  Clearly, this rationale ignored the reality that benefit levels, even 
at their highest, never came close to the poverty line for any recipient (National Council 
of Welfare, 2006).   
     The following chart shows social assistance benefit levels in Ontario for four different 
categories of recipients.  The time period chosen for display is intended to concretely 
evidence the impacts of reforms and thus includes two years immediately prior to policy 
shifts when the NDP was still in power in Ontario, the period of PC welfare transition, 
and covers the first two years of the Liberal government‟s tenure.  While the initial cuts to 
benefit levels were notable in 1995, the immediate years that followed saw minimal 
change in that benefit levels would remain constant while the cost of living would raise 
approximately 2-3% / annum.  The Liberal government did not reverse the Harris cuts but 
did allow a cost of living increase in social assistance rates to ensure that benefit levels 
would keep pace with inflation.  The graph below details this data.    
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Regarding eligibility, a number of bureaucratic restrictions account for a significant part 
of decreasing caseloads (Quaid, 2002).  Here is a chart revealing welfare caseloads from 
1995 to 2005.  The declining caseloads graphed below were portrayed as a resounding 
success resulting from OW. 
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Notwithstanding the reality that circumstances frequently did not improve for those 
exiting welfare (Lightman, Mitchell, and Herd: 2005: 98) PC reforms did not seem to lose 
popularity with the public in Ontario. 
     The successful 1999 re-election campaign of Conservative Premier Mike Harris 
portrayed declining welfare caseload statistics as a resounding success which had restored 
an eroded work ethic in the province, further pledged to implement mandatory drug 
testing for welfare recipients, and promised another series of regressive tax cuts to 
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continue to restore what was termed fairness in taxation.  The campaign brought the 
Progressive Conservatives back to Queens Park with another majority government.  A 
shift in provincial government occurred in 2003, but the centerpiece of welfare policy 
shifts (the Ontario Works Act) remains intact today.  
Central Argument:    
 
“The notion that the poor themselves, through their deviance, are responsible for the 
problem of poverty has a long history” (Hays, 2003: 124). 
 
     It is a central contention of this dissertation that the “regimes of practice” (Foucault, 
1991: 73-86) associated with Ontario Works and the public “words of welfare” (Schram, 
1995) that were integral to the success of the conservative “common sense revolution” 
operate on a “discursive field” (Foucault, 2006 [1969]: 30) reinvigorating a latent and 
institutional form of “prejudice” (Allport, 1954) called classism.  This central contention 
will be supplemented by insights from a well established body of gender scholarship 
(Gordon, 1994; Hays, 2003; Lessa, 1999; Swift, 1995; Bezanson, 2006; Fraser and 
Gordon, 1997; Schram, 2006: 43-69) showing the patriarchal power effects of 
neoliberalism in general and welfare reform in particular.  By examining the “workings, 
effects, and the „how?‟ of power” (Foucault, 2003: 274) I will show that both overt and 
covert classism survive in, and are reproduced by, the dominant public discourses of 
welfare reform which create uncritically accepted binary and disembodied “cultural 
categories that undergird the [neoliberal] social order” (Schram, 2000: 1) namely, that of 
“the lazy and immoral welfare recipient” and “the hard working and exploited taxpayer.”  
Adopting, and paraphrasing Foucault‟s seminal insights on power, I will show in this 
research that classism, via discourses of personal responsibility and over-taxation, 
insidiously “passes through the individuals it has constituted” (Foucault, 2003: 30).  In 
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other words, I will demonstrate that culture – specifically, the cultural phenomenon of 
classism as it is embedded in welfare discourse -- was frequently received, internalized, 
and reproduced by the people who participated in this study.    
The verisimilitude (Denzin, 1997: 10) of my central argument hinges on 
empirically demonstrating a notable and pronounced disjuncture between the “subjugated 
knowledges” (Foucault, 2003: 7) respondents utilized to articulate their embodied 
experiences about coming to, living on, and attempting to exit social assistance, and the 
cultural influences of the mainstream public discourses that were invoked to describe the 
poverty and unemployment of disembodied “other” welfare recipients.  In sum, the 
numerous challenges in the daily living realities embodied in the experiential knowledge 
of research respondents – that I will suggest “have a profoundly honest ring, for they rest 
on experiences too deep for deception” (Frankl, 1985: 10) – would rarely rise to the level 
of visibility when those same respondents spoke of the disembodied “other” coming to, 
living on, and “not” attempting to exit social assistance.   
Frequently, when discussing the impoverishment of “Others”, respondents would 
ignore the numerous barriers to employment – related to factors such as ill health, child 
care, and the incapacitating realities of impoverishment -- that they detailed with 
compelling clarity when discussing their personal circumstances.  In ways that were 
complex, and often confounding, respondents would sometimes legitimize the neoliberal 
model of a lean and punitive welfare policy (usually when making a disembodied 
reference to “Others”).  At other times the same respondents would make exceptions to 
the neoliberal harshness to infer that issues related to the daily living realities of disability 
(and episodic disability), mothering, and other employment barriers needed more 
attention in policy formation.  When respondents presented views contrary to the 
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dominant neoliberal model of welfare, these perspectives was usually accompanied by 
embodied stories from their personal experience.    
In analyzing qualitative data from twenty four respondents subsisting on social 
assistance, I critically examine what I am calling “the survival of classism” and suggest 
that this form of prejudice is a cultural phenomenon that is constituted, and reproduced, 
by dominant discourses and the resulting „cultural software‟ (Schram, 2000: 3)  that is 
critical in shaping the subjectivities of respondents.  I conclude by suggesting that naming 
classism is an important strategic endeavour given that this form of prejudice and bigotry 
survives by stealth and remains, to borrow the words of Schram (2000: 28) “hidden in 
plain sight.”   
It is worth reiterating, strongly, that my argument about classism being insidiously 
embedded in neoliberal welfare policy is necessarily accompanied by the complicated 
proviso that amid the accommodation that could be heard in the voices of research 
respondents, there were also moments of resistance whereby respondents noted that there 
are times when it should be considered acceptable to be in receipt of public assistance and 
rejected other derogatory assumptions implied by neoliberalism.  Like most forms of 
prejudice, the phenomenon of classism is rarely absolute or all encompassing:  most 
people do not possess a single subject position
5
.  Examining the resistance amid the 
accommodation can offer clues about strengthening resistance.        
Welfare Policy and Discourse in the Era of Neoliberal Globalization 
 
“I call this way of framing welfare policy deliberations „globalization discourse‟” 
(Schram, 2006: 2) 
 
                                                 
5
 I am indebted to committee member Dr. Gerald Cradock for pointing out that “most people do not possess 
a single subject position.”  
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     While Schram‟s insights on “welfare discipline” (punishing people into accepting the 
logic of the market) from an American context will be examined extensively in chapter 3, 
it should be noted at the outset that the cultural dimensions of globalization clearly 
transcends borders.  Swanson (2001: 81) has suggested that welfare “trap language has 
spread around the globe” and suggests that welfare state provisions don‟t help the poor, 
but rather has the effect of trapping them in an unnatural state of dependence.  This global 
transcendence also includes the diffusion of neoliberal welfare policy and discourse 
constituting a significant taxpayer (in-group) / welfare recipient (out-group) binary.  
Within this binary of classification are cultural meanings and assumptions about what it 
means to be a taxpayer and welfare recipient.  Perhaps the most crucial aspect of Allport‟s 
theorizing lies in understanding that prejudice is entirely contingent upon ingroup 
formation and the natural corollary of outgroup rejection.  The scapegoating (Allport, 
1954: 243-259) of welfare recipients, whereby they are blamed for excessive taxation and 
slowing the economy, is facilitated by neoliberal dependency discourse of the “new 
right”.    
Defining Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and the „New Right‟ 
 
“[Neoliberalism] represents the ideological and economic canvas upon which the vast 
changes to welfare states, and indeed to governance, have taken place over the 1990‟s” 
(Bezanson, 2006: 7). 
 
     While an extensive historical review of liberalism becoming neoliberalism, and 
conservatism becoming neoconservatism, is beyond the scope of this manuscript it is 
necessary to clarify what is meant by the terms that are used throughout this dissertation.   
According to David Harvey, 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
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freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices 
(Harvey, 2005: 2). 
 
Bezanson (2006: 3) shows that the Harris “government imposed major changes based on 
neoliberal [logic and] policies.”  While Harvey‟s definition of what neoliberalism is “in 
the first instance” is certainly consistent with Bezanson‟s claim, it must also be noted that 
other theoreticians emphasize the governing technology inherent in neoliberalism.  In 
Governmentality:  Power and Rule in Modern Society it is suggested that, 
Several different governmental rationalities might be 
described as variants of neoliberalism.  They are modes of 
problematization of the welfare state and its features such as 
bureaucracy, rigidity, and dependency formation.  They 
recommend the reform of the individual and institutional 
conduct so that it becomes more competitive and efficient.  
They seek to affect this reform by the extension of market 
rationality to all spheres, by the focus on choices of 
individuals and collectives, and by the establishment of a 
culture of enterprise and responsible autonomy (Dean, 1999: 
210). 
 
In short, neoliberalism can also be seen as a form of governmental technology (Rose, 
2004) designed to have people govern themselves.  It should be noted that mainstream 
use of the term „liberal‟-- inferring progressivity (Lightman, 2003: 275) – clearly has a 
much different meaning.    
     When I use the term “conservative” throughout this manuscript, I am usually referring 
to the Progressive Conservative (PC) party of Ontario.  But conservatism, as a theoretical 
concept, also warrants definition because conservative theorizing has largely informed PC 
policies and practice.  The term “conservative” is traditionally associated with a 
protection and maintenance of the status quo with respect to both social and economic 
issues.  Socially, tradition is desired and economic inequality is seen as necessary and 
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legitimate, in part, because “distributive justice” (Nozick, 1974) suggests that re-
distribution / taxation violates peoples‟ individual private property rights.   
     On economic issues, anti-collectivist (Mishra, 1984) neoconservatism now goes a step 
further than traditional conservatives and proposes regressive tax policies, and an even 
leaner social support system, so that the status quo of inequality is not maintained – it is 
exacerbated.  As can be seen in Harris‟s assertion, examined earlier, suggesting that 
Ontario was in need of a common sense revolution, the “new right” is no longer satisfied 
with simply maintaining the status quo and has developed a more activist stance 
traditionally associated with the political left.  Neoconservative activism, from groups 
like the Canadian Taxpayers Federation, has played an integral part in shaping how 
taxation is perceived and the symbolic meanings, and identities, evoked when the term 
“taxpayer” is used.                      
     The term “new right” (Mishra, 1984: 26-84) can be applied to the ideologies and 
groups espousing laisser-faire / free market promotion and anti-welfarist views about 
government interference in the market.  The new anti-collectivism, opposing welfare state 
provisions, has rekindled old notions about the desired primacy of individualism 
purportedly being unleashed to create wealth.  To understand this, it is necessary to 
review the views espoused by some of the most prominent leaders of the new right so that 
we can appreciate where the cultural diffusion that made its way to Ontario, and 
translated itself into social policy, originated.        
Reaganomics and the Conservative Welfare Scholarship of Murray 
 
“The discussion is about how to help the disadvantaged, not about how to help the 
advantaged cut their taxes, to which arguments for personal freedom somehow always 
get diverted”  (Murray, 1994: 232). 
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     Ronald Reagan was instrumental in advocating the belief that government could not be 
the solution to people‟s problems, but rather that excessive welfare state government was 
often the problem that plagued most hard working people (Obama, 2006).  Reagan‟s 
populism espoused the “trickle down” theory of economics, suggesting that massive tax 
cuts would put more money in peoples‟ pockets, stimulate the economy, and that wealth 
would trickle down to benefit everyone.  Given that a rising economic tide was 
purportedly able to lift all boats, the logic of redistributive government intervention was 
called into question.  Murray (1994: 183) argued that the cultural logic of welfare state – 
the belief that “It‟s [impoverishment] not your fault” (Murray, 1994: 191) -- was 
discriminating against the affluent, 
„Elite‟ was fast becoming a dirty word in the mid-1960‟s 
among whites; “elitism” would soon be a form of bigotry to 
rank with racism and, later, sexism and ageism. 
 
     The American welfare scholarship of Murray (1994) supported Regan‟s politics.  
Murray (1994: 146) detailed his own premises analyzing welfare reform, 
Premise #1:  People respond to incentives and 
disincentives.  Sticks and carrots work. 
 
Premise #2:  People are not inherently hard working or 
moral.  In the absence of countervailing influences, people 
will avoid work and be amoral. 
 
Premise # 3:  People must be held responsible for their 
actions.  Whether they are responsible in some ultimate 
philosophical or biochemical sense cannot be the issue if 
society is to function. 
 
The central thesis of Murray‟s seminal, Losing Ground (1994) is that welfare state 
policies irresponsibly ignored these premises and thus rich and poor alike have suffered:  
the former by being excessively taxed and the latter by unduly being made „dependent‟.  
The arguments, as we shall see, were not unique to America.  Schram (2006: xiv) 
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correctly argues “that there is indeed an Americanization of welfare discourse afoot” in 
most industrialized nations.  
     On the ten year anniversary of Losing Ground (Murray, 1994 [1984]: xvi) wrote, 
In 1984 Losing Ground‟s argument that a growing number 
of poor people were engaged in self destructive personal 
behaviour that would keep them at the bottom of society 
provoked angry retorts that I was blaming the victim.  
Today, no major figure in either academia or public life 
argues against the existence of such a group.  It even has an 
accepted, uncontroversial name:  the underclass. 
 
Indeed, the images invoked by the term “underclass” create very different meanings than 
would be perceived had the term “underprivileged” remained in vogue.  As we will come 
to see, signifiers matter because they determine what is, and is not, given to 
representation (Foucault, 2007a: 107). 
     A quarter century after Murray‟s seminal work, he weighed in on the Nadia Suleman6 
situation, invoking the taxpayer / unworthy recipient binary,  
It‟s my opinion that a woman‟s right to reproduce should be 
limited to a number which the parents can pay for.  Why 
should my wife and I, as taxpayers, pay child support for 14 
Suleman kids? (Associated Press, 02 /12 / 09). 
 
The Suleman case, despite the fact that it was in quite anomalous, was publicly headlined 
for several months in early 2009, and held to be the quintessential example of what was 
wrong with “the culture of entitlement” that was purportedly underlying a “culture of 
poverty”.  The caring labour (Swift, 1995) required to raise children, because it does not 
take place in a market context (Bezanson, 2006) is not considered to be of much value in 
                                                 
Several months after giving birth to octuplets, when public contempt was still at a very high level, Nadia 
Suleman appeared on the Dr. Phil show.  Suleman stated that her decision to have more children was made 
more with emotion (because she loves her kids) than with logic.  While I will not probe into the cultural 
influences informing Suleman‟s views, it is worth noting that the public audience was much more receptive 
to Suleman after hearing her story and realizing that she was not the villainous person she appeared to be 
when she was headlined and labelled with monikers such as “Octomom.”  Allport was clear that labels and 
categories tend to make us lose sight of the person.       
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the public narrative.  Labour that does not take place within the market is not seen as 
making a contribution to society (Gordon, 1994).  If raising one or two children is not 
considered real work, then raising fourteen children shouldn‟t really count for much 
either.  Murray was certainly not alone in his perspectives or in his anger.  Suleman‟s 
spokesperson had to resign amid anonymous public death threats (Associated Press, 02 / 
12 / 09).  While most peoples‟ hostility did not extend beyond antilocution (Allport, 1954: 
49) public contempt had been effectively pre-figured during the formative years of 
neoliberalism.          
Thatcherism 
 
“Thatcherism‟s „populism‟ signals its unexpected ability to harness to its project certain 
popular discontents, to cut across and between different divisions in society” (Hall, 1988: 
6)  
 
     Margaret Thatcher‟s (in)famous dictum that “there is no such thing as society” 
coincided with, 
the end of the social democratic consensus around the 
welfare state under the onslaught of neo-liberal 
individualism [and] the subordination of every aspect of 
social life to market forces (Browne, 1997: 37). 
 
The faith instilled in the distributive fairness of the market is justified by the cultural 
belief that people “succeed or fail on the basis of their own abilities, initiative, risk taking 
and hard work” (Browne, 1997: 38).  Producing disenchantment with “big government” 
purportedly catering to those who seemingly would not show initiative or work hard was 
the political lifeline of neoliberal politics, 
We underestimate the degree to which Thatcherism has 
succeeded in representing itself as „on the side of the little 
people against the big battalions‟ [of government] (Hall, 
1988: 6).   
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     Nikolas Rose (2004: 138-139), in Powers of Freedom:  Reframing Political Thought 
astutely characterizes the salient features of Thatcherism by quoting Thatcher, 
the first principle of this government . . . is to revive a sense 
of individual responsibility.  It is to reinvigorate not just the 
economy and industry but the whole body of voluntary 
associations, loyalties and activities which give society its 
richness and diversity, and hence its real strength . . . [We] 
need a strong state to preserve both liberty and order . . .  
[But we] should not expect the State to appear in the guise 
of an extravagant good fairy at every christening, a 
loquacious and tedious companion at every stage of life‟s 
journey, the unknown mourner at every funeral.   
 
Thatcher was clear that the neoliberal project she was carrying out had a strong moral and 
redemptive dimension, “Economics are the method” she argued, “but the object is to 
change the soul” (Harvey, 2005: 23).  Cultural logic in general, policy and taxation 
specifics in particular, were remarkably similar when comparing Thatcher‟s reign in 
Great Britain, Reagan‟s Presidency in the United States, and Harris‟s tenure in Ontario.  
Browne (1997: 37) writes, 
To assess Mike Harris‟s Common Sense Revolution, it is 
constructive to compare it to examples of conservative 
ideology and government in the countries to which Ontario 
is most closely affiliated in terms of history, trade and 
cultural influence, namely the United States and Great 
Britain. 
 
While one could find minor variations in the different locales of neoliberalism, the 
underlying discourse, cultural and policy logistics of advanced liberalism, entailed the 
following commonalities:  a)  the problems of poverty and unemployment were reduced 
to the individual and moral characteristics of the poor and unemployed who purportedly 
had been permitted to live too extravagantly; b) the increased emphasis on personal 
responsibility abandoned earlier welfare state policy notions of collective responsibility as 
the myth of equal opportunity and meritocracy reigned; c)  the grounded insights on 
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impoverishment from those living in poverty were thoroughly subjugated; d)  the cultural 
categorization of “the taxpayer” portrayed this group as the “exploited victim” (Capponi, 
1997: 72) and the binary moral opposite of the undesirable “welfare recipient.”  
Throughout this manuscript, excerpts from social assistance legislation, debate from 
within the provincial legislature of Ontario, political campaign literature, and selected 
political commentaries from the most outspoken proponents of welfare reform will 
evidence these recurring themes.  Understanding the prominence of these themes leads 
into an analysis of what classism, how it operates, and how it survives.  The monograph is 
organized in the following manner. 
Overview of the Chapters 
 
     The second chapter opens with a review of the foundational social psychological work 
on the nature of prejudice (Allport, 1954) and examines how contemporary scholarship 
assesses the merits of Allport‟s seminal insights (Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman, 2005).   
Understanding prejudice as an antipathy grounded in a categorical group membership is 
pivotal to understanding the central contention of this monograph.  A brief review of 
semantic work on classification that predates (Chase, 1938) and post-dates (Bowker and 
Starr, 1999) the work of Allport is also included.  Next, I review several existing 
definitions of classism (Power, 2006; Langhout, Roselli, and Feinstein 2006; Homan, 
2007) and will draw a conceptual distinction between overt, covert, and institutional 
classism.  The next section of this chapter will provide several empirical illustrations of 
classism.  These illustrations will be taken directly from the Ontario Works Act and from 
excerpts posited by the most outspoken proponents of welfare reform.  These examples of 
mainstream political discourse will set the stage for examining the way many respondents 
of this study took up – and thus reproduced -- those public narratives while 
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simultaneously distancing their personal lives from the negative moral meanings 
associated with welfare receipt.  I then suggest that naming and conceptualizing classism 
is a worthwhile strategic endeavour given that “Foucault suggests that, by naming 
something, by constituting it in discourse, the possibilities for resistance are created” 
(McCormack, 2002: 42).  The final section of this chapter acknowledges that classism is 
certainly not the only form of prejudice and bigotry that has illegitimately reached an 
institutional status.  The notion of intersectionality – “the relationships among multiple 
dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations” (McCall, 2005: 
1771) -- is introduced with the caveat that although my analysis is grounded in 
understanding one form of oppression, there are clearly multiple forms in daily operation 
that interact with one another.  Scholarship examining the gendered nature of welfare 
discourse (Fraser and Gordon, 1997; Evans and Swift, 2000; Swift and Birmingham, 
2000; Lessa, 1999; Hays, 2003) creating meanings that sustain, not only class 
inequalities, but also a patriarchal system will be reviewed concisely in chapter 2.          
 The third chapter opens by detailing the cornerstone assumptions of Foucault‟s 
theorizing and specifically examines the central concepts upon which Foucault‟s 
intellectual legacy was built:  discourse, subjugated knowledge, and power.  I will review, 
from The Archaeology of Knowledge (2006 [1969]: 27-28) the most significant 
theoretical contribution Foucault has made to the present analysis, 
All manifest discourse is secretly based on an „already 
said‟; and this „already said‟ is not merely a phrase that has 
already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, 
but a „never said‟, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent 
as breath, a writing that is merely a hollow of its own mark 
. . . The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than 
the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this „not 
said‟ is a hollow that undermines from within all that is 
said. 
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In other words, our standard ways of communicating emphasize certain aspects of social 
life and de-emphasize others.  I join Foucault (2006 [1969: 24) in suggesting that the 
“facts of [cultural] transmission and communication are amenable to analysis.”  
Understanding these facts of transmission can assist in the “description of cultural 
influences” (2006 [1969]: 5) that latently foster an institutionalized “inertia of mental 
attitudes
7” (2006 [1969]: 10).  Next, I review the American welfare scholarship of 
Schram to uncover some very insightful applications of Foucault‟s seminal theorizing.  I 
present Schram‟s (2000:3) critical conceptualizations of “culture” and “cultural software” 
to lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding the qualitative data analysis that will 
follow.  I conclude this chapter by arguing that although Kurt Lewin was quite correct in 
asserting that “There is nothing so practical as a good theory”, Karl Popper was equally 
correct in suggesting that “There is no theory that is not beset with problems” (Robbins 
and Chaterjee, 1998: i).  I briefly suggest what a class analysis of welfare reform could 
reveal, what gender based analyses have revealed (Copeland, 2005; McCormack, 2002) 
and point out that there are certainly valuable insights that could be gained from different 
theoretical orientations.  
Chapter 4 details the qualitative methodology employed to answer the central 
research question examining how Ontario Works, and the accompanying discourse and 
cultural logic, impacts subjectivities.  The specifics of the recruitment strategy, 
questionnaire, interview process, coding, and data analysis are all made explicit.  The 
demographics of the 24 respondents are provided and compared to the larger 
                                                 
7
 Swanson (2001: 88) argues that welfare policy “imposes a mental attitude that the poor are to blame for 
their poverty.”  In chapter 6 we will explore the poverty attributions from the twenty four respondents from 
this study. 
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demographic of OW recipients for both Oxford County and Ontario as a whole.  This 
background sets the stage for discussing the methodological strengths and limitations of 
this study and subsequently assessing the verisimilitude of the central conclusions that are 
being drawn.    While it is acknowledged that the sample is not representative of the 
larger demographic, and this does present some methodological limitations, it must also 
be noted that the openness of the recruitment strategy gave all social assistance recipients 
in Oxford County an equal opportunity to participate in this study.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the conclusions drawn by this study will have an authority that is grounded 
in the interpretive ethnographic view articulated by Denzin, 
These understandings are based on glimpses and  
slices of the culture in action.  Any given practice  
that is studied is significant because it is an instance  
of a cultural practice that happened in a particular  
time and place . . . its importance lies in the fact  
that it instantiates a cultural practice (Denzin, 1997:  
8). 
 
The qualitative methods utilized in this research will concretely instantiate the cultural 
practices of classism.  Denzin (1989: 56) points out “Precisely because any text can be 
read in different ways, it must be established that a particular interpretation is valid.”  
According to Denzin, validity
8
 “has been replaced with the words authority and 
legitimation” (Denzin, 1997: 9).  I will explain why this manuscript takes the form of an 
autoethnography – linking the “personal to the cultural” (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 739) -- 
and is presented as a “confessional tale” (Van Maanen, 1988: 73-100).  In short, the 
heightened awareness of self via open reflexivity leads to a heightened understanding of 
                                                 
8
 If validity, in conventional usage, means that one is measuring what one intends to measure, then one 
could argue that the term should not be abandoned.    
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others and, ultimately, a more thorough grasp on the cultural context in which lives are 
lived (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 733-768).         
     Chapter 5 details the interpretive phenomenological insights provided by respondents 
in relation to how they explain their own experiences and involvement with Ontario 
Works. Much of the „organic intellect9‟ provided by respondents in reference to their own 
circumstances is – notably -- very congruent with the profound Nobel prize winning 
insights provided by Amartya Sen (1992).  Sen distinguishes between the common 
cultural perception of people maximizing their capabilities through sheer individual will 
and determination, and the critically important insight lost in mainstream policy and 
discourse:  having the primary goods and means that are absolutely necessary to fulfill 
one‟s capabilities.  According to Sen (1992) and my respondents, poverty is not just about 
living with limited material resources – it is about the incapacity to move forward and 
pursue a better life precisely because of the limited material means to do so.  With this 
insight in mind I then adopt the concept of “privileged irresponsibility” (Tronto, 1993) 
and mirror the work of McIntosh (1988) and Homan (2007) to detail and unpack the 
neglected class based aspects of “The Invisible Knapsack of Privilege” that are made 
invisible by a discourse conducive to facilitating “privileged irresponsibility.”  The 
chapter concludes by pointing out that there frequently was a shift in discourse when 
many respondents articulated their views about others on welfare:  remarkably, it was 
common for many underprivileged respondents to accommodate harsh sentiments and 
antipathies towards others in a similar plight and invoke a discourse of privileged 
irresponsibility.   
                                                 
9
 This term was originally coined by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and was meant to convey the belief 
that thinking can be informed from a material / experiential basis.  
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     Chapter 6 will examine how conversational partners drew upon a discursive field to 
articulate their views of the welfare system and others who are impacted by it.  
Notwithstanding the concerns articulated by respondents in reference to their own 
circumstances, in this chapter I present illustrations of manifest discourse – and 
specifically the assumptions replete within that discourse -- when respondents discuss 
matters that transcend their own embodied experience.  Specifically, the data analysis 
identifies concrete examples of overt and covert classism that have become 
institutionalized in the culturally sanctioned explanations for why “others” come to, are 
able to “live high” on, and not prepared to exit social assistance.  Overt classism among 
research respondents manifested itself in outright in group hostility in a way that, in many 
cases, was quite remarkable.  This hostility, in part, may be attributable not only to “the 
nature of hatred” (Allport, 1954: 363-366) but to the belief on the part of respondents that 
“others” on welfare “are giving us a bad name.” 
     Covert classism drew upon the dominant cultural beliefs about the causes of poverty 
and was readily prominent when respondents were asked, “Why do you think poor people 
are poor?”  By analyzing the responses to this question, I will make manifest what I 
suggest has been made latent:  that is, the way that classism is constituted on the 
discursive field and the manner by which it survives.  Like Power (2005: 643) I found 
that there are “messy actualities of how subjects take up neoliberal discourse” because the 
acceptance of new right logic was also intertwined with moments of resistance.  While 
virtually all respondents were unapologetic and forthright about why they were 
legitimately in need, a few respondents went further than a defence of self and spoke out 
against the vilification and stereotypes of other poor people (while usually adding the 
caveat that some people do in fact fit the caricatures of the „lazy bum‟).  Most people, it 
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must be noted, do not possess a single subject position. Many respondents in this study 
would shift between an acceptance of, and resistance to, the dominant neoliberal 
rationales underlying welfare reform.   
     Notably, some questions produced much less resistance than others.  My argument 
about classism being embedded in neoliberal welfare discourse is derived largely from a 
critical analysis of respondents‟ individualized attributions for the impoverishment of 
others and their understandings of “excessive” taxation. Notwithstanding a few 
anomalies, subjectivities on these matters were overwhelmingly impacted by neoliberal 
discourse and it seemed clear that many respondents were picking up, and repeating, the 
arguments posited by the most prominent leaders of the new right when they spoke about 
“Others”.  This pivotal insight leads into the synthesis of the final chapter.    
     In the final chapter I attempt to account for and explain the notable disjuncture 
between the embodied “self” and the disembodied “other” that was a common theme 
among the qualitative data provided by my research respondents.  I conclude that this 
disjuncture bears the indelible imprint of the cultural meanings associated with poverty, 
unemployment, taxation and welfare receipt that emanate from the Ontario Works act and 
the public “words of welfare”.  I return to my central argument to suggest that welfare 
policy and welfare discourse are replete with assumptions and misconceptions that are 
both prejudicial and classist.  Classism survives, I contend, when these policies and 
accustomed discourses are uncritically accepted and taken up by those who are most 
harmed by them. 
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Chapter 2 
A Problem With No Name:  Conceptualizing and Re-conceptualizing Classism 
 
“My worker told me that if he had his way „every person on welfare would have to 
account for every piece of toilet paper that they use.‟”  -- Dorothy (research respondent) 
 
“It required years of labour and billions of dollars to gain the secret of the atom.  It will 
take a still greater investment to gain the secrets of man‟s [sic] irrational nature.  It is 
easier, someone has said, to smash an atom than a prejudice.”  (Allport, 1954: xvii) 
 
     In his classic work on poverty, The Other America:  Poverty in the United States 
(1962) Michael Harrington demonstrated that “There are misconceptions [about the poor] 
that literally blind the eyes” (Harrington, 1993 [1962]: 14).  Harrington elaborates, 
Here is the most familiar version of the social blindness: 
„The poor are that way because they are afraid of work.  
And anyway, they all have big cars.  If they were like me or 
my Father and Grandfather, they could pay their own way.  
But they prefer to live on the dole and cheat the taxpayers.‟ 
(Harrington, 1993 [1962]: 14). 
 
Prejudice toward the poor has not changed much, if at all, since Harrington‟s time.  From 
within the Provincial legislature, Janet Ecker (1997) has argued, “The Ontario Works Act 
would strengthen our ability to prevent fraud and abuse to protect the welfare system for 
those who really need it” (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: LO1360).  The frequently cited 
message, here, was that the current system was being abused by people who didn‟t really 
need it.  Of the 52 582 investigations of welfare fraud carried out over the tenure of 
Harris‟s Premiership, a total of 430 criminal convictions were laid:  a 122 to 1 
investigation to criminal charge ratio (htpp://dawn.thot.net/Kimberly_rogers/wb-qa.html).  
     Typifications and stereotypes regarding social assistance recipients usually mean that, 
Whenever the issue of welfare comes up, there are always 
some who say that recipients need a push to get them off the 
system.  The push, in this context, usually means less 
money to live on so welfare won‟t be too comfortable, and 
some form of compulsory work-for-welfare or workfare 
(Interfaith Social Assistance Reform Coalition, 1998: 35). 
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This argument presupposes that the support provided by social assistance makes life 
comfortable for recipients and assumes that work is readily available if people would just 
take the time to get training.  One of the defining hallmarks of prejudicial thinking, as we 
will come to see, is that it patently ignores corrigible evidence that would invalidate its 
erroneous conclusions.  Regarding benefit levels, at their highest peak, in 1992, social 
assistance rates in Ontario reached  only 62% of the low income cut off poverty line (for a 
single employable).  In 2007, social assistance rates in Ontario (for the same category of 
recipient) totalled a meagre 33% of the median after-tax income in the province (National 
Council of Welfare, 2008).  Regarding the logic that training is the solution to 
impoverishment, this reasoning overlooks the economic reality that we are now living in 
the first generation where, for many, completing university-level training does not 
necessarily translate into secure, living-wage, employment (Livingstone, 1996). 
     Writing in an American context, in Women and the Politics of Class, Johanna Brenner 
observes that, “The myths, stereotypes, and just plain lies that circulate around welfare 
reform are outrageous; yet they seem to be impervious to reasoned argument” (Brenner, 
2000: 155).  The phenomenon of classism, as we will observe from analyzing Ontario 
welfare policy and qualitative interview data from twenty four social assistance 
respondents, clearly transcends the borders of America.  While there has not been much 
change since The Other America, hope for change is enhanced with a better 
understanding of what exactly prejudice is and an increasing awareness of how it 
operates. 
     This chapter opens with a review of foundational social psychological work on The 
Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954) supplemented by a critical analysis of the 
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contemporary merits of Allport‟s intellectual legacy as detailed in On the Nature of 
Prejudice:  Fifty Years After Allport (Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman, 2005).  Next, I review 
several existing definitions of classism (Power, 2006; Langhout, Roselli, and Feinstein 
2006; Homan, 2007) and detail the specific tenets of this form of prejudice (Homan, 
2007: 57-58).  I then will draw a conceptual distinction between overt and covert classism 
and critically examine the cultural phenomenon of institutionalization as posited by 
prominent welfare policy analysts Quaid (2002: 7) and Kingfisher (1996: 8).  Next, I 
present several empirical illustrations of overt and covert classism from welfare policy 
and select political commentaries dealing with welfare and homelessness including 
verbatim excerpts from political debate within the provincial legislature.  These examples 
set the stage for later examining the qualitative data provided by 24 people on social 
assistance and understanding the manner by which the common cultural meanings that 
play on the discursive field impact subjectivities.  In examining the origins of the words 
of welfare, and later how they are taken up by respondents, I suggest that the terms 
“welfare dependency” and “personal responsibility” have the power of what Allport 
(1954) called “nouns that cut slices.”   The chapter closes with a caveat on single issue 
advocacy, draws attention to the numerous prejudicial discursive constructions endemic 
to identity politics, and discusses the significance of understanding intersectionality 
(Brenner, 2002).        
“The Nature of Prejudice”:  Allport‟s Timeless Perspectives 
 
 Allport‟s (1954) work examining the social psychological dynamics and multiple 
manifestations of prejudice is widely considered to be a timeless classic (Dovidio, Glick, 
and Rudman, 2005).  For present purposes, the most germane aspect of Allport‟s seminal 
work are his definitions of prejudice, critical conceptualization of “a stereotype as an 
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exaggerated belief associated with a category” (Allport, 1954: 191) and analysis of 
linguistic factors fostering the normality of prejudgment.  These normative prejudgments 
– and this is crucial – are spawned by linguistic tags and ultimately translate into 
categorically grounded ingroup formation and outgroup rejection.  In theory and in 
practice (as we will come to see very clearly examining the “words of welfare‟) for 
prejudice to thrive, an enemy, replete with all their supposedly undesirable and immoral 
traits, must be clearly and categorically defined.  Allport‟s conceptualizations and 
analyses of the linguistic factors of prejudice are crucial ingredients to understanding my 
central argument about the “survival of classism” and will assist us in coming to see how 
“outside [sociocultural] influences shape the attitude of the individual” (Allport, 1954: 
221).   These invaluable aspects of a seminal intellectual legacy, then, warrant close 
examination.  
Prejudice Defined 
 
Allport (1954: 6-9) assessed the merits of several compelling definitions of 
prejudice.  Tracing the roots of this conceptualization, he shows, 
The word prejudice, derived from the Latin noun 
praejudicium, has, like most words undergone a change of 
meaning since classical times.  There are three stages in the 
transformation. 
 
1.) To the ancients, praejudicium meant a precedent – a 
judgment based on previous decisions and experiences. 
 
2.) Later, the term, in English, acquired the meaning of a 
judgment formed before due examination and consideration 
of the facts – a premature or hasty judgment. 
 
3.) Finally the term acquired also its present emotional flavour 
of favourableness or unfavourableness that accompanies 
such a prior and unsupported judgment. 
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Perhaps the briefest of all definitions of prejudice is:  
thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant.  This crisp 
phrasing contains the two essential ingredients of all 
definitions – reference to unfounded judgment and to a 
feeling tone.    
 
This conceptualization is then extended with the explicit rationale it is too brief for 
complete clarity; there is clearly more to understand about the nature of prejudice.  
Allport (1954: 6) goes on to argue that, 
People may be prejudiced in favour of others; they may 
think well of them without sufficient warrant.  The wording 
offered by the New English Dictionary recognizes positive 
as well as negative prejudice: 
 
 A feeling, favourable or unfavourable, toward a person or 
thing, prior to, or not based on, actual experience.   
 
The term “without sufficient warrant” is examined further and it is suggested that “a 
judgment is unwarranted whenever it lacks basis in fact” or when facts are imbalanced 
“scanty and strained” (Allport, 1954: 7).  Allport points out that prejudiced people often 
feel that their perspectives are not prejudicial but are sufficiently warranted.  The targets 
of antipathy purportedly have “a well deserved reputation” and this thinking is 
accompanied by the assertions expressed like, “Just look at them.  Don‟t you see that they 
are different in an objectionable way” (Allport, 1954: 87).    While stereotypes sometimes 
originate in a “kernel of truth” (Allport, 1954: 19), in many cases the incomplete facts 
that inform prejudicial thinking are “scanty and strained.”  People “resort to a selective 
sorting of [their] own few memories, mix them up with hearsay, and over generalize” 
(Allport, 1954: 7).  While it is sometimes difficult to make a concrete distinction between 
what constitutes sufficient (or insufficient) warrant for a generalization, a sure sign of 
prejudicial thinking is that it is not amenable to change even presented with corrigible 
evidence.             
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     Allport further suggests – and this, I propose, is at the very practical heart of his work -
- that when antipathies are grounded in essentialist categorical generalizations, prejudice 
is in action.  Another definition is posited which is perhaps the most relevant to this study, 
An aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs 
to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is 
therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities 
ascribed to the group (Allport, 1954: 7).  
 
Allport (1954: 8) goes on to suggest what I will later proceed to empirically evidence by 
examining the “words of welfare” (Schram, 1995):   that is, “Overcategorization is 
perhaps the commonest trick of the human mind.”  Further, it is suggested that “Given a 
thimbleful of facts we rush to make generalizations as large as a tub” (Allport, 1954:  8).     
Allport (1954: 178-187) later conceptualizes what it meant by a “stereotype” and details 
“the linguistic factors of prejudice” that latently predispose the human mind toward 
overcategorization.  It is to these aspects of The Nature of Prejudice that we now turn.  
Understanding “Stereotypes” and their Functions 
 
     Allport writes, “Whether favourable or unfavourable, a stereotype is an exaggerated 
belief associated with a category.  Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in 
relation to that category” (Allport, 1954: 191).  A stereotype could not exist without “a 
linguistic tag that designates our categories,” (Allport, 1954: 191) and this reality is 
pivotal to understanding how the meaning making linguistic factors of prejudice 
symbolically function.  Culturally sanctioned images are invariably spawned by linguistic 
tags – i.e. “welfare recipient,” “poor person,” “homeless,” or “taxpayer” -- that are 
insidiously replete with meanings creating what Walter Lippman simply called “pictures 
in our heads” (Allport, 1954: 191).  Yet, “a stereotype is not identical with a category; it 
is rather a fixed idea that accompanies the category” (Allport, 1954: 191).  Those fixed 
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ideas act in such a way as to preclude differentiated thinking about a given category (i.e. 
that many people on social assistance do have a work history, even while on social 
assistance, and do pay taxes every time they make a purchase) and equally significant, to 
leave entirely unquestioned the finite limits and often tenuous bases of categorization.   A 
stereotype shares some common features with a typification given that the latter can be 
defined as a conceptual process by which people organize their understanding of the 
world, not in terms of the unique qualities of persons, events, or things but in terms of  
what is presumed to be the typical features of these (Schutz, 1966).         
     Notably, The Tyranny of Words (Chase, 1938) predates Allport in suggesting that 
there is something in the structure of language (and categories) that checks 
communication, and thus perception.  In studying semantics – matters having to do with 
communication and meaning – Chase (1938: 20) arrived at the conclusion that “abstract 
terms are personified to become burning, fighting realities.”  Chase then suggests an 
abstract term entails a label with no actual referent.  Applied to the subject matter of this 
dissertation, the term “dependency” is an abstraction without a concrete referent but very 
few people are aware of this.  Demagogues thrive, Chase (1938) argues, on semantic 
illiteracy.  Abstractions, in the form of powerful buzzwords, come to be associated with 
categories of people, and “categories have a close and immediate tie with what we see, 
how we judge, and what we do” (Allport, 1954: 21).        
    There is also notable work on categorization post-dating Allport suggesting that “our 
lives are hedged round with systems of classification” (Bowker and Star, 1999: 1) and 
that “these standards and classifications, however imbricated in our lives, are ordinarily 
invisible” (Bowker and Star, 1999: 2).  It is suggested that, 
45 
 
Remarkably, for such a central part of our lives, we stand 
for most part in formal ignorance of the social and moral 
order created by these invisible, potent entities.  Their 
impact is indisputable, and as Foucault
10
 reminds us, 
inescapable (Bowker and Starr, 1999: 3).   
  
A cross cultural comparison can help to illuminate the power of categorization as it 
relates to the subject matter of this research.  Lessa (1999) begins her doctoral 
dissertation, “Restaging the Welfare Diva: Case Studies of Single Motherhood and Social 
Policy”, with the following observation, 
In Brazil there are no single mothers.  There we find many, 
maybe millions of women with their children and no fathers.  
We hear endless stories about how fathers faded away in 
search of work in the city, in another city, anywhere.  We 
also find widows, divorced and separated women and 
unwed mothers.  The variety of descriptions is very vast 
since nobody ever thought of grouping them together under 
any general denomination or category such as mothers of 
one sort or another.  What purpose would that accomplish?  
All have to fend for themselves, and if you need to ask for 
help from family, friends, or relatives what counts is the 
whole story, not a label.  There is no doubt that there is a 
stigma against the unwed mother, the only one of these 
denominations which can be said to refer to something close 
to a category and, as well, to be definitely associated with 
motherhood.  But nobody would ever imagine that all 
women raising children alone could be the same one thing 
(Lessa, 1999: 1). 
 
This powerful excerpt shows, by the revealing jolt of a cross cultural comparison, that 
categories are not as pre-given as they usually appear.  A careful reading of this passage 
also shows that the very nature of classification creates an illusory homogeneity whereby 
it seems that everyone falling within a given category is “the same one thing.”  In 
Allport‟s terms, this means that the individual is lost to sight.  This critically important 
insight leads us back to Allport‟s work on the nature of stereotypes.    
                                                 
10
 Foucault‟s theorizing will be examined extensively in the following chapter. 
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     A stereotype is not entirely tantamount to a prejudice, but rather functions to 
legitimate and rationalize prejudicial thinking.  In sum, Allport‟s work on stereotyping 
posited two central propositions:  1.)  categorization is a necessary pre-requisite that 
spawns stereotyping and prejudice; and 2.) the contents of stereotypes produce unfounded 
but widely shared cultural meanings.  Allport empirically details his case by examining 
“stereotypes concerning the Jew” and “stereotypes concerning the Negro.”  This 
monograph will later apply these foundational insights to concretely detail stereotypes 
concerning the welfare recipient that legitimate and rationalize classism.       
The Linguistic Factors of Prejudice 
 
     Within an examination of “the linguistic factors of prejudice” (Allport, 1954: 178-88) 
three profound conceptualizations are drawn:  1) “nouns that cut slices” (Allport, 1954: 
178) are considered to be 2) “labels of primary potency” that are tantamount to 3) 
“emotionally toned labels”.   These conceptualizations can assist in making manifest the 
latent cultural impact that uncritically accepted mainstream discourse has on subjectivity.   
     Allport (1954: 178) cites novelist William James in suggesting that without words the 
world would be an “empirical sand-heap.”  For a generalization to exist and be held in 
mind it must be fixed in words.  Allport (1954: 178) writes, “In the empirical world of 
human beings there are some two and a half billion grains of sand [In 1954 there were 2.5 
billion “grains of sand” -- there are now 6 billion] corresponding to our category „the 
human race.”  Allport explains that it would be impossible to deal with such vast and 
separate entities in our thoughts and thus we use language to group people and form 
clusters.  We welcome names that assist in this clustering process.  Nouns invariably 
facilitate this clustering process.  Allport (1954: 178) ingeniously proceeds to clearly 
make manifest a latent linguistic reality, 
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The most important property of a noun is that it brings 
many grains of sand into a single pail, disregarding the fact 
that the same grains might have fitted just as appropriately 
into another pail.  To state the matter technically, a noun 
abstracts from concrete reality some one feature and 
assembles different concrete realities only with respect to 
this one feature.  The very act of classifying forces us to 
overlook all other features, many of which might offer a 
sounder basis for the rubric we select. 
 
As we have already established, Allport was not the first, or last, analyst to question the 
tenuous nature of classification.  The Nature of Prejudice, however, remains invaluable 
for pointing out that some labels, in the form of nouns “are exceedingly salient 
and powerful” and “tend to prevent alternative classification or even cross-classification” 
(Allport, 1954: 179).  These powerful “nouns that cut slices” (Allport, 1954: 178) can 
legitimately be referred to as “labels of primary potency” precisely because “these 
symbols act like shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations that we might 
otherwise perceive.”  In other words, if a person becomes labelled with a label of primary 
potency – there is a dehumanizing tendency to see that person as nothing but the label.  
This manuscript will later assess the merits of Allport‟s theorizing by examining the slice 
cutting power of nouns in the form of persons (“welfare recipient,” “homeless,” 
“taxpayer”) and things (“personal responsibility” and “dependency”).  
“On the Nature of Prejudice:  Fifty Years After Allport” 
 
     Classic scholarly works, for good reason, have a tendency to be revisited for many 
years after their initial impact.  Allport‟s work is no exception.  On the fifty year 
anniversary of The Nature of Prejudice, some of the most renowned researchers who have 
analyzed the various facets of the dynamics and manifestations of prejudice revisited the 
groundbreaking concepts and assertions initially laid out by Allport and assembled an 
update on the contemporary merits of his work, On the Nature of Prejudice:  Fifty Years 
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After Allport (2005).  While there have been heightened understandings regarding some 
areas of prejudice that were initially missed by Allport, and minor revisionism in other 
areas, it is clear that his timeless “ideas have [positively] influenced scholars in the field 
as much over the past 25 years as they did in the book‟ first 25 years”  (Dovidio, Glick, 
and Rudman, 2005: xiii). 
     Contemporary scholarship has critiqued, and expanded, the particular aspects of 
Allport‟s foundational work that I will be adopting:  defining prejudice, understanding the 
nature and functions of stereotypes, and apprehending the linguistic factors fostering the 
normality of prejudgment.  In assessing the merits of Allport‟s work, and the revisionism 
and critiques that came after, we can begin to draw some grounded conclusions about the 
merits of his legacy – a legacy that will prove invaluable analyzing the qualitative data in 
this monograph. 
Prejudice Re-examined 
 
     Dovidio et al argue that “Allport‟s most fundamental blind spot concerns his definition 
of prejudice „as an antipathy based on a faulty or inflexible generalization‟” (Dovidio, 
Glick, and Rudman, 2005: 10).   Within the Fifty Years After Allport review (2005), 
Eagly and Diekman (p19-35), Jackman (p.89-105), and Rudman (106-120) -- concur that 
this „antipathy‟ based definition has neglected important aspects of prejudice and 
suggested that prejudice does not always entail antipathy but can also manifest itself in 
affectionate paternalism.  Rudman in particular suggests that Allport overlooked the 
ordinariness of gender prejudice and that only two pages of his classic work were devoted 
to analyzing sexism. 
     There are undoubtedly merits to this critique.  If Allport were alive today, one could 
reasonably posit that he would openly acknowledge the legitimate merits of better 
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understanding the paternalistic manifestations of prejudice.  Specifically, there is a strong 
patriarchal paternalism that ascribes little value to the importance of caring labour.  That 
said, it must also be noted that Allport guarded, very strongly, against attributing 
prejudice to a single taproot and openly acknowledged that prejudgment had various 
categorically bound foundations and translated into numerous manifestations – an astute 
observation I will take up to conclude this chapter.  Allport clearly and explicitly noted 
that, “The problem [of prejudice] as a whole is many sided, and the reader is asked, while 
examining one facet, to hold in mind the simultaneous existence of many other facets” 
(Allport, 1954: 17).  Although Allport‟s work still reigns as the most detailed and 
comprehensive examination of prejudice, it says something about the multifaceted nature 
of the phenomenon of prejudicial thinking that not all of aspects of prejudgment were 
examined in The Nature of Prejudice. 
       The critiques regarding Allport‟s definition of prejudice seem to sidestep the reality 
that Allport proposed and utilized several conceptualizations of prejudice.  Further, 
Allport made it clear:  i.) that prejudice can have both favourable and unfavourable 
dimensions, and ii.) the two defining traits of prejudice are unfounded categorical 
judgment and a feeling tone.   One cannot deny that Allport certainly did not discuss 
prejudice manifested as affectionate paternalism and this is an area which later scholars 
duly rectified.   For present purposes, however, it must not be overlooked that prejudice 
often can, and usually does, engender antipathy and that many of Allport‟s enduring 
contributions have endured for very good reason.  In the context of this investigation, 
when gender based prejudice is combined with classism in welfare policy and discourse, 
there is nothing affectionate about the outcome.  There is, however, a high level of 
paternalism with respect to what forms of labour are valued and deeply inscribed cultural 
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prejudices presupposing expectations about who is responsible for what work.  There can 
be no doubt that antipathy manifests itself in the form of prejudice under investigation in 
this monograph.    
Allport‟s Enduring Contributions to Understanding Stereotypes and Their Functions 
 
“The stereotype does not justify or legitimate welfare practices; rather, those practices 
justify the stereotypes” (Cruikshank, 1999: 106). 
 
      Jost and Hamilton (2005: 208-224) argue that Allport‟s impact on understanding 
prejudice has not only stood the test of time, but even more significantly, has increased 
over time, “especially with regard to the structure and function of stereotypes” (P.208).  A 
half century after Allport, we can assert with as much certainty as social analyses permits, 
that categorization is a necessary but not sufficient cause of 
prejudicial attitudes [and reaffirm that] the cultural context 
is crucial, for stereotypes operate in relation to societal and 
ideological systems (Jost and Hamilton, 2005: 208-224). 
 
There have been extensive developments furthering Allport‟s work on stereotypes.  These 
developments have analyzed the perceptions of people as members of social categories 
and perceptively noted, 
The central idea is that stereotypes are belief structures 
that influence the processing information about 
stereotyped groups and their members 
(Jost and Hamilton, 2005: 210).  
 
Jost and Hamilton suggest that the impact of stereotypes on social cognition, and thus 
subjectivity, is probably even more profound than even Allport himself knew.  It is 
suggested that the last two decades of research have shown that stereotypes, 
 a.) direct attention to certain aspects of the available 
      information. 
 
 b.) color the interpretation of that information. 
                        
 c.) influence the way information is retained in memory. 
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 d.) shape judgments and subsequent actions, and 
                              
e.) Serve as hypothesis that are tested and 
     disproportionately favoured in the interpretation 
     of new information. (Jost and Hamilton, 2005: 210)  
 
In short, in reviewing how contemporary scholarship views Allport‟s seminal work on 
stereotypes we can reasonably draw two conclusions, 
1.) Allport had an „uncanny ability to meaningfully link 
societal and cultural levels of analysis to a psychological 
investigation of the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of 
individuals and groups.  This is perhaps the most important 
achievement of The Nature of Prejudice, although it is 
underappreciated‟; 
 
Notwithstanding Allport‟s genius he, 
 
2.) did not recognize that system justification (in addition to 
ego justification and group justification) is an important 
motive for individuals . . . In retrospect, we can say that the 
justification function of stereotyping was incomplete 
[because] stereotypes are used – implicitly and explicitly – 
to justify much more that „love prejudice‟ and „hate 
prejudice‟.  They imbue existing forms of social 
arrangements with meaning and legitimacy; they preserve 
and bolster the status quo‟ (Jost and Hamilton, 2005: 220).   
 
Applying this profound insight, we can begin to understand how class and gender 
inequalities have become exacerbated by the legitimating stereotypes that resonate 
through the words of welfare.  The qualitative data analysis of this monograph will utilize 
the strengths of Allport‟s theorizing while subsequently accounting for the blind spots 
perceptively noted by later scholars.  Allport‟s work has a practical utility in 
understanding “the rituals of degradation” (Herd et al, 2005) that have become a part of 
welfare discourse, but there are undoubtedly more insights to be gained in understanding 
how stereotypes do, in fact, “imbue existing forms of social arrangements with meaning 
and legitimacy.”      
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The Enduring Linguistic Factors Fostering the Normality of Prejudgment 
     Mullen and Leader (2005: 192-207) suggest subsequent research has confirmed that 
ingroups and outgroups are defined by clear social categorizations and that these 
categorizations are invariably a pre-requisite for prejudicial thinking.  Allport‟s work has 
been re-affirmed and in particular has been pivotal in understanding “how the use of 
language both reflects and perpetuates bias” (Mullen and Leader, 2005: 198).  
Specifically, Allport‟s signature phrase “nouns that cut slices” has been shown to have an 
empirical grounding:  “Typing [a member of a social category] by nouns fixates the other 
person as a typical instance of a social category” (Graumann and Wintermantel, 1989: 
192).  Ontario welfare policy, as we shall see, types by nouns. 
     It has been shown that ethnophaulisms (the prefix “ethno” meaning “of the people” 
and the suffix “phaulism” meaning “to disparage”) “probably constitute the most direct 
and effective expression of prejudice in everyday discourse” (Greenberg, Kirkland, and 
Pyszczynski 1988: 75).  I will later come to demonstrate the ethnophalocentric 
components of welfare discourse, and show that ethnophaulisms “are not merely 
symptoms of prejudice but carriers of the disease as well” (Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 
1985: 70).  Understanding this, we are well on our way to understanding how the 
“survival of classism” is discursively transmitted.  Many of Allport‟s perspectives have 
received considerable support informing this understanding.   We now turn our attention 
toward examining a particular form of prejudice.          
Classism as a Form of Prejudice 
 
“Classism is the elephant in the room that everyone wants to pretend doesn‟t exist” 
(Homan, 2007: 55). 
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     Power (2006: viii) shows that “considerable research has examined prejudice and 
stereotyping with particular attention to racism and sexism.  Little of this research focuses 
on classism.”  Similarly, Langhout, Rosselli, and Feinstein (2006: 145) argue that 
“although gaining more attention recently, classism is an area that has historically lacked 
consideration in psychological literature.”  This sociological treatise will join a small but 
growing body of literature attempting to fill this notable void.  Prior to doing this, 
however, I would like to add an important qualification to Power‟s (2006) assertion that 
racism and sexism have received more scholarly attention than classism.  Recent 
scholarship on intersectionality reminds us of the finite limits of any single analytic 
category, and as Anne Bishop astutely observes, 
When I see people competing, claiming their own 
oppression as the “worst” or “most worthy of support,” I see 
us all running on a treadmill.  As long as we try to end our 
oppression by rising above others, we are reinforcing each 
other‟s oppression, and eventually our own (Bishop, 1994: 
10). 
 
That said prejudice towards the economically disenfranchised does require close 
examination.  Prior to examining and assessing the merits of the existing academic 
definitions of classism, it must be noted that this term (while being new to the academe) 
still does not exist in everyday mainstream parlance.  Classism is a problem with no name 
that has remained problematic, in part, precisely because it has not been named in 
mainstream discourse.  Just as Homan asserted in the epigraph above, Power‟s (2006: 5) 
doctoral dissertation from the University of Michigan reaffirms that society, 
makes endless class judgments without naming them as 
such.  Social class can be described as being „the elephant 
in the room‟ of American society.  That is, there are 
obvious disparities of income and opportunity yet people 
are careful not to discuss class explicitly. 
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Only very recently has classism begun to be defined in mainstream dictionaries.  This 
reality, I suggest, is quite remarkable given how long prejudice toward the poor has 
existed.  From the Elizabethan Poor Laws up to present day welfare policy, classism has a 
very long historical lineage that shows contemporary cultural remnants.  Prosperity, 
because it typically is presumed to have resulted from hard work and perseverance, has 
been associated with morality.  Poverty, usually seen as a reflection of a poor work ethic 
and an inability to defer gratification, is linked with personal shortcomings and 
immorality.  These cultural beliefs have a long historical lineage with contemporary 
cultural remnants.  In fact, in contemporary consumer society, one‟s social status is 
largely derived by what they consume and those unable to meet a desirable material 
standard of living pay a price in terms of their social status.   
     The reality that there is no linguistic tag in mainstream discourse to articulate negative 
prejudice toward the poor and prejudicial reverence toward the affluent has very real 
implications.  Although virtually all respondents in my research spoke of being harshly 
treated by others as a result of their poverty, no one used the term classism to articulate 
this phenomenon.  In almost a quarter century of regularly reading newspapers and 
watching broadcast news, I have never observed the term “classism” utilized in 
mainstream media.  Although anecdotal, I believe that this observation is quite 
significant.  I join Homan (1997: 210 – 211) in suggesting that it is time “to bring the 
injustice of classism out of America‟s collective closet and into the light of day because it 
cannot be ignored anymore.”  Step one is to define exactly what classism is. 
Classism Defined 
 
“Taxpayers have told us they won‟t tolerate fraud and they won‟t tolerate abuse of the 
system.  Our government won‟t either” --Frank Klees, 1997 (Ontario Hansard Issue, 
1997: LO1840.) 
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     Classism has been defined as "acting on stereotypes and negative attitudes in ways that 
separate, exclude, devalue, discount, and define [the economically disenfranchised] as 
'other'" (Langhout, Rosselli, and Feinstein, 2006: 148).  This definition is crucial for 
highlighting the “Othering” aspect of prejudice that manifests itself generally in a 
powerful, and often moralizing, “us / them” or “ingroup / outgroup” binary division.  In 
the context of our examination of the words of welfare, this distinction translates into a 
“taxpayer / welfare recipient” dichotomy that has both material and social status 
implications.  The “othering” aspect of prejudice, and the status evaluations it invokes, is 
crucial:  “classism would not be possible if Americans did not make social distinctions 
between class groups, valuing some over others” (Power, 2006: 5).  This realization by 
Power leads into her insightful conceptualization.          
     Power (2006: 5) suggests that classism is composed of three components:  1) 
stereotypical thinking that entails a set of beliefs about poverty and the poor that are 
widely shared and socially validated; 2) prejudice, or negative attitudes and emotions felt 
toward the poor, and 3) discrimination, distancing from, or vilifying the poor.  This 
definition is particularly useful for highlighting the “widely shared and socially validated” 
aspects of prejudice, and particularizing the general manifestations of prejudice in 
specific beliefs about poverty and the poor. 
     According to Homan (2007: 22) “Classism is defined as any form of prejudice or 
oppression against people based on their actual or perceived socio-economic class.”  
Assessing the merits of this definition warrants breaking it down to its component parts 
and critically examining the concepts it invokes:  prejudice, oppression, and 
socioeconomic class.  Allport made clear, and later scholarship confirmed, that prejudice 
56 
 
is fundamentally characterized by unfounded categorical judgments coupled with a 
feeling tone.   Mullaly (2002: 28) suggests that oppression is a multifaceted phenomenon, 
that clearly exists, 
when a person is blocked from opportunities to self-
development, is excluded from full participation in society, 
does not have certain rights that the dominant group takes 
for granted, or is assigned second class citizenship, not 
because of individual talent, merit, or failure, but because of 
his or her membership in a particular group or category of 
people. 
 
Socioeconomic class, expanding the monolithic aspects of orthodox Marxian theorizing 
with Weberian insights, can be seen as a composite ranking that invokes not only one‟s 
material standing via wealth and income, but also the social status derived from, among 
other things, the source of that material standing.      
     Homan‟s (2007) work is also invaluable for detailing the explicit tenets of classism 
that are implicit within welfare policy and discourse.     
The Tenets of Classism 
 
The basic tenets of classism hold that: 
1. If you are poor it is entirely your own fault. 
2. If you are poor, you must be deficient in some way. 
3. If you are poor, you are a potential thief. 
4. If you are poor, it‟s because you are stupid.  
5. If you are poor, it‟s because you are lazy. 
6. If you are poor, it‟s because you chose to be poor. 
7. If you are poor, it‟s because you didn‟t try hard enough. 
8. If you are poor, it‟s because you didn‟t plan better. 
9. If you are poor, it‟s because you had children you 
couldn‟t afford. 
10. If you are poor, it‟s because you are uneducated and 
unskilled. 
11. If you are poor, you lack good manners. 
12. If you are poor, you are threat to the rest of society. 
13. If you are poor and female, you are sexually 
promiscuous. 
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14. If you are poor, it‟s because you lack the discipline to 
control the urge for immediate gratification.  (Homan, 
2007: 57-58) 
 
This list is a composite of things that may be believed about people living in poverty.  
Although few people would (or logically could) subscribe to all fourteen tenets 
concurrently, when one considers the reasoning invoked, and the conclusions drawn, by 
dependency discourse it becomes clearer that social welfare policy has been influenced by 
a negativity of the kind displayed here.  Notably, when the respondents of this study were 
asked “why do you think that poor people are poor people poor?” their attributions 
(examined in chapter 6), almost invariably, named some form of personal deficiency as 
the primary causal component of impoverishment.  Given that the term “dependency” has 
become a keyword guiding welfare reforms, it is essential to understand the images 
invoked when this abstract “symbolic machinery”11 (Chase, 1938: 10) is invoked.        
Dependency Discourse 
“Dependency has become a keyword of U.S. politics.  Politicians of diverse views 
regularly criticize what they term „welfare dependency‟” (Fraser and Gordon, 1997: 121). 
 
     In The Poverty of Welfare Reform Handler concisely summarizes four key features of 
the assumptions inherent in the term “dependency” that serve to rationalize welfare 
reforms in several locales, 
 „Dependency,‟ as used in the context of welfare, is not 
simply being poor.  It is not simply being out of work.  
Rather, welfare dependency is a moral issue; it is a 
failure to have the proper work ethic. 
 
 Providing aid destroys the work ethic.  Welfare is not 
simply a matter of „economics‟ – that is, providing 
income support.  Rather, fundamental values are 
threatened. 
                                                 
11
 This term is borrowed from The Tyranny of Words (Chase, 1938) which predates the linguistic theorizing 
of Allport.   
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 The behaviour of the individual rather than the 
environment should be changed.  Self sufficiency 
through work is to be achieved by changing the mothers 
rather than the labour market.  People who want to work 
can work. 
 
 Reform efforts should be directed at adults.  In spite of 
the apparent fear that deviant values will be passed on, 
with relatively few exceptions (for example, requiring 
school attendance) welfare children are largely ignored 
(Handler, 1995: 4). 
 
In reference to the term “dependency”, Fraser and Gordon (1997: 122) argue that, 
 
Keywords typically carry unspoken assumptions and 
connotations that can powerfully influence the discourses 
they permeate – in part by constituting a body of doxa, or 
taken-for-granted common sense belief that escapes critical 
scrutiny.  
 
If one were to look for a concrete illustration of how terms utilized to describe the social 
world are active forces in shaping it, one would be well served to examine the usage of 
the term “dependency‟ in welfare discourse and how, 
use of this keyword serves to enshrine certain interpretations 
of social life as authoritative and to delegitimate or obscure 
others, generally to the advantage of dominant groups in 
society and to the disadvantage of subordinate ones” (Fraser 
and Gordon, 1997: 123). 
 
Haney and Rogers-Dillon (2002: 328) observe, “Given that so many welfare state 
scholars and researchers rely on the in/dependence dichotomy, it is surprising that few of 
them have reflected systematically of what it implies.”  In addition to the class based 
implications noted above by Handler (1995), the mutual interdependence required to 
make a traditional family wage system work, advantages men by minimizing the 
necessity and value of caring labour beyond the labour market (Swift, 1995; Hays, 2003).  
The term “dependency” has not become any kinder, or more gender sensitive as the 
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traditional family wage system broke down. As family forms changed, caring labour has 
remained the primary responsibility of women and continues to be patently subordinated 
(both materially and culturally) to labour that takes place within the market.  Further, our 
mutual interdependence is badly obscured by the term “dependency” and obscures the 
empirically verifiable reality that we are all dependent on others (Gordon, 1994).     
 
     In the course of political debate at Queen‟s Park, “dependency” was a term frequently 
invoked by the proponents of policy shifts.  In reference to the objective of ending 
“welfare dependency”, within the Provincial legislature MPP Tony Clement argued, 
What we're talking about here . . . is increasing 
responsibility by the individual recipient to ensure the 
outcomes are the ones that the recipient wants and that 
society wants (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: LO1900) 
The evaluation criteria for a positive outcome was the number of people leaving social 
assistance, which was considered tantamount to ending dependency.  Curiously, the 
number of people escaping poverty after exiting social assistance was not considered 
important enough to be included in policy discussions.  In purportedly combating the 
evils of „dependency‟, MPP Jack Carrol argued from within the Provincial legislature, 
The Ontario Works Act seeks to bring back the original 
intent of this system, which was to provide people with an 
income assistance program of last resort and to help people 
return to work. The system was not created as an incentive 
for people to stay on it and to become dependent upon it. In 
the long run, that has not done recipients any great favours. 
We all know that people are better off with a job than 
without a job. Ontario Works gives recognition to this 
obvious fact. Ontario Works, unlike our current system, will 
operate on the basis that people will be better off with a job 
(Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: LO1640). 
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One caregiving mother in this research, Gina (see chapter 5), was quite clear that she was 
not better off with a job because the cost of child care offset her minimal earnings (from 
the secondary labour force) so that she was no better off, and the end result was that her 
young children spent more time being raised by strangers and less time with their mother.  
This mother was not making an irresponsible decision in returning to social assistance, 
but was responsibly making the best of a bad situation.  While this particular monograph 
is concerned with a particular form of classism as it relates to people who are receiving 
social assistance (and understanding the connotations implicit in the term „dependency‟ is 
a prerequisite of this aim), it should be noted that, like most forms of oppression, classism 
is a multifaceted phenomenon that does not exist as a discrete or isolated problem:  there 
is a gendered subtext intersecting with the classism of welfare discourse.  
Conceptualizing Further:  Overt, Covert, and Institutional Classism 
     While the above definitions – owing to those authors who have take the time to define 
classism -- are all well thought out and usefully conceptualized, distinguishing between 
overt, covert, and institutional classism can, very practically, assist in recognizing the 
different facets of classism as a form of prejudice, and ultimately, facilitate understanding 
the various ways in which it operates and survives.   
     Overt classism, then, can be defined as a candid and direct moralizing antipathy 
toward the poor.  The natural corollary is a candid and direct moralizing reverence for the 
economically affluent.   In short, overt classism links and attributes poverty to character 
deficiency, immorality,  and / or a supposed inability to defer gratification.  Wealth is 
associated to strong character, morality, and asceticism.  Overt classism is virtually 
synonymous with what Baxter (1997: 39) calls “poor bashing.”  Overt classism, 
notwithstanding the reality that is has not been named throughout history, has a very long 
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historical lineage.  As Max Weber (1978) argued in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, people threw themselves into commercial activity and associated material 
prosperity with moral salvation and equated destitution with damnation in a manner that 
was thoroughly grounded in the religious doctrines of sixteenth century Calvinism 
(Morrison, 1995: 340).  Weber pointed out that the famous maxims of Benjamin Franklin 
– frugality, punctuality, hard word – were seen as not only practical but contained a 
„surplus of virtue‟ (Morrison, 1995: 247).  
     To be covert is to be concealed or not open.  Covert classism, I will suggest, is a more 
insidious form of prejudice that is grounded in an uncritical – and unfounded -- 
acceptance of beliefs about meritocracy and equality of opportunity.  Power (2006: 1) 
suggests that “belief in the „American Dream‟ persists despite evidence of negligible 
social mobility . . . the poor are blamed for their own [poverty].”  There may be 
anomalous periods (i.e. the depression of the 1930‟s) where poverty attributions become 
more sociological, but as anthropologist Katherine Newman comprehensively details in 
No Shame in My Game:  The Working Poor in the Inner City, 
We inhabit an unforgiving culture that is blind to many 
reasons why some people cross that employment barrier 
and others are left behind.  While we may remember, for a 
time, that unemployment rates are high, or that particular 
industries have downsized millions of workers right out of a 
job, or that racial barriers or negative attitudes toward 
teenagers make it harder to get a job at some times and for 
some people, in the end American culture wipes these 
background truths out in favour of a simpler dichotomy:  
the worthy and the unworthy, the working stiff and the lazy 
sloth (Newman, 1999: 87)  
 
Covert classism, then, can be defined as a cultural belief system that ultimately attributes 
people‟s vocational, economic, and social standing directly to their individual efforts and 
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abilities, while simultaneously ignoring the structural and econometric factors inevitably 
generating poverty and unemployment and the well established sociological patterns of 
social stratification.  While it is beyond debate that the labour market does not provide 
employment for everyone or enable everyone who labours within it to escape poverty, 
covert classism still thrives even among highly renowned scholars.  Consider the seminal 
neoconservative scholarship of Murray, 
The intellectual analysis of the nature of structural poverty 
had given a respectable rationale for accepting that it was 
not the fault of the poor that they were poor.  It was a very 
small step from that premise to the conclusion that it is not 
the fault of the poor that they fail to pull themselves up 
when we offer them a helping hand (Murray, 1994: 39).    
 
Murray is clearly inferring here that it is the fault of the poor that they are poor and 
presupposing that the “helping hand” offered is adequate.  It says something about the 
prevalence of classism that very few of the twenty four of the respondents in this research 
directly countered Murray‟s reasoning when they were asked, “Why do you think that 
poor people are poor?”  According to a labour force survey from Statistics Canada 
(March 2009), Canada has lost 295 000 jobs since October 2008.  Stereotypes clearly do 
direct our attention to certain aspects of available information and colour the 
interpretation of that information.  
     While covert classism is more prevalent than overt classism, both have recurring 
institutional bases.  In her comprehensive policy analysis of welfare reform in six 
jurisdictions, Quaid (2002: 7) writes that “the process by which actions [or beliefs] are 
repeated and given similar meanings is referred to as „institutionalization.‟”  Similarly, 
Kingfisher (1996: 8-9) suggests that, 
At a broader structural level, the languages of newspapers, 
radio talk shows, television sit-coms, and everyday chit chat 
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at the grocery store are the „institutionalization‟ of views of 
women and poverty, while at the same time being sites for 
the contestation of these views.   
 
Kingfisher (1996: 9) suggests that the qualitative data she examines in her work, is “more 
than just „talk‟”, but “rather, it is one of the means by which social structures and 
institutions are reproduced.”  Institutional classism, then, is about the repeated policy 
actions, words of welfare, and the resultant cultural beliefs about poverty and 
unemployment that are given similar meanings that function to reproduce stereotypes and 
prejudice toward the poor. 
 Policy and Political Illustrations of Classism 
 
     Two compelling examples of “nouns that cuts slices,” can be found in the frequently 
invoked welfare policy terms “personal responsibility” and (as we have already 
examined) “dependency”.  These nouns, in the form of things, are inextricably associated 
with imagery of „the welfare recipient‟ -- a noun in the form of a person who is tagged 
with a label of primary potency (or an emotionally toned label).  Given the prominent role 
that these intertwined conceptualizations have played in contemporary welfare discourse, 
and the pejorative meaning making charge that results when they are invoked, it is 
important to critically analyze the problematizations that are signified and framed (and, 
equally significant, the problems that remain linguistically untagged and thus languish in 
obscurity) within these words of welfare.   
     Writing about „welfare dependency‟ in an American context, Fraser and Gordon 
(1997: 122) perceptively note, “If we can step back from this discourse we can interrogate 
some of its underlying presuppositions.”  While Fraser and Gordon‟s (1997: 122) 
genealogy of the word “dependency” asks “What are the gender and racial subtexts of this 
discourse, and what tacit assumptions underlie it?”, there is an opportunity to build upon 
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this line of questioning to enquire about the class based subtexts of welfare discourse and 
the „tacit assumptions under[lying] it.”  I join Hays (2003: 10) in examining 
contemporary welfare policy to critically enquire, “What message does it send to the poor 
and the nation?”  I concur with Hays‟ (2003) assessments that caring labour is not 
adequately valued or remunerated and that single motherhood and changing family forms 
have been scapegoated for the impoverishment brought about by a low wage post 
industrial economy.  But as important as Hays‟ (2003) question is about the message 
being sent “to the poor and the nation”, her question, as it is posed and answered, 
presupposes that there is only one message being sent.  I suggest, that there is more than 
one message embedded in welfare policy.  One of those pivotal messages – about 
demanding responsible behaviour – clearly has moralizing overtones with a class based 
subtext informing the central argument of this manuscript.          
     As we saw in Chapter 1, the first section of the OWA states that the first purpose of 
the act is to recognize personal responsibility.  Similarly, the term is written directly into 
the title of American Legislation, “The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act.”  There is a latent, and essentially unquestioned, process of 
problematization in this discourse.  Replete within this explicit purpose acknowledging 
personal responsibility is the underlying assumption that if you are a social assistance 
recipient, it is some form of personal irresponsibility that accounts for this undesirable 
reality.  Former notions of collective responsibility languish on the proverbial sidelines of 
contemporary social policy and the discursive field of welfare reform.  Following 
Allport‟s metaphor or “nouns that cut slices”, the labelled welfare recipient is sliced off 
(or atomized) from the context of societal circumstances, and their impoverishment ipso 
facto attributable to some form of a personal shortcoming. 
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     The second purpose of the OWA states that the Act is to provide temporary financial 
assistance to those most in need while they satisfy obligations to become, and remain, 
employed.  Again, there are underlying stereotypical assumptions, grounded in the 
categorical noun “welfare recipient” and detailed throughout the Common Sense 
Revolution, that inform this policy directive:   i) that welfare policy has unduly served 
those not really in need for unnecessarily extended periods; ii) and that welfare recipients 
have unfairly forgone obligations to become and remain employed and instead have 
become dependent on the system.  The adequacy of financial assistance necessary to 
enable people to function at a level required to carry out a meaningful job search is 
excluded in contemporary policy discourse and “spirited away through a linguistic 
„sleight of hand‟” (Fraser and Gordon, 1997: 130).  According to the Social Planning 
Council of Toronto (1999: 7), „extreme poverty threatens health, and therefore, 
employability‟.   
     The third section of the Ontario Works Act states that the act should effectively serve 
people needing assistance.  Effectiveness in mainstream welfare discourse is tantamount 
to exiting social assistance.  If being on welfare is considered personally irresponsible, 
leaving welfare is the responsible thing to do.  Consider the words of welfare from 
Premier Harris on the night of his re-election in 1999, 
I am proud of the 380 000 people who have broken free of 
the „cycle of dependency‟ off of welfare.  And our goal, as I 
said, it‟s a „rising tide.‟  And I very much disagree with 
those who say „well if there is a winner somebody has to 
lose.‟ That‟s nonsense.  When we grow and prosper and get 
stronger – everybody wins (CTV election Broadcast12). 
 
                                                 
12
 Transcribed verbatim from VHS recording of CTV‟s election coverage of the 1999 provincial election in 
Ontario. 
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 Absent from this discourse is an understanding of the plight of what Statistics Canada 
(2003) calls “welfare leavers”.  There is a very critical distinction between exiting social 
assistance to escape poverty and exiting social assistance to remain impoverished or have 
one‟s material life conditions worsen.  Later in this chapter we will examine how Harris 
and others discussed the problem of increasing homelessness. 
     The fourth section of the OWA states that the Act must be fair to taxpayers.  This 
directive is significant as it concretely establishes a responsible taxpayer (ingroup) / 
irresponsible welfare recipient (outgroup) binary categorization replete with the moral 
meaning that hardworking taxpayers are unduly exploited by welfare policy and, 
ultimately, by welfare recipients who have become unduly dependent on the system.  
Welfare receipt is likened to an irresponsibly “chosen” lifestyle of drug, alcohol, or 
medical dependency.           
Illustrations of Overt Classism 
 
“People have ideas about how reality actually is, or was, and they have ideas about how 
it ought to be, or ought to have been.  The former we call „beliefs.‟”  The latter we call 
„valuations.‟ . . . In their „opinions‟ people express both their beliefs and their valuations.  
Usually people do not distinguish between what they think they know and what they like 
or dislike” (Mydral, 1944: 1027).  
 
     Perhaps Rush Limbaugh‟s political commentaries, which are usually overflowing with 
beliefs and valuations, can be considered the epitome of overt classism.  Consider the 
perspectives he posited in The Way Things Out to Be, 
The poor in this country are the biggest piglets at the 
mother pig and her nipples.  They‟re the ones who get all 
the benefits in this country.  They‟re the ones who are 
always pandered to.  (Limbaugh, 1993: 27)   
 
The “us / them” categorizing Limbaugh invoked could not have been clearer.  The 
corollary of this perspective holds that the non-poor / “the taxpayer” is the harshly treated 
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moral bystander having their needs ignored while “the [immoral] poor” are concurrently 
“always pandered to.”  Now if Limbaugh‟s perspectives were solely those of one isolated 
right wing editorialist, they would hardly be worth mentioning but the blatantly 
prejudicial and classist views Limbaugh regularly espouses have had, and continue to 
have, even more prominent proponents who have ultimately written these perspectives 
into social policy (and regressive tax policies) in a way that has institutionalized classism.   
     Consider how the term “dependency” has been utilized within congressional debates.  
Florida governor John Mica (cited in McCormack, 2002) held up a sign in congress 
reading, “DON‟T FEED THE ALLIGATORS” and explained, 
We post these warnings because unnatural feeding and 
artificial care create dependency.  When dependency sets 
in, these otherwise able alligators can no longer survive on 
their own.  (House of Representatives, March 24 1995 cited 
in McCormack, 2002:  62-63) 
 
Representative Barbara Cubin of Wyoming went further, 
The Federal Government introduced wolves into the State 
of Wyoming, and they put them in pens, and they brought 
elk and venison to them every day.  This is what I call the 
wolf welfare program.  The Federal Government provided 
everything that the wolves need for their existence.  But 
guess what?  They opened the gates and let the wolves out 
and now the wolves won‟t go.  Just like any animal in the 
species, any mammal, when you take away their freedom 
and their dignity and their ability, they can‟t provide for 
themselves  (McCormack, 2002: 63). 
 
The „elk and venison‟ imagery invoke the perception, by analogy, that social assistance 
benefits are unduly generous and enable a posh diet and catered to lifestyle, particularly 
when overly privileged recipients exploit the system to live in opulence – while the 
hardworking taxpayer suffers unduly.   
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     Harsh sentiments towards welfare policy, and welfare recipients, transcend the 
spectrum of formal politics and infiltrate the views of those whom society tends to hold in 
high esteem.  Fraser and Gordon (1997) have noted that Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas was openly critical of his sister, 
She gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare 
check.  That‟s how dependent she is.  What‟s worse is that 
now her kids feel entitled to the check too.  They have no 
motivation for do better or getting out of that situation. 
(Fraser and Gordon, 1997: 121)   
 
     Thomas is inferring a „culture of poverty‟ perspective, here, and suggesting that the 
single-parenting his sister is providing (which is not considered real work) is inadequate, 
ipso facto, because she is on welfare.  Thomas did not mention anything about the Father 
of his nieces or nephews.  Discourse draws our attention away from the inequalities 
embedded in different axes of domination.  Neoliberal forms of discourse – the 
significations and meanings that they carry -- were effectively prefigured by Ronald 
Reagan, to whose words of welfare we now turn. 
     While the practice and rationale of the welfare state once viewed redistributive 
government policy to ensure a minimum standard of living for everyone as a necessary 
social provision (Mishra, 1984), “Reagan‟s demonization of the poor sowed the seeds that 
killed any benevolence towards the poor and this eventually brought the Welfare Reform 
Act of 1996 to fruition” (Homan, 2007: 263).  Reagan was a master at playing the 
working poor off against those out of work.  Quoting Reagan, Homan (2007) cites a 
compelling illustration,   
It‟s not fair that some healthy strapping young buck piles up 
his shopping cart with steaks which he pays for with food 
stamps while the working man is wondering how he is 
going to be able to afford a couple of pounds of hamburger.  
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It‟s time we ended welfare as an entitlement (Homan, 2007: 
260). 
 
McCormack (2002) shows that Reagan was also instrumental in shaping public opinion  
 
by leading the charge against those allegedly „scamming the system‟, 
 
The Chicago welfare queen has eight names, thirty 
addresses, twelve social security cards and is collecting 
veterans‟ benefits on four non existing deceased husbands.  
Her tax free income alone is over $150 000 (cited in 
McCormack, 2002: 20) 
 
Although no person fitting Reagan‟s fictional description was ever located, the images he 
invoked were influential in portraying welfare fraud, and by extension people on social 
assistance, as a nationally scandalous problem.  The choice of Chicago for Reagan‟s 
fiction clearly had racial overtones.  That Reagan chose to vilify a welfare “queen”, here, 
was also gendered.     
     Further, in his 1986 State of the Union address, Reagan invoked concern over family 
values and strengthened an already strong association between poverty and immorality, 
in the welfare culture, the breakdown of the family, the 
most basic support system, has reached crisis proportions – 
in female and child poverty, child abandonment, horrible 
crimes and deteriorating schools (cited in McCormack, 
2002: 59). 
 
In sum, by fuelling images of opulence, fraud, and immorality “Reagan was particularly 
effective in shifting the terms of the debate around welfare” (McCormack, 2002: 59).  He 
cemented the new right rhetoric and instilled the belief that “Government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem” (Obama, 2006: 174).  The market 
and tax cuts were the solution.       
     Now if Reagan‟s views were merely the isolated sentiments of a deceased president 
who has been out of power for over twenty years, they would not warrant much attention 
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but the fundamentals of Reagan‟s perspectives spawned Clinton‟s popular call to “end 
welfare as we know it.”   Ronald Reagan‟s influence is alive and well in contemporary 
welfare discourse:  personal responsibility and dependency are still the dominant players 
controlling the discursive field.   
Contemporary Manifestations 
 
      Current American President Barack Obama (2006: 39-40) writes, “What I find 
remarkable is not that the political formula developed by Reagan worked at the time, but 
just how durable the narrative that he helped promote has proven to be.”  The current 
American President has perceptively noted, and expressed concern, “that our current 
political discourse unnecessarily divides us” (Obama, 2006: 13).  Obama certainly 
deserves credit for attempting to interrupt the discourse of present day “tax rage” in 
suggesting that “the Bush tax cuts for the wealthy [are] both fiscally irresponsible and 
morally troubling” (Obama, 2006: 58).   In some contexts, Obama appears to be highly 
cognizant of, 
How a particular narrative, repeated over and over again . . . 
eventually becomes a hard particle of reality; [and] how 
political caricatures and nuggets of conventional wisdom 
lodge themselves in our brain without us ever taking the 
time to examine them (Obama, 2006: 148).  
 
In the context of welfare policy, however, Obama is certainly not immune from repeating, 
and not taking the time to examine, a harsh public narrative that is far too familiar, “I 
think that much of what ails the inner city involves a breakdown in culture that will not be 
cured by money alone” (Obama, 2006: 15).  While Obama is writing in the context of 
providing hope, not just money, to the inner city, he seems to gloss over the reality that 
the former is a pretty significant prerequisite for the latter.  Lost in the public narrative is 
the reality that a minimum standard of living is a pre-requisite of hope and healthy 
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functioning.  Ironically enough, even the original author of the „culture of poverty‟ thesis 
recognized this, 
Above all, where hunger and discomfort rule, there is little 
spare energy for the gentler, warmer, less utilitarian 
emotions and little chance for active happiness (Lewis, 
1959: ix).  
 
This realization is so incredibly important.  It is so unequivocally true, and yet it remains 
so thoroughly ignored. 
     Obama goes on to assert what he believes is a primary solution to inner city poverty, 
We could begin by acknowledging perhaps the single 
biggest thing we could do to reduce such poverty is to 
encourage teenage girls to finish high school and avoid 
having children out of wedlock (Obama, 2006: 303)   
 
Given that this is the primary inner city poverty reduction strategy of the most left leaning 
President in more than two generations, then it is clearly time to unpack the longstanding, 
deeply ingrained, and insidious narratives of classism and the gender based subtexts
13
.  
First, let‟s review some Ontario manifestations of that narrative. 
Neoliberalism in Ontario 
 
     If the OW Act hinted toward an antipathy of welfare receipt, Harris himself was 
somewhat more candid when he suggested that most people who were out of work did not 
know how to find a job or they just did not want one.  Harris was quite clear about his 
rationale for cutting the $40 per month nutritional supplement for pregnant women on 
social assistance, “We don‟t want them spending it on beer” (Lessa, 1999: 1).  The 
“Common Sense Revolution” and its proponents would exploit the stereotypes vilifying 
                                                 
13
 Obama‟s poverty reduction strategy, here, curiously overlooks that teenage girls (except in extraordinarly 
rare circumstances of artificial imsemination) do not become pregnant on their own.  On different 
occaisions Obama has also spoken out against “deadbeat fathers”.  
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the economically disenfranchised – specifically, zoning in on the alleged concern that the 
“taxpayer” was being ripped off.  This rhetoric would transcend welfare policy.   
     Consider how Harris refused to budge when it was suggested that cuts to social 
housing should be reversed to ameliorate homelessness, “To say that government should 
build more housing and have more boondoggles and rip offs is not a solution” (Hurtig, 
1999: 46).  The October 1998 “Report of the Provincial Task Force on Homelessness”, 
chaired by former MPP Jack Carroll, further fuelled concern over fraud by pointing out it 
was not clear how to respond to, 
situations where people in the same month receive a 
welfare cheque, which includes a shelter allowance, and 
also stay in an emergency hostel.  Some estimates suggest 
this practice may involve as many as 60% of the emergency 
hostel client caseload.  If that is accurate, it means that 
substantial resources are being spent which could be better 
directed. 
 
So the provincial task force was not only concerned with welfare fraud, but now there 
was additional alarm over people scamming the homeless shelter system.  Taxpayers 
clearly did not deserve this irresponsible spending catering to the irresponsible homeless.   
Later, responding to the deaths of homeless people in Ontario, Harris replied “Isn‟t it sad 
that these people just seem to want to be homeless” (Layton, 2000: 15). 
     Harris was certainly not alone in his views, according to Al Palladini, Harris‟s 
Minister of Economic Development, Trade and Tourism:  
Street beggars are blemishing Toronto‟s image as a tourist 
attraction, and the time has come to make them move along.  
Some of these people are basically doing it because they 
want to do it.  Some of them should be moved out of there 
(Hurtig, 1999: 46). 
 
This was essentially at the heart of the rationale leading to the passage of the Safe Streets 
Act in Ontario – specifically targeted at „squeegee kids‟, another ethnophaulocentric noun 
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that cuts slices -- which made it a criminal offence to ask for assistance in public places.  
The logic and spirit of this legislation has a history that can be traced back to Elizabethan 
Poor Laws.  While the Toronto Sun ran its headlines claiming the enormous profitability 
of panhandling, NDP MPP Peter Kormos critiqued the safe streets act and the 
conservative stance on “squeegee kids” by pointing out how hypocritical the conservative 
position was.  Kormos suggested that it is the Tories who preach the message – over and 
over again – that when life deals you a hard blow, you don‟t come crying to government, 
but rather use whatever resources you have at your disposal, sell yourself, and become 
entrepreneurial.  That, Kormos claimed, is exactly what “squeegee kids” were doing and 
thus to criminalize them for it was tremendously hypocritical.  The Safe Streets Act 
passed nonetheless and remains in effect today.  Swanson (2001: 19) has argued that 
“poor bashing is more than name-calling; it can be laws that assume it is acceptable to 
treat poor people inhumanely” (Swanson, 2001: 19).  Allport (1954: 23) reminds us that 
“holding to a prejudgment when we know better is one of the strangest features of 
prejudice.” 
     Notwithstanding the reality that the NDP in Ontario opposed the Safe Streets Act, and 
both the NDP and Liberals, in several ways, had begun to enact more social democratic 
welfare policy after the SARC report of 1988, Jordan‟s claim that a rigid market based 
logic and anti-welfarism are not the sole province of conservative parties certainly has 
relevance for Ontario.  The views espoused by Thatcher and Regan were not only taken 
up by Blair and Clinton, but are “now percolating through to all other first world 
societies” (Jordan, 2008: 121).  Consider the sentiments of former NDP premier Bob Rae, 
The left‟s answer to welfare reform has been widely 
perceived as simply giving people who are not working 
more money to stay at home.  This approach created a 
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reaction from working families who then determined that 
their taxes were simply being used to subsidize idleness
14
.  
This happened in the US, the UK, and now Canada.  It has 
changed the welfare debate.  Social democracy needs to put 
work and education back at the centre of its commitment to 
income support (Rae, 1998: 99). 
 
During his tenure in office Rae convened the Advisory Group on New Social Assistance 
Legislation.  According to Scott, the advisory group produced two studies, “Back on 
Track” (1991) and “Time for Action” (1992):  “The first identified further changes to the 
existing system, similar to those implemented by the Liberals in 1989, as a prelude to the 
creation of new social assistance legislation outlined in the second” (Scott, 1996: 23). 
 While “Back on Track” and “Time for Action” recommended building upon the 
first SARC operating principle of meeting needs, in 1993 the NDP published its own 
plans for reform in a report appropriately entitled “Turning Point.”  This was in fact a 
“turning point” of the transition from welfare to workfare in Ontario precisely because it 
asserted, 
that the first goal of social assistance should be to „assist 
people in moving as quickly as possible back to work.‟  The 
system should be designed, then, to promote independence 
by encouraging job preparation, and to provide fair 
treatment to all low income families, including the working 
poor (Scott, 1996: 23). 
   
The differences between the NDP, Liberal, and Conservative stance, in some cases were 
hard to locate.  Consider the views of Sandra Pupatello, a Liberal MPP, when she was 
Minister of Community and Social Services, 
Our government is committed to helping people leave 
welfare for work, and leave welfare for good . . . We know 
that Ontario Works employment services do work well for 
some people on social assistance . . . And in the end, the 
more people we get off social assistance, and into real, 
                                                 
14
 The term “subsidizing idleness” was originally used by Newt Gingrich in the United States. 
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lasting jobs, the better it is for all of us (Pupatello, 2005: 
A8). 
   
Liberal MPP‟s, like Bruce Crozier of Essex South, would sometimes invoke the “words 
of welfare” from within the provincial legislature, and add a minor variation, 
When the word „fraud‟ is mentioned, I would like to say that 
there isn‟t anybody in this legislature, anybody in the 
province, save a few, who doesn‟t want to eliminate all 
forms of fraud, whether it be in the welfare system, whether 
it be in the workplace, whether it be in our financial district.  
                        (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: LO2000)  
 
Of course the term “fraud”, by definition, denotes something bad.  No fair or rationale 
person supports fraudulence.  But what is term fraud, in many instances, could (given the 
benefit levels we examined in chapter 1) be more accurately labelled “survival”.  
Notwithstanding the reality that the excerpt above points out that “fraudulence” exists in 
different walks of life, the argument is more similar than different from what was argued 
by the proponents of the common sense revolution.        
Illustrations of Covert Classism 
 
“If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are 
possible . . . Tonight is your answer” (Barrack Obama, election night victory speech, 
Nov.4, 2008). 
 
     Covert classism certainly has a less draconian feel than the vitriol of a Reagan, 
Limbaugh, or Harris and it operates more insidiously than overt classism.   Yet one 
should not underestimate the inhumane policy decisions and cultural beliefs that results 
from covert classism.  In his groundbreaking expose The Other America:  Poverty in the 
United States, Harrington (1993 [1962]: 27) writes, “The mind and the feelings, of even 
good willed individuals, are so suffused with unconscious racism that [the] misery [in 
urban ghettoes] is overlooked.”  Extending Harrington‟s insights, the same can surely be 
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said for covert classism.  But of course this could not be said in Harrington‟s time as there 
was no word to articulate prejudice toward the poor. 
     Consider how policy makers with less overtly harsh sentiments than Reagan have 
invoked the notion of dependency in the context of welfare, 
The issue of welfare is the issue of dependency.  It is 
different from poverty.  To be poor is an objective 
condition; to be dependent, a subjective one as well . . .  
Being poor is often associated with considerable personal 
qualities; being dependent rarely so.  Dependency is an 
incomplete state in life:  normal in the child, abnormal in 
the adult.  In a world where completed men and women 
stand on their own feet, persons who are dependent – as the 
buried imagery of the word denotes – hang.  (Moynihan, 
1973: 17) 
 
Although not appearing to have the intense vitriol of overt classism, covert classism still 
translates into a very harmful prejudice that functions to legitimize enormous material 
inequalities that would otherwise be considered illegitimate.  Margaret Thatcher‟s often 
cited quip is perhaps the very acme of covert classism,   
I think we have been through a period of time where too 
many people have been given to understand that if they 
have a problem, it‟s the government‟s job to cope with it.  „I 
have a problem, I‟ll get a grant.‟  „I‟m homeless, the 
government must house me.‟  They‟re casting their 
problems on society.  And, you know, there is no such thing 
as society.  There are individual men and women and their 
families.  And no government can do anything except 
through people, and people must look to themselves first.  It 
is our duty to look after ourselves, and then to look after our 
neighbour. (Dean, 1999: 151) 
 
Thatcher would frequently repeat comparable messages decrying state intervention to 
ameliorate inequality,   
governments and experts cannot fix these problems for us. 
It is only when each of us recognizes our individual 
personal and social responsibility to be part of the solution 
that we also realize higher self esteem  
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(Cruikshank, 1999: 8). 
 
The neoliberal logic, here, suggests that inequality (in whatever form it appears) should 
not be ameliorated by the state because, among other things, it has resulted from the fair 
and open outcome of market competition.  Notably, one of the first acts of the Harris 
government in Ontario was to rescind employment equity (Bezanson, 2006: 61).   The 
belief that “there is no such thing as society” patently draws attention away from 
structural inequality in various forms and thus does not even begin to consider the inter-
related connections between various axes of domination.  
Intersectionality 
 
“The conceptual isolation of class (or any other aspect of social identity, for that matter) 
is a contrivance that, although helpful for the purposes of discussion, does not accurately 
represent the complex interactions among class, race, ethnicity, gender, and / or sexual 
orientation that characterize lived experience” (Smith, 2005: 687). 
 
     Brenner (2002: 293) writes, “in feminist theory „intersectionality‟ has emerged as an 
analytic strategy to address the interrelation of multiple, cross cutting institutionalized 
power relations defined by race, class, gender, and sexuality (and other axes of 
domination).”  Intersectionality denotes the notion that inequality has multiple, and 
interrelated, manifestations and that oppression takes many forms.  McCall (2005: 1721) 
suggests that intersectionality can be seen as, “the relationships among multiple 
dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations.”  The “complexity 
of intersectionality” began to be acknowledged when “critics first alleged that feminism 
claimed to speak universally for all women” and this made many feminist researchers 
“acutely aware of the limitations of gender as a single analytic category” (McCall, 2005: 
1721).  In “Psychotherapy, Classism, and the Poor”, Smith (2005: 689) explains, 
By the early 1980‟s, feminist thinkers and social critics such 
as Davis (1983), hooks (1981, 1984), and Lorde (1984) 
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were effectively challenging mainstream feminism on its 
claim that it represented the experiences of all women – 
rather, they argued, it was concerned primarily with the 
experiences of middle class, White, heterosexual women.   
 
     More recently Bernice Lott and Heather Bullock (2007: 9) have adopted a comparable 
stance in claiming that “middle class feminists15 need to do the difficult work of stopping 
to consider what they do not know about the lives of their less affluent sisters.”   Some 
would argue that this claim can, and should, be taken an anti-oppressive step further to 
interrogate the public silences regarding the undesirable commonalities in lives of all less 
affluent people, while not losing sight that impoverishment is experienced in different 
ways by different people and intersects with other forms of advantage and disadvantage.         
     For present purposes, the point of drawing upon the intersectionality literature is to 
point that prejudice does not discriminate against only one target. Numerous categorically 
bound forms of advantage and disadvantage overlap and interact with one another.  
Notably, this observation has a quantitative predecessor in a classic Canadian work on 
inequality.  Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of John Porter‟s legacy from The Vertical 
Mosaic is relevant here, “If we attempt to treat ethnicity as a single independent variable 
we are immediately confounded by many related variables that are impossible to hold 
constant (Porter 1965: 74).”  While this manuscript focuses on a particular form of 
prejudice called classism, “The problem [of prejudice] as a whole is many sided, and the 
reader is asked, while examining one facet, to hold in mind the simultaneous existence of 
many other facets” (Allport, 1954: 17).  With this caveat in mind, Allport‟s classic work 
                                                 
15
 Given the seemingly pejorative usage of the term “middle class feminists”, here, it should be pointed out 
that I would be replicating a prejudicial error I am arguing very strongly against to not posit a critique of 
Lott and Bullock:  it is fallacious to presume a homogeneity within this (or any other) categorical label.  
Given that the notion of intersectionality is coming out of feminist scholarship, there are several “middle 
class feminists” – many of whom are cited in this manuscript -- who have taken the time to carefully 
consider class oppression.          
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will nonetheless remain at the forefront of the analysis for much of this manuscript 
because his insights on ingroup formation and outgroup rejection remain far too relevant 
to the subject matter of welfare reform.  While scholarly analysis from various schools of 
thought have enhanced understanding about the tenuous nature of classification, the 
general populace – and the respondents in this research – appear to have been deeply 
impacted by the presumed essentialism inherent in the terms “taxpayer” and “welfare 
recipient” and thus Allport‟s work remains too relevant to ignore.   But to supplement 
Allport‟s classic work, more contemporary understandings will show that prejudice and 
oppression are truly multi-faceted phenomena.      
     Robin Kelley opens Yo‟ mama‟s disfunktional:  fighting the culture wars in America 
(1997) with a compelling illustration of gender, race, class and age oppression 
intersecting to culminate in a very draconian prejudice.  Kelly writes about growing up in 
an urban American ghetto and recounts playing a game called „the dozens.‟  In Kelley‟s 
neighbourhood the „dozens‟ consisted of light-hearted and humorous insults about a given 
person‟s mother.  While carried out as a form of entertainment, the dozens was also 
designed to toughen inner city kids up for the harsh realities of ghetto life.  Kelley (1997: 
2) articulates an extreme disenchantment with the harsh reality that the “culture of 
poverty” cult gained the prominence that it did in the academy, formal politics, and 
society at large.  Kelley explains his reasoning, 
You would think that as a kid growing up in this world I 
could handle any insult, or at least be prepared for any 
slander tossed in the direction of my Mom – or for that 
matter, my whole family, my friends, or my friends‟ 
families.  But when I entered college and began reading the 
newspaper, monographs, and textbooks on a regular basis, I 
realized that many academics, journalists, policy makers, 
and politicians had taken the „dozens‟ to another level.  In 
all my years of playing the dozens, I have rarely heard 
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vitriol as vicious as the words spouted by Riverside 
(California) county welfare director Lawrence Townsend:  
„Every time I see a bag lady of the street, I wonder, „Was 
that an A.F.D.C. [welfare] mother who hit the menopause 
wall – who can no longer reproduce and get money to 
support herself?‟  I have had kids tell me that my hair was 
so nappy it looked like a thousand Africans giving the 
Black Power salute, but never has anyone said to my face 
that my whole family – especially my mama – was a tangle 
of pathology” (Kelley, 1997: 2). 
 
Clearly the prejudicial views that Townsend espoused had more than one manifestation:  
class, race, gender, and age were intertwined to create a powerful antipathy along more 
than just one axes of domination.     
     In “White Privilege and Male Privilege:  A Personal Account of Coming to See 
Correspondences Through Work in Women‟s Studies” (1988), McIntosh expresses 
concern that although she had noticed throughout her academic career that some men may 
acknowledge that women are disadvantaged in the curriculum, acknowledgements of 
male over-privilege were nonexistent.  McIntosh (1988:70) suggests that “these denials 
protect male privilege from being fully recognized, acknowledged, lessened, or ended”.  
A parallel is then drawn to the phenomenon of “white privilege that was similarly denied 
and protected” (McIntosh, 1988: 70).  McIntosh argues that her contention that whites are 
carefully taught not to recognize their privilege, just as males are taught not to rectify 
their advantages.  White privilege is defined, 
as an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count 
on cashing in each day, but about which I was meant to 
remain oblivious.  White privilege is like an invisible 
weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, 
tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, 
emergency gear, and blank checks (McIntosh, 1988: 71).   
 
McIntosh then illustrates what she means by white privilege in detailing “forty six 
ordinary and daily ways in which I experience having white privilege by contrast with my 
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African American colleagues in the same building” (McIntosh, 1988: 71).  The list is 
explicitly termed an “invisible knapsack of privilege”, reflecting the reality that most 
people are oblivious to its existence.  The forty six items on the list, McIntosh states, 
detail “those conditions that I think in my case attach somewhat more to skin color 
privilege than to class, religion, ethnic status, or geographical location, though these other 
privileging factors are intricately intertwined”  (McIntosh, 1988: 73). 
     In assessing the merits of McIntosh‟s invisible knapsack, one has to be impressed with 
anyone willing to take stock of his or her privileges – in whatever form they appear -- and 
explicitly detail that privilege for the commendable purpose of ameliorating the plight of 
those who are on the undesirable end of a given oppression.  As Harrington pointed out 
more than a generation ago, there are misconceptions about poverty and the poor that 
function to blind people.  “Privileged irresponsibility” (Tronto, 1993) grants people who 
enjoy privilege the right to ignore hardships they do not face.   
     Below I have charted seventeen aspects of white privilege taken directly from 
McIntosh‟s (1988: 73-75) list.  Beneath each item I will point out how class privilege 
remained incognito.       
Class Privilege Incognito 
 
•  “If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an 
area which I can afford and in which I would want to live.”  
 
Depending on the depth of one‟s poverty, renting anywhere at all can be exceptionally 
challenging and purchasing a home is not an option. 
 
• “I can be reasonably sure that my neighbours in such a location will be neutral or 
pleasant to me” 
 
Material deprivation has a proclivity to turn neutrality or pleasantness into harsher 
sentiments. 
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•  “I can go shopping alone most of the time, fairly well assured that I will not be 
followed or harassed by store detectives.” 
 
Extreme poverty can take away one‟s capacity to go shopping and if one has the 
appearance of having been extremely deprived, they are not likely to be exempted from 
the prejudice of law enforcement (Hester and Eglin, 1992). 
 
•  “I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people of my 
race widely and positively represented.” 
 
Depending on the depth of one‟s poverty, televisions and newspapers may not be part of 
one‟s lifestyle.  If they are, the media does not portray the poor in a positive light. 
 
•  “When I am told about our national heritage or civilization I am shown that people of 
my color made it what it is.” 
 
The myth of meritocracy is rampant in history books. 
•  “I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials that testify to the 
existence of their race.” 
 
When Canada‟s poorest children are more than three times as likely to be in remedial 
education that the richest children (Statistics Canada, 1997), the curriculum is clearly 
failing the poorest children of all races. 
 
•  “I can go into a book shop and count on finding the writing of my race represented, 
into a supermarket and find the staple foods that with my cultural traditions, into a 
hairdressers shop and find someone who can deal with my hair.” 
 
Published work from people who have lived in poverty is also rare, finding foods that fit 
within one‟s budget can present other challenges, and not being able to afford a haircut is 
also a humbling experience. 
 
•  “Whether I use checks, credit cards, or cash, I can count on my skin color not to work 
against the appearance that I am financially reliable.” 
 
Extreme poverty can certainly undercut one‟s capacity to present as financially reliable 
because, among other things, it undercuts one‟s capacity to be financially reliable. 
 
•  “I could arrange to protect our young children most of the time from people who might 
not like them.” 
 
Parents living in poverty may be deprived of this luxury by virtue of their poverty. 
•  “I did not have to educate our children to be aware of systemic racism for their own 
daily physical protection.” 
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Parental education about classism is often impaired by an incapacity to name this form of 
prejudice. 
 
•  “I can be pretty sure that my children‟s teachers and employers will tolerate them if 
they fit school and workplace norms;  my chief worries about them do not concern  
others‟ attitudes towards their race.” 
 
Canada‟s richest children are more than twice as likely as Canada‟s poorest to be in 
enriched education (Statistics Canada, 1997).  The odds of a person being in white collar 
work are strongest if both his father and grandfather were also in white collar work than 
for any other combination of background statuses (Goyder and Curtis, 1977). 
 
•  “I can talk with my mouth full and not have people put this down to my color.” 
Bad mannerisms may also be attributed to one‟s class. 
•  “I can swear, or dress in second hand clothes, or not answer letters, without having 
people attribute these choices to the bad morals, the poverty, or the illiteracy of my race.” 
 
Bad manners can be attributed to moral deficiencies associated with class. 
•  “I can remain oblivious to the language and customs of persons of color who constitute 
the world‟s majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion.” 
 
The language and customs of persons of material privilege are written into social policy 
and culturally sanctioned and desirable. 
 
• “I can criticize our government and talk about how much I fear its policies and 
behaviour without being seen as a cultural outsider.” 
 
The term “socialist” is frequently invoked as an ethnophaulism to describe, and “other”, 
people who espouse for greater material equality. 
 
•  “I can be reasonably sure that if I talk to „the person in charge,‟ I will be facing a 
person of my race. 
 
When one lives in poverty, they can be reasonably certain that they will be facing a 
person of a different class if they ever get to talk to “the person in charge.” 
 
•  “I can go home from most meetings of organizations I belong to feeling somewhat tied 
in, rather than isolated, out of place, outnumbered, unheard, held at a distance, or 
feared.” 
 
If one lives in poverty, they are more likely to be isolated and not be able to attend 
meetings.  If they do attend (depending on the nature of the meeting) there is a very real 
possibility that they will not be heard. 
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•  “My culture gives me little fear about ignoring the perspectives and powers of people 
of other races.” 
 
The perspectives of those living in poverty are frequently ignored with impunity. 
• “I am not made acutely aware that my shape, bearing, or body odour will be taken as a 
reflection on my race.” 
 
These traits may also be chalked up to class. 
•  “I can worry about racism without being seen as self interested or self seeking.” 
A person living in poverty speaking out against its injustice faces a comparable 
conundrum. 
 
•  “I can take a job with an affirmative action employer without having my co-workers on 
the job suspect that I got it because of my race.” 
 
Class based inequality is generally not even recognized in affirmative action programs.   
•  “I can think over many options, social, political, imaginative, or professional without 
asking whether a person of my race would be accepted or allowed to do what I do” 
 
Living in poverty in a consumer culture limits the options one can realistically think 
about, and concurrently means that one will have to think about acceptance with the 
limited options they do have. 
 
•  “I can be late for a meeting without having the lateness reflect on my race” 
One is more likely to be late for a meeting without the benefit of owning a reliable 
vehicle, and lateness may be interpreted as a reflection of one‟s class. 
•  “I can choose public accommodation without fearing that people of my race cannot get 
in or will be mistreated in the places I have chosen.” 
 
Extreme poverty may mean that one cannot afford accommodation and even if they can, 
landlords have more freedom to mistreat those without resources. 
 
•  “I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against me.” 
The quality of legal and medical help one has access to is also, very much, a reflection of 
one‟s material standing.  Incidentally, if one is poor one is much more likely to require 
medical supports. 
 
•  “I can easily find academic courses and institutions that give attention only to people 
of my race.” 
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Those same courses and institutions are very likely to exclude the perspectives of people 
living in poverty. 
 
•  “I can expect figurative language and imagery in all of the arts to testify to the 
experiences of my race.” 
 
That same language and imagery concurrently testifies to the middle and upper class 
experiences.   
 
     We know that categories in general, and stereotypes in particular, emphasize certain 
traits while ignoring other realities.  The purpose of supplementing McIntosh‟s inventory 
of invisible privilege was not to detract from her insightful way of tagging unearned 
privilege that is too frequently ignored.  The purpose was to join her project and add 
another class dimension to understanding invisible privilege.  Privileges, in whatever 
form they appear, are too often invisible to those who possess them.  The pejorative views 
on impoverishment posited by some prominent politicians whom we examined earlier in 
this chapter are illustrations of “privileged irresponsibility” in action.  As we will see in 
chapter 6, one effect of welfare discourse is to facilitate “privileged irresponsibility” by 
ignoring various facets of underprivilege that are made invisible by readily accepted 
slogans and buzzwords.  Incredibly, even underprivileged people are not immune to 
invoking a discourse of privileged responsibility because the cultural images of welfare 
discourse screen out the harsh realities of impoverishment.          
Conclusion 
 
     It is next to impossible to combat a prejudice like classism when much of society 
remains oblivious to its existence.  Allport‟s classic work can assist in understanding what 
prejudice is and how it operates.  In particular, understanding the linguistic factors of 
prejudice is vital in recognizing how meanings, and thus perceptions, are created by the 
new right words of welfare.  After Allport, poststructural theory later took up the project 
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of understanding the latent power of discourse in constituting the world as we know it.  
Specifically, “Foucault suggests that, by naming something, by constituting it in 
discourse, the possibilities for resistance are created” (McCormack, 2002: 42).  It is to the 
work of Foucault we now turn.    
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Chapter 3 
The Discursive Field:  From Foucault’s Theorizing to Schram’s Application 
 
“Subjectivity cannot be properly understood outside the conditions of 
 its own production” (Cruikshank, 1999: 56). 
 
Introduction 
 
     This chapter will assess the merits of Michel Foucault‟s poststructural theorizing, 
review the postmodern welfare policy applications of Schram, and suggest that the 
strengths of a discourse analysis should supplement, not ignore, the insights from a class 
analysis.  Power, I contend, operates discursively and ideologically and this operation is 
not separate or autonomous:  the meanings and identities constituted by welfare discourse 
are patently ideological in the sense that they serve to justify and legitimize the class 
domination of one group over another.  There is also a gender component to inequalities 
exacerbated by welfare state restructuring (Bezanson, 2006).  While the qualitative data in 
this research from twenty four semi-structured interviews is more amenable to a discourse 
analysis to illuminate how power operates, I will join Pimpare (2004) and Swanson 
(2001) in suggesting that there is a “who” behind the “how?”  
     “Power,” Michel Foucault (2003: 72) argues “creates illusions.”  Illusory thinking 
often manifests itself in sweeping categorical and unifying generalizations, perhaps the 
most common being “those people are all the same”.  Despite the empirically verifiable 
realization that “as soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self evidence” (Foucault, 
2006 [1969]: 26) the unifying categories of welfare discourse predominate and remain 
unquestioned.  This, Schram argues throughout his extensive scholarship, is a cultural 
phenomenon with very real power effects.  Rational analysis (i.e. everyone deserves a 
minimum standard of living that enables them to function) is often subjugated to 
irrationality (i.e. making poor people poorer will force them to work and thus reduces 
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poverty) in welfare policy and the resultant cultural meaning making, in part because 
Foucault‟s (2006 [1969: 24) call to “question those divisions or groupings with which we 
have become so familiar” has never really been answered.   In fact, under neoliberalism 
the taxpayer / welfare recipient binary division is as entrenched as it ever has been.  
Groups like the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and the National Council of Welfare 
advocate at opposite ends of this division, but neither group has ever put much thought, at 
least in their published works, into the cultural construction of the dichotomy.  This 
division appears natural and thus escapes critical scrutiny. 
     In The Poverty of Welfare Reform, Handler (1995: 8) asks, 
What is going on?  Why does society cling to the basic 
assumptions that underlie welfare policy when it is so clear 
that they do not comport with reality?  Why do we 
perpetuate the same misguided policies that not only do 
nothing positive for the welfare poor but continue to punish 
and stigmatize them?  What is this incessant need to blame 
the victim?  Why do we continue this exercise in symbolic 
politics? 
 
While these critically informed questions initially struck at the heart of my personal 
rationale for undertaking and completing this dissertation, throughout my research my 
analytical side became more informed by a theoretical orientation that is more concerned 
with episteme by concretely detailing “the workings, the effects, and the how of power” 
(Foucault, 2003: 275).  When I began examining the qualitative data from semi- 
structured interviews with twenty four respondents subsisting on social assistance, I 
began to notice how discourse divides and „others‟ people.  There were some common 
themes that resonated throughout these unconscious divisions that, if noticed, could 
provide some compelling answers to the question of why “we perpetuate the same 
misguided policies that not only do nothing for the poor but continue to punish and 
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stigmatize them?”  But the question of “why?”, post structural Foucaultian theory 
suggests, is inseparable from the question of “how?”   
    In her PhD dissertation,“TANF Reauthorization:  Divergent Discursive Practices and 
Welfare Policy Discourse”, Copeland (2005: 11) writes about how the association 
between morality and wealth unconsciously makes its way into subjectivities, 
discursive fields are marked by boundaries that define what 
can [and cannot] be understood.  These boundaries are 
marked by powerful normative assumptions about the 
relationship between morality and wealth. 
 
Discourse, like stereotypes, direct our attention to certain features of social life and divert 
our attention from others.  To understand how the association between wealth and 
morality is discursively constituted, disseminated, and reproduced – in other words, to 
understand the survival of classism – this chapter will review the social theory of 
Foucault (1980, 1988, 1990, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and the contemporary 
applications of Schram (1995, 2000, 2006).    
     First, I will briefly review some key observations on social theory provided by Sears‟s 
(2005) insightful treatise A Good Book in Theory:  A Guide to Theoretical Thinking.  
Next, I will review the intellectual legacy of Foucault by breaking his theorizing down 
into its conceptual component parts and detailing what Foucault meant by 
governmentality, regimes of practice, discourse, truth, subjugated knowledges, and power 
/ knowledge.  After defining each of these terms, I will explain their relevance to 
contemporary welfare policy analysis in general.  Chapters 5-7 will further detail why 
these terms are relevant to this monograph in particular.  After Foucault‟s work is 
reviewed, I will examine the contemporary applications of Schram and, in particular, 
emphasize Schram‟s (2000) conceptualizations of culture and cultural software and 
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deconstruction of the powerful welfare policy buzzwords “personal responsibility”.  I 
conclude this chapter by arguing that although Kurt Lewin was quite correct in asserting 
that “There is nothing so practical as a good theory”, Karl Popper was equally correct in 
suggesting that “There is no theory that is not beset with problems” (Robbins and 
Chaterjee, 1998: i).  I briefly point out what a class analysis (as opposed to a discourse 
analysis) of welfare reform could reveal and suggest that there are valuable insights that 
could be gained from different theoretical orientations. 
Some Perceptive Theorizing on Theory 
 
“Theoretical thinking can be exciting because it allows us to be surprised by a world that 
we thought that we already knew” Sears (2008: 14). 
 
     In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault (2006 [1969]: 6) asks “what is a theory?  
what is a concept?”   These definitional considerations warrant a brief exploration prior to 
delving into the heart of Foucault‟s work.  While I will rely, momentarily, on the 
definition of some renowned scholars to conceptualize theory, I will suggest that a 
concept is a thought, term, or definitional idea that functions as a building block of 
theory.  All social theories entail key, interrelated, conceptualizations that are somewhat 
analogous to pieces of a jig saw puzzle in that they need to be put together in order to see 
the whole picture (and different theoretical puzzles, of course, culminate in different 
completed images).  Foucault himself argued that “it is the concept that the historian‟s 
work never ceases to specify”(2006 [1969]: 9).  To understand Foucault‟s work, to be 
able to apply it, and thus to grasp the central argument of this monograph, it is imperative 
to understand what Foucault, and later theorists, meant by six interrelated concepts of:  i) 
governmentality; ii) regimes of practice; iii) discourse; iv) subjugated knowledges; v) 
truth and vi) power / knowledge.  After these terms have been defined, I will explain why 
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each concept is relevant to understanding the substantive subject matter of welfare policy 
in general:  chapters five through seven of this monograph will show why these concepts 
are relevant to this manuscript in particular.  A few more reflections on theory are 
warranted at the outset. 
      Expanding on the epigraph (above) from Sears, one will see things that one will not 
otherwise see, gain insights that they will not otherwise gain, and ask critically reframed 
questions that they will not otherwise ask, if they can come to apprehend and apply the 
“key premises [and] cornerstone assumptions about the way [a given theory suggests] 
things work” (Sears, 2005: 22).  That, of course, is what social theory does:  posit 
explanations of “the way things work.”  Armstrong and Armstrong (1990: 18) suggest, 
theory is an attempt to organize explanations in a systemic 
way, to develop a connected and logical understanding of 
how people and social systems work. 
 
 Questions surrounding the concept of power – what is it?  who possesses it? how does it 
operate? --have been a central preoccupation of much social theorizing for a very long 
time, and because one cannot underestimate the often latent operation of power in the 
formation of subjectivities, this longstanding central preoccupation with power remains as 
relevant today as it ever has been.   
The Poststructuralism of Foucault and The Postmodern Applications of Schram 
 
     In her PhD dissertation, “Discourse as a Category of Analysis in Policy Studies:  The 
Case of Welfare Reform”, Lindquist (2003: 35-36) explains,  
Poststructuralists argue that discourse – the seemingly 
ephemeral phenomenon of sensory signifiers we use to give 
meaning to the world – is the primary means through which 
power and dominance is exerted, and social, economic, and 
political institutions and structures are the sites of its 
exercise (Foucault 1990, 1979, 1983).  Poststructuralists 
take discourse as the primary unit of analysis. 
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     The post-structural theory of Foucault provides invaluable insight about “the way 
things work” by specifically focusing on how power operates through discourse and, in 
particular, “how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially 
constituted” (Foucault, 1980: 97).  Utilizing the theorizing of Foucault in the context of 
American welfare policy analysis, Schram (2006: xi) demonstrates, in a compelling way, 
that “discourse extends to [create] social identities.”   Understanding how subjects are 
constituted provides greater opportunity for taking on the formidable, but necessary, 
challenge of reconstituting subaltern subjects;  thus, it is a worthwhile endeavour to 
closely examine the politics, and the “how?”, of identity formation.  It is to the work of 
Foucault and Schram which we will now turn. 
Governmentality 
 
“The activity of government is inextricably bound up with the activity of thought.  It is 
thus both made possible by and constrained by what can be thought and what cannot be 
thought at any particular moment in our history” (Rose, 2004: 8).  
 
     Governance, in its everyday meaning, is any attempt to regulate or control a behaviour 
or thought.  Foucault‟s conceptualization of governmentality suggests that we need to 
think of that regulation in ways that transcend the standard conceptualizations of 
government as taking place solely through the prohibitive power of the state.  Governance 
takes place not solely by what it represses, but, crucially, by what it creates:  objects of 
knowledge, truths, and realms of practice (Goode and Maskovsky, 2001: 286).  In The 
Philosophy of Foucault, May (2006: 82) points out that Foucault never denied that 
repressive power exists or that the state possesses it, but that many have misread 
Foucault‟s work on power to arrive at this misguided conclusion.  Foucault did suggest, 
however, that a compelling form of power can also operate from below – from our 
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practices and our existing relations in civil society.  In an interview entitled “Truth and 
Power” Foucault makes this point clearly in a passage that has not received the attention 
that it warrants, 
I don‟t want to state that the state isn‟t important; what I 
want to say is that relations of power, and hence the 
analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend 
beyond the limits of the state – in two senses.  First of all, 
because the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, 
is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual 
power relations; and, further, because the state can only 
operate on the basis of other, already existing power 
relations (Foucault, 1980: 122). 
 
It is necessary, then, to perceive of governance beyond the state.  How we are directly 
regulated is important, but this question cannot be divorced from how we come to 
indirectly regulate ourselves.  Foucault (1991: 102-103) provides a threefold 
conceptualization of governmentality, 
By this word I mean three things, 
 
1.  The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculation and tactics that 
allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form 
of power, which has as its target population, as its principal 
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security. 
 
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the 
West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all 
other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of 
power which may be termed government, resulting, on the 
one hand, in the formation of a whole series of a specific 
governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the 
development of a whole complex of savoirs [knowledges]. 
  
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through 
which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed 
into the administrative state during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes „governmentalized‟. 
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The Relevance of Governmentality 
 
“An „analytics of government‟ [is] a way of analyzing those regimes of practices that try 
to direct, with a certain degree of deliberation, the conduct of others, and oneself ” 
(Dean, 1999: 40). 
 
     The notion of governmentality, specifically its pre-occupation with the “how?” of 
power, is invaluable to analyzing many issues including welfare policy because,    
Practices of governing and ruling are not restricted to „the 
political‟ or to one sphere, so we must focus on how we are 
governed and by what practices, rather than by which 
people in which sphere (Cruikshank, 1999: 120). 
 
State power would not be so powerful if it were not disseminated through the social 
institutions and daily discursive practices of civil society that create cultural divisions.  
So, for example, when the Conservatives instituted a welfare fraud hotline for the public 
to call this produced a number of effects, not the least of which was a departure from the 
necessity of a16
th
 century panoptical type of surveillance – given that the few could be 
watched by the many at any time, people would better govern themselves.  This 
governmental rationality also played a notable role in constituting the identity of both the 
welfare, and working, subjects.  Lost in the „zero tolerance‟ rhetoric of the “Common 
Sense Revolution” is the realization that “the discourse and politics of welfare fraud have 
obscured the imprecision of what is considered to be fraud, and by whom” (Chunn and 
Gavigan, 2004: 228).  As we will see in the next chapter, many research respondents  
employed survival techniques like relying on the assistance of extended family members 
or babysitting a neighbourhood child in order to compensate for the inadequacy of their 
income.  What is considered “fraud” could more properly be named survival.  Despite all 
the hype, the hotline, and the hysteria, after 52 582 official investigations from the 
Ontario Ministry of Community, Family and Children‟s Services, 
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(http://dawn.thot.net/kimberly_rogers/wb-qa.html) a total of only 430 criminal 
convictions resulted.  Yet this story, or these numbers, never made its way into 
mainstream consciousness.  In chapter 6 we examine how the twenty four respondents in 
this research took up the discourse of welfare fraud.   
     This monograph in particular is concerned with how the prejudice of classism is 
constituted in welfare discourse, reproduced, and survives in the operation of power 
“from below”.  In understanding how subjectivities and behaviours are governed, we will 
follow a theoretical tradition that “directs us to attend to the practices of government that 
form the basis on which problematizations are made” (Dean, 2001: 28).  Understanding 
this theoretical tradition necessitates understanding, among other things, the latent and 
insidious meaning-making role that “practices” invariably play.     
Regimes of Practice 
 
“Such forms of knowledge define the objects of such practices (the criminal, the 
unemployed, the mentally ill, etc.), codify appropriate ways of dealing with them, set the 
aims and objectives of practice, and define the professional and institutional locus of 
authoritative agents of expertise” (Dean, 1999: 22) 
 
     In a powerful passage that is at the theoretical heart of the analytical rationale 
informing this study, Foucault detailed the difference between his theorizing on power 
and the perspectives of other theoreticians in an interview entitled “Questions of 
Method”, 
The target of analysis wasn‟t “institutions,” “theories,” or 
“ideology” but practices – with the aim of grasping the 
conditions that make these acceptable at a given moment; 
the hypothesis being that these types of practices are not 
just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, 
guided by pragmatic circumstances – whatever roles these 
elements may actually play – but possess up to a point their 
own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and 
„reason.‟ (Foucault, 1991: 75). 
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Understanding the end results of these practices, then, is a worthwhile endeavour.  
Practices are not necessarily undertaken to ameliorate a pre-given problem, but rather 
define exactly what is problematic.   
The Relevance of „Regimes of Practice‟ 
 
“It is a question of analyzing a „regime of practices‟– practices being understood here as 
places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the 
planned and taken for granted meet and interconnect” (Foucault, 1991: 75). 
 
The concept of “regimes of practice” is clearly relevant to OW, because welfare policies 
impose rules and give reasons that create taken for granted, or „common sense‟, 
perceptions.  In this respect, there truly was a „common sense‟ revolution in Ontario, but 
certainly not in the sense of sound logic.  While it is standard to regard social policies and 
social programs as solutions to ameliorate social problems, it is perhaps more realistic to 
think of those policies and programs as presumptively defining what is problematic, ipso 
facto, by virtue of the solutions they espouse.  As we will see in the qualitative data 
analysis examining the subjectivities of twenty four research respondents in this 
manuscript, the regimes of practice associated with Ontario Works were instrumental in 
circulating power in the form of perceptions about issues such as the nature of 
unemployment, poverty, personal irresponsibility, welfare fraud, and tax rage.  Regimes 
of practice include regular and patterned phrases, or sets of statements, that come to shape 
what is, and is not, thought.        
Discourse 
 
“Discourse works by telling us in advance of any perception what it is we can see and 
what is or is not important” (Cruikshank, 1999: 24) 
   
     For Foucault discourse is a set of patterned and recurring statements -- that transcend a 
given individual speaking those statements -- that systematically function to constitute 
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formal knowledge.  These “discursive regularities” (Foucault, 2006 [1969]: 23-85) not 
only govern the way that a given topic can, and cannot, be meaningfully discussed, 
queried or assessed but also regulate what topics are appropriate for discussion, enquiry, 
or assessment. 
     Foucault suggests that on a given „discursive field‟ there are “rules of formation” that 
are unconsciously followed and, 
the rules of formation operate not only in the mind or 
consciousness of individuals, but in discourse itself; they 
operate therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, 
on all individuals who undertake to speak in this discursive 
field (Foucault, 2006 [1969]:  69-70). 
 
     The discursive field can be seen as an external cultural force – existing over and above 
individuals – that exerts an unnoticed but powerful coercive influence on communication 
and thus subjectivity.  In reviewing Foucault‟s legacy, May (2006: 39) concurs that “the 
unconscious structuring of discourse, sets the character and boundaries of how the debate 
and discussion can happen.”  One of the most profound and important expressions of 
power is the power to frame the problem and thus set the parameters of the debate.      
     The constructed boundaries of discourse, and thus thought, are ultimately 
unrecognized by those speaking within the discursive field.  Foucault himself refers to 
discursive regularities as “the positive unconscious of knowledge” precisely because they 
elude consciousness (Foucault, 2007 [1966]: xi).   In her doctoral dissertation examining  
American welfare policy, Copeland (2005: 10) argues, 
The power of discourse stems from its appearance as 
factual – through the creation of a common sense 
understanding as well as the silencing of alternative 
understandings that seem to challenge the truth. 
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“Common sense”, by another name, is habituated patterns of thinking that are so readily 
accepted by virtually everyone so as to avoid scrutiny or alternative understandings.  
Foucault explains why understanding how the discursive field plays on perception is 
vitally important,   
The analysis of thought is always allegorical in relation to 
the discourse it employs.  Its question is unfailingly:  what 
was being said in what was said?  The analysis of the 
discursive field is oriented in quite a different way; we must 
grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its 
occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at 
least its limits, establish its correlations with other 
statements that may be connected with it, and show what 
other forms of statements it excludes (Foucault, 2006 
[1969]: 30-31. 
 
To appreciate how a given problem gets framed or how a given subject is formed, it 
becomes necessary to transcend “common sense” and “describe [and contextualize] the 
organization of the field of statements where they appeared and circulated” (Foucault, 
2006 [1969: 63).  That is what the qualitative data analysis of this monograph aims to do. 
The Relevance of Discourse   
 
     In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault argues that discourse transmits power not 
only by what is being said, but equally significant, by what it does not say,   
All manifest discourse is secretly based on an „already 
said‟; and this „already said‟ is not merely a phrase that has 
already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, 
but a „never said‟, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent 
as breath, a writing that is merely a hollow of its own mark 
. . .  The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more 
than the repressive presence of what it does not say, and 
this „not said‟ is a hollow that undermines from within all 
that is said (Foucault, 2006 [1969]: 27-28). 
 
One of the things that is “not said” in contemporary welfare policy is that there is a 
“conservative function at work in the theme of cultural totalities” (Foucault, 2006 [1969]: 
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17).  The taxpayer / welfare recipient dichotomy creates a “binary perception and division 
of society and men [sic]; them and us, the unjust and the just” (Foucault, 2003: 74).  
Power is in operation in the unquestioned naturalization of these binary perceptions.  
     In undertaking comparable research, Telling Tales:  Living the Effects of Public 
Policy, Neysmith, Bezanson, and O‟connell (2005) articulate an observation that I will 
adopt as the theoretical linchpin of my central argument,   
All of these stories rely on the ways in which people “make 
meaning” and on our capacities as researchers for hearing 
these practices at work.  While experiences have a material 
reality, once they are communicated and continue to be 
retold, they take on a new shape.  Discourses also operate at 
an institutional level.  The meanings and values of an 
institution are expressed in systematically organized sets of 
statements.  These are also picked up [and repeated] by 
participants.  The notion of a „discursive field‟ is helpful 
here because it seeks to understand the relationship between 
language, social institutions, subjectivity, and power. 
(Neysmith, Bezanson, and O‟connell, 2005: 170). 
 
These “systematically organized sets of statements” facilitate the survival of classism 
when they are “picked up by participants”.  These culturally sanctioned recurring 
statements highlight some aspects of certain issues while ignoring, or discounting, other 
aspects.   
Subjugated Knowledges 
 
“Has any member of congress ever tried to live for a month on a welfare check?  For that 
matter, have any of them ever tried to live on the check that a welfare recipient would 
receive if she were lucky enough to find a job?” (Quindlen, 2002: 64). 
 
     To subjugate, in conventional usage, is to subdue or conquer.  In post-structural social 
theory, to subjugate knowledges is to ignore, disqualify, or delegitimize their legitimacy.  
The political aspects of Foucault‟s (2003: 7) theorizing explicitly call for “the insurrection 
of subjugated knowledges.”   In Society Must Be Defended (2003), a collection of his 
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1975-76 lectures from the College de France, Foucault posits a twofold definition of 
subjugated knowledge: 
Subjugated knowledges . . . are blocks of historical 
knowledges that were present in the functional and systemic 
ensembles, but which were masked, and the critique was 
also able to reveal their existence by using, obviously 
enough, the tools of scholarship. 
 
Second, I think that subjugated knowledges should be 
understood as meaning something else and, in a sense, 
something quite different.  When I say „subjugated 
knowledges‟ I am also referring to a whole series of 
knowledges that have been disqualified as non conceptual 
knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges;  naïve 
knowledges; hierarchically inferior knowledges; 
knowledges below the required level of erudition or 
scienticity”  (Foucault, 2003: 7) 
 
While both conceptualizations of subjugated knowledge are relevant, it is the former 
conceptualization that warrants the most attention given the qualitative interview data 
upon which this manuscript is based.   
The Relevance of Subjugated Knowledges 
 
“If you don‟t have the necessities of life – nothing else matters”   
(John Sweeney)   
 
     The quote (above) from John Sweeney was the central message of his opening remarks 
at a Kitchener-Waterloo community action forum on homelessness in 2000.  Sweeney 
chaired the Social Assistance Review Committee back in the 1980s.  I witnessed Sweeney 
speak in Kitchener in 2000 when he stated, “If you don‟t have the necessities of life – 
nothing else matters”.  Sweeney was summarizing what the participants of SARC told the 
committee back in the 1980s.  Sweeney argued that things were bad for social assistance 
back then, but they are worse now.  What has been thoroughly subjugated in welfare 
discourse and welfare policy, notwithstanding the rhetoric of the “perversity thesis” 
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(Block and Somers, 2003), is that “you can‟t punish people out of poverty” (Homan, 
2007: 475).  When talking about the barriers to securing meaningful employment, many 
respondents, in similar variations delivered that same message.  Chapter 6 of this 
monograph will take up Foucault‟s project and examine the subjugated knowledges of 
welfare because “adequate social support to meet basic physiological needs cannot be 
dismissed from the equation” (Homan, 2007: 33).    
Truth 
 
“Meaning is being solely constituted by systems of constraints characteristic of the 
signifying machinery” (Foucault, 2007b: 53) 
 
     Truth, in conventional use, generally means „factually correct‟ or „accurate‟.  
 The post-structural meaning, however, is quite different.  Foucault (1980: 133) argued in 
Power / Knowledge that: 
„Truth‟ is to be understood as a system of ordered 
procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, 
circulation and operation of statements. 
 
„Truth‟ is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power 
which it induces and which extend it.  A „regime‟ of truth.     
  
       In Welfare Discipline:  Discourse, Governance, and Globalization, Schram 
perceptively expands on Foucault‟s conceptualization of “truth”, 
Truth remains for me best understood as an artefact of 
discourse.  In other words, truth, whatever it may be 
ultimately, is, for humans, apprehensible first and foremost 
as a discursive practice.  Bracketing the ultimate nature of 
truth, I prefer to situate my truth studies in the ways in 
which discourse presents things to us as if they were true.  
With Michel Foucault, I am more interested in how 
discourse makes some things out to be true, regardless of 
whether they are.  (Schram, 2006: 1-2).  
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In Powers of Freedom:  Reframing Political Thought, Nikolas Rose critically posits an 
explanation for (among other things) how truth is formed.  Specifically, Rose‟s 
examination is concerned with, 
the ways in which certain languages of description, 
explanation, calculation and judgment came to acquire the 
value of truth and the kinds of actions or techniques that 
were made possible by such truths. (Rose, 2004: 8). 
 
The Relevance of „Truth‟ 
 
“The truth is kept secret.  It‟s swept under the rug.  If you never know truth then you 
never know love.  Where‟s the love y‟all? C‟mon.  Where‟s the truth y‟all? C‟mon!”  
(Black Eyed Peas, 2003 hit “Where is the love?”)  
 
     Shortly after being ousted from power by the Tories, former Ontario premier Bob Rae 
wrote in his memoirs “the [political] right likes to point to a massive growth in fraud and 
delinquency as the reason for this [increased welfare expenditures],  but this is simply not 
true” (Rae, 1996: 200).   The discursive practices of  the “Common Sense Revolution”, 
however, were politically successful in presenting their arguments as true.  Understanding 
“truth” as an artefact of discourse would assist in the process of mastering “the art of not 
being governed quite so much” (Foucault, 2007: 45).  To master this art “we must ask two 
questions:  what does Foucault mean by power and how does it work?” (May, 2006: 82) 
Power / Knowledge 
 
“Power, according to Michel Foucault, is fundamentally productive:  it does not simply 
constrain and repress but also – or thereby – creates.  It creates objects of knowledge; it 
creates truths; and it produces realms of practice”  (Goode and Maskovsky, 2001: 286). 
 
     According to Foucault, “power acts as much, or more, through what it creates than 
through what it represses” (May, 2006: 81).  Foucault initially made this argument by 
posing an illuminating (and rhetorical) question, 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but to say no, do you really think one would be 
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brought to obey it?  What makes power hold good, what 
makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn‟t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no, but it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse (Foucault, 1980: 119).  
 
Breaking with traditional state and class theory conceptualizations, Foucault further 
details what he suggests power is not,     
Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, 
something that one holds on to or allows to slip away;  
power is exercised from innumerable points . . .  
 
Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and 
all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at  
the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix     
[there is] no such duality extending from the top down . . .  
(Foucault, 1990 [1978]: 94 
 
It must also be noted that Foucault grafted his conceptualization of “power” (pouvoir) 
within an inextricable nexus to “knowledge” (savoir) and explained the interrelationship 
between the two,    
the use of the word knowledge (savoir) that refers to all 
procedures and all effects of knowledge (connaissance) 
which are acceptable at a given point in time and in a 
specific domain; and secondly, the term power (pouvoir) 
which merely covers a whole series of particular 
mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely to 
induce behaviors and discourses (Foucault, 2007: 60).  
 
The nexus between power and knowledge, then, is clear:  the former does not function 
without the latter. 
The Relevance of Power / Knowledge 
 
“For knowledge to function as knowledge it must exercise power” (Foucault, 2007b: 71) 
     Applied to the subject matter at hand, power has created the objects of „welfare 
dependency‟ and „personal responsibility‟, the „truths‟ of welfare fraud and “tax rage”  
and the realm of workfare known as OW.  The discourse produced, the resulting 
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„discursive regime‟ is replete with moralizing prejudices.   As we will see in the 
qualitative data analysis to follow, these objects, truths, and realms of practice have 
produced a fundamentally classist “power [that] passes through the individuals it has 
constituted” (Foucault, 2003: 30).  Here, we can begin to understand one compelling 
explanation of how “mimetic adoption of dominant values and manners appears  among 
the subordinated” (Adam,1978: 86).  Subordination can, and does, play a role in 
reproducing itself.  Let us now examine the “words of welfare” as detailed by Schram.   
Schram‟s American Welfare Policy Scholarship  
 
“Welfare dependency discourse was never an accurate representation of a pre-existing 
reality, but over time it made itself real” (Schram, 2006:19). 
 
     Schram‟s postmodern American welfare policy analyses, as we have seen, provide a 
useful supplement and contemporary application to the theoretical groundwork laid by 
Foucault.   There is also unique value in Schram‟s works in that he provides practical 
conceptualizations of „culture‟ and „cultural software‟.   Schram‟s compelling cultural 
critiques reach their intellectual acme in a detailed unpacking of how the uncritically de-
contextualized notion of „personal responsibility‟ deceptively functions to individualize 
poverty in welfare discourse while ignoring what globalization is doing to the labour 
market.   
     In the foreword to Words of Welfare (Schram, 1995: ix), Frances Fox Piven, explains 
why she finds Schram‟s approach to welfare policy analysis so informed.  Piven does this, 
adeptly, by an illuminating comparison between Schram‟s postmodern approach and the 
dominant model of policy studies that uncritically assumes policies to be scientifically 
informed interventions to obvious pre-given social problems, 
Presumably the objective is to alter taken-for-granted 
conditions named poverty, or dependency, or underclass 
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culture.  The means, or strategies, of intervention are 
ostensibly derived from scientific studies of empirical cause 
and effect relations that identify the sorts of interventions, 
usually in the form of economic incentives and 
disincentives, that can be expected to reduce poverty and 
the cultural deficiencies associated with poverty.  In other 
words, the dominant model regards policy as the rational 
and scientifically based manipulation of specific aspects of 
the circumstances of the poor to achieve the articulated goal 
of reducing their poverty. 
 
Piven shows that the dominant model of policy science in American politics has resulted 
in: i) portrayals of welfare expenditures as cause for alarm when program costs amount to 
1 percent of the federal budget; ii) claims that welfare encourages women to become 
perpetually dependent on handouts when the administration‟s own data show that 75% of 
recipients remain on the rolls for less than two years; iii) right-wing moralizing arguments 
suggesting that welfare has increased out of wedlock births while ignoring the reality that 
this phenomenon has increased in all social strata of society. 
     While one could certainly argue that these are prime examples of bad applications of 
the dominant model of policy science, there are also less incriminating applications of the 
dominant model (i.e. like when the depth of poverty becomes measured and examined as 
a variable determining the likelihood of escaping poverty (Ross et al, 2000).  Schram 
claims, 
Policies do more than satisfy or dissatisfy; they change the 
basic features of the political landscape.  Policies can set 
political agendas [determining what is and is not considered 
problematic and in need of amelioration] and shape 
identities and interests.  They can influence beliefs about 
what is possible, desirable, and normal.  They can alter 
conceptions of citizenship and status. They can channel or 
constrain agency, define incentives and redistribute 
resources.  They can convey cues that define, arouse, or 
pacify constituencies (Soss and Schram, 2007: 113). 
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There is far too much that is missing from the “common sense” view that social policies 
simply remedy pre-given social problems by invoking scientifically informed 
interventions.  Specifically, the latent and neglected dimensions of welfare policy, 
Schram (1995: xii) argues, are symbolic, “and the symbols or interpretations constructed 
by welfare policy discourse are transmitted both by words and arguments about policy 
and welfare practices”.  Symbolism matters because it constructs identity.  Identity 
matters because it deeply influences how we view each other‟s worth, and the world 
around us.  Critiquing both the material and cultural realities of American welfare reform, 
Piven argues, 
The point I want to make about these new practices is that 
they are simultaneously material and cultural in their 
effects.  Grants are reduced, or terminated are obviously a 
very material change.  But material practices, especially 
material consequences with such awesome consequences as 
the loss of a welfare grant, are also cultural because they 
help to shape the way people think about themselves and 
their world (Piven, 2001: 144). 
 
 Let us now review Schram‟s conceptualizations of culture and cultural software. 
 Culture and Cultural Software 
 
“Social welfare policy has become unusually freighted with cultural significance” 
(Schram, 2000: 1) 
 
     Schram sees culture as “shared ways of communicating, coding, and categorizing.  It 
is akin to what J.M. Balkin calls „cultural software‟” (Schram, 2000: 3).  Cultural 
softwares, according to Balkin (1998), are the predominant conceptual binaries that are 
socially constructed and carry out a latent, but powerful, meaning-making interpretive 
function: “People make sense of the cultural world not through isolated conceptual 
oppositions but through networks of linked conceptual oppositions” (Balkin, 1998: 217)    
In After Welfare:  The Culture of Post Industrial Society (Schram, 2000: 2-4) posits seven 
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assumption about what culture is and how it functions:  1) culture makes social 
interaction possible; 2) culture invokes interpretive categories we use to understand the 
world; 3) these categories are often grounded in binary dichotomies; 4) a culture expands 
via the linking of interpretive categories from one area to another; 5) “new and unsettling 
social developments, such as same sex marriage or the increase of single parent families, 
tend to be understood in terms of pre-existing interpretive categories and conceptual 
oppositions” (p.3); 6) the bias of cultural categories can be re-worked for positive social 
change; and 7) contesting the unquestioned pre-given nature of culture is an important 
struggle that can have significant material consequences.       
     The applications, here, strike at the heart of my argument about the survival of 
classism.  The unquestioned taxpayer / welfare recipient binary written into welfare 
policy is an integral part of the unquestioned “discursive regime” of power:  there is a 
powerful cultural meaning attached to both sides of the dichotomy and this is integral to 
neoliberal communication, coding, and categorizing.   The „taxpayer‟ and „the welfare 
recipient‟ invoke „cultural categories that undergird the [neoliberal] „social order‟ 
(Schram, 2000: 1).  
Schram on „Personal Responsibility‟ 
 
“Blaming the victim gets legitimated by the seemingly neutral category of personal 
responsibility” (Schram, 2000: 28).  
 
     If Foucault (2006 [1969]: 30) made it clear that the task of discourse analysis is to 
uncover “what is being said in what is being said”, Schram has carried out Foucault‟s 
project with impeccable clarity in decoding the subtext of “personal responsibility” in 
welfare discourse, 
The contemporary welfare policy discourse might sound 
fair in the abstract; however, in late 20
th
 century America, it 
108 
 
has become a way of blaming the poor for their poverty 
without ever having to say so.  “Personal responsibility” 
allows the cultural biases of welfare to be “hidden in plain 
sight” (Schram, 2000: 27). 
 
Ultimately, this translates into classism being “hidden in plain sight”.  The unfairness of 
“personal responsibility” lies in its implicit failure to consider employment related 
disadvantages grounded in such structural inequalities “posed by class, race, and gender” 
(Schram, 2000: 29).  Adding to Schram‟s insights, personal responsibility glosses over 
several other employment related barriers, in particular, barriers related to health.  While 
several of my respondents listed one, or more, serious health concerns as a barrier to 
employment (and were fighting hard to get past a restrictive bureaucracy to qualify for 
ODSP), there is ample evidence beyond my qualitative data to suggest “studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated the association between ill health and poverty” (O‟Connor and 
Olsen, 1998: 164). 
     In addition to detailing why “personal responsibility” in welfare discourse culminates 
in unfair meaning making, Schram is also clear about how this happens, 
the behaviour implied by personal responsibility can be said 
to suggest an identity.  The text of personal responsibility 
implies multiple identities available from the iconography 
of the dominant culture, among them the middle class man 
of virtue and the so called welfare queen as the 
embodiments of what personal responsibility represents and 
what it does not.  The welfare queen is the implied 
visualizable other of the contemporary welfare discourse of 
personal responsibility (Schram, 2006: 29). 
 
That welfare reform has vaulted images of personal responsibility to the forefront of 
thinking on poverty is significant in that “it is generally an instance of what some have 
called „new‟ forms of discrimination that discriminate without explicitly saying so” 
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(Schram, 2006: 37).  In other words, the meanings and interpretations invoked by the 
term personal responsibility foster discrimination by stealth. 
Connecting Allport‟s Analysis of Prejudice With Schram‟s Insights on Culture 
 
     The words and arguments about policy and welfare practices fit the criteria for 
prejudice in general and meet the definitional threshold of classism in particular.  The 
taxpayer / welfare recipient moral binary is freighted with a cultural in-group / out-group 
meaning and is the quintessential method of “typing by nouns” in the era of 
neoliberalism.   Schram has repeatedly argued policy about the poor is about re-encoding 
the poor as the marginal “other.”  Ontario Works, as we shall see, has certainly 
accomplished this, and yet there is no word in conventional usage to articulate this 
“othering” process.   
Some Limitations of Postmodern Theorizing on Power 
 
“If your only tool is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail” (Johnson, 1992: 
108) 
       
     Poststructural analysis, notwithstanding its invaluable insights, unduly glosses over 
some critically important aspects of power.  Inherited material prosperity is an important 
source of power for some because it expands their choices and, in many cases, enables 
them to have their will carried out.  Inherited material deprivation is a source of 
powerlessness for others because it restricts their choices (in some cases quite severely) 
and undercuts their capacity to have their potential maximized or their will carried out.  
Although not entirely reducible to material standing, in some ways, power is something 
that some people possess and others clearly do not.  For example, before I complete this 
section of my dissertation I have the power to go and snack on virtually anything I want – 
which I will be doing momentarily.  When my brain gets tired of writing, I have the 
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power to go and take a break at a quality gym – that will be in a few more hours.  When I 
come back, after I re-fuel with a nutritious meal that I picked up in my car on the ride 
home, my brain will be rejuvenated.  I will return to writing on my quality computer 
equipped with the most up to date software.  If I were deprived of these powers / 
possessions, I would be significantly less equipped, and thus less able, to complete this 
dissertation.  This incompleteness – devoid of any understanding whatsoever of the 
material conditions under which I am living my life -- would be attributed to my lack of 
intelligence, work ethic, or moral character.  Possessing these (among other) powers, my 
privilege is literally invisible.  Some will argue, and many will uncritically agree, that 
when I complete my doctorate and re-enter the middle class world of work, I will deserve 
to have my taxes cut because I work so hard.  
   While Foucault‟s work is certainly invaluable to answering the “how?” of power, it 
stops short of adequately understanding the “who?”  While postmodernists would, quite 
correctly, point out that there is heterogeneity within both the “rich” and the “poor” (or 
for that matter any categorical label) there is also the common thread of material privilege 
and poverty respectively within these groups (albeit experienced in different ways and at 
varying levels and in conjunction with a whole host of other forms of advantage and 
disadvantage).  One could argue that Foucault‟s claim that “Power comes from below; 
that is, there is no binary and all encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the 
root of power relations”  (Foucault, 1990 [1978]: 94) seems to be “denying the ways in 
which the origins, identities, and development of subordinated categories of people 
remain fully rooted in the dynamics of capitalism”  (Adam, 1997: 39).  In a social policy 
and regressive tax environment where an already enormous material inequality is 
widening – tax cuts are making rich people richer and welfare reform is making poor 
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people poorer -- sidestepping the compelling associations between material privilege and 
power, destitution and powerlessness, produces an ineluctably incomplete picture.      
     Further, Foucault‟s (1990 [1978]: 92) assertion that “By power, I do not mean 
“Power” as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of a 
given state” seems to miss the harsh realities of what state power can do -- and whose 
interests are served (and disserved) by the operation of the state.  Though Foucault never 
denied that the state is a source of power, this reality is lost by many of Foucault‟s 
followers.  The power of the state could not possibly be clearer than in the repressive 
mechanisms of Ontario welfare policy.  Consider the particulars of section 73.1 and 73.2 
of the OWA, 
1.)  The Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not apply with 
respect to participation in a community participation 
activity under this act   
 
Unionization for participants prohibited * 
       (*bold in original)   
  
2.) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), under the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 no person shall do any of the 
following with respect to his or her participation in a 
community participation activity: 
 
1.) Join a trade union 
2.) Have the terms and conditions under which he or she 
participates determined through collective bargaining 
3.) Strike.   
 
Collective bargaining is legislated out of the equation and the conditions of workfare 
placements are not open to negotiation.  It does not matter if a workfare placement is not 
even coming close to making a participant marketable, or if a placement does not even 
exist (as in the case of many of my research respondents) – it is not legal to form a union, 
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collectively bargain, or strike.  This draconian clause in the OW Act did not receive the 
attention it warranted.   
     While there was a provincial tribunal set up to oversee the changes in welfare 
legislation, the OWA sec. 67(2) made it clear that, 
The Tribunal shall not inquire into or make a decision 
concerning, 
a.) The constitutional validity of a provision of an Act or a 
regulation; or 
b.) The legislative authority for a regulation made under an act 
1997, c. 25, Sced. A, s.67 
 
Not only was there prohibitive state regulation here, there was state legislation regulating 
that this regulation could not be deregulated or legally questioned.  Power here, in this 
instance, needed no capillaries:  it was functioning by legally sanctioned edict from the 
start.  It could not be argued that making poor people 21.6% poorer, or enacting draconian 
eligibility restrictions, was constitutionally violating anyone‟s rights (under sec. 7 of “The 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms”) to “life, liberty, liberty or the security of person.”  
     Finally, there is too much that is cloaked in the view that “power is not something that 
is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away” 
(Foucault, 1990 [1978]: 94).  In some ways, power is not solely something that one has or 
doesn‟t have, but in other ways power must be associated with material and social 
standing.    Foucault‟s view seems to be overlooking that some very important forms of 
power are acquired when one assumes certain vocational positions replete with their 
accompanying material and status rewards, and that power is something that can – and in 
the cases of several of my research respondents, has – slipped away.   
     As we will see in the qualitative data analysis in the next two chapters:  there is power 
in being able to pay all of one‟s bills and in having the resources to carry out one‟s life in 
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a way that is materially desirable; there is a very real form of powerlessness in not being 
able to meet living expenses, and existing under conditions of material deprivation.  
When the material resources to move forward remain beyond one‟s reach, this is a very 
profound form of powerlessness.  This fate is likely to befall certain people through no 
fault of their own, while others are likely to be forever exempt from it by virtue of their 
circumstances of birth. 
Discourse vs. Ideology or Ideological Discourses?    
 
     Schram posits his own Foucaultian take on discourse, detailing what he argues are the 
distinctions between the key concepts of a discourse analysis and class analysis of 
perception and subjectivity, 
What we call the conspiracy of discourse is a potent  
force for making the world the way it is because  
discourse is more than mere talk or propaganda.  It  
is also different than ideology.  Discourse is  
arguably more powerful than ideology.  Ideology  
characterizes an alleged pre-existing reality, but  
discourse constitutes that reality.  Although the 
            distortions of ideology can be challenged by  
            pointing to inconsistent facts, discourse operates  
            more insidiously to constitute those facts (Schram,  
            2006: 12). 
 
While Schram‟s argument is compelling, it is a mistake to overlook the class based 
interests that are served by the ideological dissemination of facts and their discursive 
constitution.  While some authors have gone even further than Schram to abandon 
Marxist notions of ideology as a theory of perception, in his doctoral dissertation 
“Invisible Hands, Visible Harms:  Ideology and the Welfare System”, Palitto (2002) 
argues that abandonment is unduly premature.  Palitto‟s revision of orthodox Marxism 
sees ideology as distortions of meaning that serve unjust domination.  Wallerstein (1995: 
230) suggests that ideas still matter, serve the interests of some people to the expense of 
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others and that those  “ideas do not come out of nowhere [thus] thinking about the social 
bases of our ideas, seems more necessary than ever.” 
     I would suggest that rather than seeing ideology and discourse as two entirely separate 
and autonomous conceptualizations of power and perception, it is possible – in fact, quite 
necessary -- to graft the strengths of both perspectives and see how the constitution of 
meaning via the discursive „words of welfare‟ is patently ideological.  Further, as Barry 
Adam notes, 
Hegemonic discourses are scarcely primal causes in 
constituting subjects; rather they require propagators and 
beneficiaries.  It remains necessary to explain why they 
flourish or wither in particular societies and eras, and why 
some succeed in “hailing” subjects and why others fail.  
(Adam, 2002: 105) 
 
So, who is propagating?  Who is benefitting?  According to Steven Pimpare‟s The New 
Victorians:  Poverty and Propaganda in Two Gilded Ages (2004)  self interested free 
market business conservatives orchestrated the attack on welfare. Studies from the Fraser 
Institute in Canada (Scafer et al, 2001) and TD Bank Financial Group (2005) followed the 
suit of their American counterparts by praising conservative welfare policy shifts after the 
fact.  There were powerfully mobilized elite driven campaigns leading the charge.  
Redistribution of wealth to the privileged and attacks on the underprivileged were 
inextricably linked.  As much as Harris claimed that his policies originated in what “Main 
street” wanted, he was carrying out what “Bay street” wanted.   
     In a political and policy environment where an already enormous material inequality is 
growing larger, it is important not to lose sight of what is still invaluable in a class 
analysis.  Given that Marx was clear that “the only wheels which political economy set in 
motion are greed and the war among the greedy” (Marx, 1844: 132) in the era of 
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neoliberalism, we should be asking, as Wallerstein (1995: 231) does, “Who, or what 
would be served, by ignoring [Marx‟s work] completely?”  It seems clear that greed and 
greedy people would be, and are being, served when class analysis is flattened. 
Gender and Power  
     It must also be noted that there is an inequitable gender dynamic creating power 
imbalances (McCormack, 2002; Copeland, 2003) in what Baker and Tippin (1999: 39-44) 
call „Malestream‟ theories of the welfare state.  Foucault‟s argument that power is not 
something some people have, or don‟t have, overlooks who has easier access to paid 
work, and who is culturally expected to carry out what forms of unpaid (or poorly paid) 
domestic labour under what conditions.  Notwithstanding Foucault‟s important 
contribution in understanding the “how?” of power, to make invisible or downplay the 
“who?”, is to do a disservice to those who are on the undesirable end of power 
imbalances.       
Assessing the Political Dimensions of Foucault‟s Theorizing 
 
“By this phrase „political dimension‟ I mean an analysis that relates to what we are 
willing to accept in our world – to accept, to refuse, and to change, both in ourselves and 
in our circumstances” (Foucault, 2007a: 152). 
 
     One does not adopt a theoretical perspective and take the time to author an extended 
monograph on a given topic, unless one sees tremendous value in the strengths of that 
perspective.  Consider Foucault‟s analysis of his own work,   
But my project is precisely to bring it about that they „no 
longer know what to do‟, so that the acts, gestures, 
discourses which up until them seemed to go without 
saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous.  This 
effect is intentional.  And then I have some news for you:  
for me the problem of the prisons isn‟t one for the „social 
workers‟ but one for the prisoners (Foucault, 1991: 84).     
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If there is power in discourse, and there most certainly is, then to affect change we do 
need to “invent new ways of talking and seeing” (Foucault, 2007a: 21).  It would be ideal 
if those uncritically accepted meaning-making terms would become “problematic, 
difficult, [and] dangerous.”   
     But Foucault‟s brilliance has not had the impact that it may have had – and may still 
have – because his work (like that of many of his followers) is too often written in 
unintelligible and inaccessible academic language.  If “new ways of talking” are not clear, 
enough people will not hear what is being said.  Following from Foucault‟s proclamation 
that his problem is for the prisoners, it simply cannot be overlooked that the 
overwhelming majority of disenfranchised people (there may be rare exceptions) are 
going to be able to understand Foucault‟s discourse on discourse to translate his political 
dimension practical action.  In Structural Social Work:  Ideology, Theory, and Practice, 
(Mullaly, 1997: 109) posits that effective change agents must communicate “in a form 
that is intelligible to those who are oppressed in society”.   Those who are serious about 
laying classism (or any form of prejudice) to rest, would be well served to heed Mullaly‟s 
call for intelligibility.   
Conclusion 
 
     Just as Foucault (1980: 110) argued that “there were no ready-made concepts, no 
approved terms of vocabulary available to question the power-effects of psychiatry”, I 
suggest that precisely the same argument can, and must, be levied against the power 
effects of welfare reform.  Naming classism, understanding how it survives and is 
transmitted in welfare discourse, is an important strategic endeavour. There is practical 
transformative potential in “finding words that will at last name accurately that which has 
never been named before” (Foucault, 2007a [1966]: 130). It would be hard to imagine the 
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civil rights movement accomplishing what it accomplished had the populace been 
unaware of what racism was.  The same can be said for all three waves of the women‟s 
movement and sexism.  In 2010, the general populace remains oblivious to what classism 
is.  
   This chapter opened with an epigraph from Foucault suggesting that power creates 
illusions.  One of the illusions created by the power effects of Ontario Works is the 
legitimizing inhumane policy practice of invoking the “perversity thesis” – ultimately 
making poor people poorer – to punish them out of poverty.  In chapter six we will review 
what 24 respondents on social assistance had to say about the conservative view that 
exceptionally low social assistance rates force people to work, and thus are a wise policy 
decision.  
     There is also the illusion, invoked by the unquestioned totalizing use of the term 
“taxpayer”, that people with enormous amounts of wealth have been given a raw deal by 
our system of distribution and that we need to continue to cut their taxes and give them 
more.  The wealthy, after all, are the good people of society.  The poor, on the other hand, 
have reaped what they failed to sow.   
      If there is power in discourse, and there most certainly is, the natural corollary of that 
observation is that there must also be power in counter discourse.  Schram cites the 
underappreciated legacy of Amartya Sen to suggest that, particularly in a culture pre-
occupied by notions of personal responsibility, “we must first re-allocate resources 
sufficiently so that all persons have the ability to develop their capabilities sufficiently to 
participate as full members of society” (Schram, 2006: 130).  This insight is so important 
to those most directly impacted by welfare policy, and yet this reality remains so 
thoroughly subjugated.  As an effort to counter these disturbing realities, I will examine 
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the subjugated knowledges of research participants in chapter 5.  As Lott and Bullock 
(2007: 20) have argued in Psychology and Economic Injustice:  Personal, Professional 
and Political Intersections, “We need to take seriously the question asked by Fine (2002: 
20), „Who is absent?  Who is excluded?  And who is refused an audience?‟”   
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Chapter 4 
Methodology:  Strengths and Limitations 
 
“Qualitative methods are most useful and powerful when they are used to discover how 
respondents see the world” (McCracken, 1988: 21) 
 
     This chapter will detail the qualitative methodology utilized to carry out this study by 
reviewing the specifics of data sources, recruitment strategy, sample and sampling 
frames, semi-structured interviews, coding, analysis, and the methodological rationales 
for presenting this dissertation in the form of an “autoethnography” (Ellis and Bochner, 
2000: 733-768) reflexively explaining the research process through the first-person 
narrative medium of a “confessional tale” (Van Maanen, 1988: 73-100).  The chapter will 
conclude with a critical assessment of both the primary strengths and weaknesses of this 
particular approach.      
Epistemological Standpoint 
 
     Like virtually any research project, the methods employed in this dissertation serve as 
instruments to arrive at conclusion(s) presented in the form of valid knowledge claims 
(Power, 2002: 128).  I operate from the assumptions noted, and synthesized, by Power 
(2002: 128), 
„Empirical propositions have no absolute status, but are 
only claims to truth, to be tested as adequate through the 
inter-subjective judgment of the scientific community‟ 
(Fowler, 1996: 8).  The practice of science, and scientific 
sociology, involves „moving from a less true to a more true 
knowledge, or rather, as Bachelard puts it, an 
„approximated, that is to say, rectified, knowledge‟ 
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, 1991: 8).     
 
Data Sources 
 
     Semi-structured interviews with 24 people on Ontario Works in Oxford County serve 
as the primary data source for this monograph.  To address the central research question 
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and meet the research objectives, speaking directly with people on social assistance, and 
making these conversations the focal point of analysis, was a natural decision.  Data 
analysis is supplemented by welfare policy in the form of the Ontario Works Act, the 
legislation that preceded the OWA (the General Welfare Assistance Act), and selected 
political commentaries from the most outspoken proponents of the cultural logic of 
neoliberalism whose prominent “words of welfare” (Schram, 1995) were disseminated 
into public discourse, written into public policy, and (as I will demonstrate) inculcated 
into the subjectivities of respondents.  These data sources are suitable for answering the 
central research question guiding this inquiry:  How does OW, and the accompanying 
logic of neoliberal welfare reforms, impact the subjectivities of respondents?  
Recruitment 
 
     In the fall of 2006, I approached the executive director of Ontario Works Oxford 
soliciting his assistance in order to secure respondents to interview for this research.  I 
explained that I was a PhD student and a social worker with the local Children‟s Aid 
Society.  The executive director presented as quite approachable and asked, during this 
initial meeting, exactly what I was researching and what was prompting me to carry out 
this research.  I was candid in stating that I wanted to capture how OW was experienced 
on the ground by those most impacted by welfare reforms.  When probed further, I 
expressed concern with the logic informing welfare policy shifts in that it ultimately 
reduced the problems of poverty and unemployment to the personal deficits of the poor 
and unemployed.  But irrespective of my views, I advised that I wanted to speak with 
people on social assistance to find out, from their perspectives, what is and is not 
working.  The executive director gave me a nod of affirmation and proceeded to assist me 
in making provisions to facilitate data collection by including an informational flyer I had 
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created advertising the research (see appendices) within the social assistance checks that 
were mailed out in February 2007.       
     For ethical reasons of confidentiality, OW could not provide me with the contact info 
of people on social assistance, but they could make my study known to them.  OW 
Oxford was helpful in that the only requirements placed on me for advertising this 
research was assuming the cost of copying the flyers (925 in February 2007 and 904 in 
June 2007) and ensuring that all of the flyers were folded so that they could fit in a letter 
sized envelope.  In short, OW Oxford was helpful in facilitating this study.  For a social 
service organization to so easily facilitate an unsolicited researcher‟s request to examine 
how clients experience their services (especially when that researcher had been candid 
expressing concerns with the logic of the policy directives governing how the 
organization operated) was, in my view, impressive.                 
     Consistent with Baxter (1997), McCormack (2002) and Soss (2005), engaging 
economically disenfranchised people for research purposes proved challenging (and these 
challenges are often attributable to the effects of their disenfranchisement).  Recruiting 
enough participants proved difficult and it was not much of a consolation for me to 
realize that other researchers investigating comparable subject matter had gone through 
the similar challenges.  Power (2002: 139) detailed her experience by pointing out, 
lone mothers did not respond to more „sociologically 
acceptable‟ methods of recruitment, such as sending formal, 
written requests as for participation, but were willing to 
participate when referred by someone who was known.  
 
Snowball sampling had only limited success in my study as it provided me with two 
additional research participants.  Notwithstanding the discouraging challenges recruiting 
respondents, it was encouraging that those who became engaged in interviews, twenty 
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four in total, participated thoroughly in the interview process.  All respondents presented 
as very willing to share the particulars of their personal stories and detail their views on a 
variety of issues related to social policy and impoverishment.   
     The first round of recruitment secured 12 respondents who replied to the invitation to 
participate in this study and one additional participant via snowball sample.  Knowing 
that more respondents would be required, a second round of recruitment took place in 
June 2007 and this secured another 10 respondents who replied directly to the flyer 
soliciting research participants and another respondent via snowball sampling.  Snowball 
cases were solicited by asking each research participant if they knew anyone else on 
social assistance in Oxford county who might be interested in participating in my study.  
If respondents answered affirmatively, I provided them with additional flyers advertising 
this research and requested that they be passed on to anyone else on social assistance who 
may be interested in talking to me.  Both respondents secured via snowball sample 
advised that they did not receive the original flyer advertising my research with their 
social assistance check, but became familiar with this research via the contact that 
referred them to me.  While my intent was to provide every person in Oxford County an 
equal opportunity to participate in this research, it is not certain if everyone in the 
sampling frame ended up receiving notification of this study.   Through my social work 
position with a different organization, I was made aware of two other people in Oxford 
County who were on social assistance but did not receive the pamphlet advertising this 
research.  When I initially discovered this, my first instinct was to secure these two 
people for an interview and include them in my study.  The research ethics board at the 
University of Windsor, however, advised that this would not be permissible as it would 
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clearly constitute a conflict of interest.  This decision that was disappointing to me at the 
time, but in hindsight the REB at U of W was clearly fulfilling its role.  
     After 24 interviews it appeared that I had reached the point of saturation.  To be sure, 
each respondent had a somewhat unique story and a different way of expressing it.  
Further, there was also some uniqueness and variation in the ways each respondent 
articulated their views on various social and political issues that arose during the course 
of semi-structured interviews.  But amid the uniqueness and differences, there were also 
consistently recurring themes:  the undesirability of coming to OW, the instability and 
insecurity of life on the system, experiencing degradation, barriers to employment, and 
(perhaps most intriguingly) about how the poverty attributions respondents expressed 
about “others” simply did not fit with their own story.  In the later interviews, I was not 
hearing much that was different from what I was hearing earlier in the data collection 
process.  After having talked to twenty four people, it was time to move from analyzing 
each interview separately to a more comprehensive qualitative analysis determining what 
could, and could not, be meaningfully ascertained from the totality of all twenty four 
interviews.  The quality of my analysis, in part, would hinge upon understanding the 
sample of respondents who participated in this study in relation to the sampling frame 
from of all people on social assistance in the municipality where this research took place 
and the province of Ontario as a whole.  Further, to be credible, the conclusions drawn 
from this study (like those of any meaningful research) would have to be placed within 
the context of the knowledge base established by the existing research literature.      
The Sample in Relation to the Sampling Frames 
 
     The recruitment strategy for this research was designed to provide all people on social 
assistance in Oxford County an equal opportunity to participate in this research.  As 
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previously noted, at least four people in Oxford county who should have received the 
flyer advertising this research reported that they did not.  It is not known how many 
others of the more than 900 people in the sampling frame were not made aware of this 
research.  Just over 1% of the sampling frame participated in each round of recruitment.  
When Lightman (2003) carried out comparable research attempting to recruit people on 
social assistance in Toronto, there was an 8% response rate.  One can realistically deduce 
from these numbers that there were very likely more than four people who did not receive 
the flyer advertising this study. 
      As one might expect the sample that chose be interviewed was not a completely 
representative sample of the population under investigation.  It is necessary to look at the 
particulars of the sample in relation to the sampling frame.  This analysis will entail 
examining the demographic traits of age, gender, race, and family composition.  For each 
of these traits it will be made clear who was over and underrepresented and a discussion 
methodological implications will follow. 
Age  
 
      The age of respondents ranged from 27 to 59 years.  The average age of respondents 
was 42.14 years old with a standard deviation of 9.09.  While the average or standard 
deviation of the sampling frame was not available, the specific numbers of welfare 
recipients who fell into the following age brackets was provided to me by the MCSS.  
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AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLING FRAME (January 2007) AND SAMPLE 
 
Age 16-
19 
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-
54 
55-
59 
60-
64 
65 
+ 
% of the 
sampling 
frame 
 
N=200753 
5.94 15.67 14.19 12.69 12.79 13.04 10.61 7.18 4.74 2.79 .37 
% of 
sample 
0 0 16.6 12.5 12.5 4.16 20.83 8.33 12.5 0 0 
# = 0 0 4 3 3 1 5 2 3 0 0 
            
 
Source:  Electronic Correspondence With Ministry of Community and Social Services 
(2009) 
 
To concisely summarize who was over and under-represented in terms of age 
demographics, the youngest and oldest age cohorts were not represented at all and most 
age groups in between had an approximate representation.  One can reasonably posit that 
being at the extreme ends of the age groups expected to participate in the labour force 
poses unique barriers that were missed by this study.  Further, like virtually all qualitative 
research examined in the process of reviewing the literature, this study did not examine 
the perspectives of children.  This is a notable gap in the literature given that 
approximately 40% of OW beneficiaries are children. According to the MCSS, in January 
of ‟07, of the 422 641 total OW beneficiaries, 159 015 were children (37.62%).  In an 
attempt to limit the extent to which this limitation of excluding children‟s‟ voices detracts 
from the analysis in this study, chapter 5 will review qualitative data from the Interfaith 
Social Assistance Reform Coalition whereby children in poverty detail the realities of 
impoverishment. 
Gender 
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     Three quarters of respondents 75% (n = 18) were female and one quarter 25% (n = 6) 
were male.     During the month that data collection commenced for this research, January 
2007, there were 200 696 cases (referring to either a single individual or family unit).  Of 
those cases, 113 888 (56.7%) were female and 86 808 (43.2%)
16
 were male.  The total 
number of beneficiaries on OW (single individuals and heads of family units plus all their 
dependents) was 382 301.  Of all beneficiaries 151 944 (39.7%) were children. 
Comparing the sample to the sampling frame, then, women were overrepresented in this 
study, men were under-represented and children were not represented at all.  
Race 
 
     Twenty two respondents identified their race / ethnicity as white while one respondent 
advised that she was black and another stated that she was from aboriginal descent.  Like 
McCormack (2002: 10), “one weakness of my sample is the lack of racial diversity of 
those interviewed in the [research locale]”.  While only one of McCormack‟s seventeen 
respondents from the locale of an urban ghetto she called “Harbor City” was white, only 
two of twenty four respondents in my research project (8.3%) were not white.  According 
to Bezanson (2006) 13% of the Canadian population is non-white (Aboriginal or racial 
minority).  Given that 3.8% of the Canadian population is Aboriginal, this population was 
represented in my sample.  But it is important to not lose sight of the reality that having 
only one Aborignal person who opted not to make reference to their ethnicity does not 
even begin to cover the depth and prevalence of Aborignal impoverishment in Canada. 
(Specific data on racial inequality and poverty will be provided in the strengths and 
limitations section of this chapter).  Contact with the office of the Ontario Minister of 
                                                 
16
 The Ministry advised that the numbers were rounded and thus only add up to 99.9% of the caseload. 
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Community and social services revealed that the racial composition of OW recipients in 
Ontario is not known.   
Family Composition 
 
     In terms of gender and family composition, here are some demographic OW statistics, 
provided via personal correspondence with the MCSS
17
. In January of 2007,  single 
people with children constituted 70 166 (34.96%) of cases and 194 311 beneficiaries 
(50.82%), 118 065 (30.88%) of whom were children.  Single people with children were 
adequately represented in my sample then, given that 33.33% (n=8) fit into that family 
composition.  Single people with children constituted 72 597 (31.64%) cases and 200 118 
(47.43%) beneficiaries, 120 833 of whom were children.  Single adults were slightly 
over-represented in the sample, 41.6% (n=10).   
     While the lack of representativeness of the youngest and oldest categories of recipients 
is one limitation of this study it should be noted that even “the most carefully selected 
sample will almost never provide a perfect representation of the population from which it 
was selected.  There will always be some degree of sampling error” (Babbie, 1995: 226-
227).     
     As in any research project recruiting respondents, it is reasonable to conclude that 
participants who chose to participate probably had different characteristics from those 
who opted to remain on the sidelines.  Most of the people in my study were candid that 
they had no alternative but to rely on family and friends in moments of material and 
social crisis.  While acknowledging that different people have different reasons for 
participating (or not participating) in a research project, it seems reasonable to assume 
                                                 
17
 Sylvia Gurriero, a policy analyst with the Ministry of Community and Social Services provided the 
provincial demographics to me via electronic correspondence. 
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that others within the sampling frame may not have had this additional support and thus 
were too isolated and atomized to respond to my study.  Power (2002: 141) wrote about 
becoming familiar with two people in her community who chose not to respond to her 
request to be interviewed, 
These last two cases were poignant reminders that I was 
only able to recruit single mothers who had the security and 
resources to speak with me, and that there were others in 
more vulnerable and precarious situations who did not have 
those resources. 
     
To minimize the extent to which the sampling error limits this study – and to increase the 
verisimilitude of my argument – I will set my findings within the context of what other 
samples in other studies have found.  Notwithstanding some sampling limitations of this 
research, it is important to note that the generalizability of my argument is enhanced by 
the reality that they qualitative data gathered by other researchers examining different 
cohorts produced remarkably similar results.   
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
“The method [of interviewing] can take us into the mental world of the individual, to 
glimpse at the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world.  It can also take us 
in the lifeworld of the individual, to see the content and pattern of daily experience” 
(McCracken, 1988: 9) 
 
     I began each interview by remunerating respondents $15.00 and proceeded to explain 
to each participant their rights as a participant in the study.  I stated that I was not 
affiliated with OW and that under no circumstances would I compromise the anonymity 
of anyone who was a part of this research.  I discussed having gone through a research 
ethics board at the University of Windsor to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that 
no harm would come to people who participated in my research by virtue of their 
participation.  I invited respondents to choose a pseudonym for themselves and (where 
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relevant) their places of employment and explained the rationale for utilizing 
pseudonyms.  To protect respondent‟s pseudonyms are used throughout the write up of 
this research.  Almost without exception, this preamble to the interviews appeared to put 
respondents at ease.  I requested permission to audio tape interviews and advised 
respondents that they could have me turn off the audio recorder at any time without 
having to give me a rationale or explanation.   Each respondent signed the necessary 
releases to authorize audio recording the interviews and verify that they had been 
remunerated (see appendices).  It was made clear to all respondents that they did not have 
to answer any question that they did not want to answer, and that they reserved the 
unconditional right to end the interview at any time, for any reason, without having to 
explain or justify that decision.  I believe that describing the ethics safeguards to 
respondents had the effect of putting most conversational partners at ease during the 
interview process.  Except for three respondents who opted not to reveal their age, all 
respondents answered every question that was posed and no respondent exercised their 
right to have the audio recording device turned off or terminate the interview.   
     The content of my benchmark questions in the semi-structured interviews revolved 
primarily around the following areas:  coming to OW, living on a social assistance 
income, attempting to exit social assistance, support networks, experiences with workers 
and / or work placement, views on the Ontario Works Act, and suggestions for improving 
OW.  Open ended questions asked respondents to share any other experiences or views 
they wanted to discuss and asked if they felt we had missed anything important in our 
discussion.  This semi-structured approach allowed participants to emphasize the aspects 
of their experiences with OW that they deemed most important and to articulate their 
views in their own words.  The interview guide was specifically designed to concurrently 
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address questions that the existing research literature deemed problematic, yet at the same 
time to afford participants to discuss whatever they deemed relevant irrespective of the 
preconceived notions I had going into the interview.  The flexibility of the semi-
structured style afforded the opportunity to probe ideas, rephrase questions, and 
investigate the basis on which recipients‟ views were grounded.  
     Research participants were invited to choose the location of interviews.  Two thirds of 
respondents chose to be interviewed in their home, almost one third in a designated coffee 
shop chosen by conversational partners, and one participant chose to meet and tell her 
story in a local library.  All interviews were preceded with informal greetings and small 
talk that led into the ethics preamble prior to officially starting the interview.  When 
respondents made important comments outside interviews, I requested that they would 
repeat what they had said on my dictaphone (audio cassette recorder).  This request was 
accommodated on all occasions and it was common for respondents to appear pleased 
that I had a keen interest in recording what they had to say.  Almost all interviews lasted 
approximately one hour in duration with the shortest interview being forty five minutes 
and the longest lasting just over two hours. All of the people who participated in this 
study were promised anonymity in any public materials based on their interviews and 
were invited to choose their own pseudonym.  While a few respondents advised that I 
could use their real name, I opted not to do so.   
     Other researchers interviewing respondents under comparable conditions in different 
locales have noted that “most informants appeared surprisingly relaxed and comfortable 
with the interviews” (Soss, 2005: 23) presumably because they were eager to tell their 
story (Hays, 2003).  This was my perception of how most respondents experienced the 
interview process in this research.  It appeared that most could sense (and appreciate) that 
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the ethics preamble was designed to protect them, and in making it clear that I was not 
affiliated with OW I believe that most respondents gathered, quite correctly, I was 
carrying out this research because I may have some concern for their plight.  Also, in 
providing financial remuneration ($15.00) immediately when meeting with each 
respondent, and advising them that I would be remunerated from the department at my 
university, I believe assisted in building a favourable rapport with respondents.  This was 
significant because, 
When interview informants recount their own experiences, 
their stories are shaped by what they perceived at the time 
of the events, what they can remember during the interview, 
and what they are willing to share with the interviewer 
(Soss, 2005: 19). 
 
I believe that I solicited more data than I otherwise would have because informants‟ 
recollections did not appear compromised by anxiety during the interviews, and virtually 
all respondents seemed candid and open when revealing their personal stories and 
perspectives on policy. 
     In terms of the substantive content of interviews, comparable qualitative research has 
suggested that the cultural and sociological significance of the data analysis lies in the 
critical understanding that,      
The interviews were a meaning making process; while 
women recounted moments during which they experienced 
welfare stigma, their narratives also allowed [the 
researcher] to gain some insights into the process through 
which they construct their identity in relation to the 
discourse (McCormack, 2002: 15) 
 
The particulars of exactly how the insights of this research were gained via examination 
of the qualitative data lie in detailing the process of coding the transcripts to analyze the 
meaning making that resonated through the interviews. 
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Coding and Analysis 
 
“Data analysis is exciting because you discover themes and concepts embedded 
throughout your interviews” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 226). 
 
     All twenty-four interviews were transcribed in their entirety and entered into QSR N6 
qualitative software analysis program.  Transcribing the interviews myself provided me 
with an in-depth and detailed knowledge of the data I had to work with.  Further, because 
I was hearing the data for a second time during transcription, and often had visual images 
to supplement the auditory recording, the transcriptions were very likely more accurate 
than they would have been had I chosen to hire another person for this task (see Power, 
2002: 147-149).  After having carried out and transcribed the interviews, I listened to the 
audio recording of all twenty four interviews again prior to carrying out the coding 
process.  Further, each of twenty four transcripts were read separately to begin the process 
of beginning to make sense of the data as a coherent whole.  
     After the transcripts and audio recordings had been reviewed, coding was the first 
tangible step in the process of analysis.  Rubin and Rubin (1995: 238) define coding as, 
“the process of grouping interviewees‟ responses into categories that bring together 
similar ideas, concepts, or themes.”  As one might expect, the prospect of beginning the 
process of making sense of more than 300 pages of interview data was somewhat 
intimidating.  Coding the data effectively necessitated a comprehensive microanalysis.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 57), in a thorough examination of the coding process, define 
micro analysis as “the detailed line-by-line analysis necessary at the beginning of a study 
to generate initial categories (with their properties and dimensions) and to suggest the 
relationships among categories.”   
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    Nineteen general categories and codes provided the basis of analysis informing the 
write up. Within almost each category and code there were two recurring themes that 
resonated throughout the entirety of the qualitative data, virtually without exception (the 
exceptions will be examined in chapters 5 and 6).  First, when respondents would 
question, challenge or discredit the predominant cultural narratives about poverty and 
welfare receipt, they would concretely evidence their case by drawing upon their 
experiential knowledge and detailing why they did not consider themselves to be 
personally irresponsible in light of the circumstantial realities confronting them.  This 
phenomenon occurred throughout the explored themes of coming to social assistance, life 
„on the system‟, and when respondents discussed their efforts to leave welfare or detailed 
the undesirable reasons that realistically precluded this from happening.  These stories 
were often foregrounding or followed by stories of experiencing the stigma of poverty 
and welfare receipt – a stigma they claimed should not be applied to them. 
   Notwithstanding the frequency with which respondents spoke of experiencing an unfair 
stigma, interviewees would just as frequently accommodate and reproduce public 
discourse and the dominant pejorative narratives of welfare.  Specifically, it was common 
for conversational partners to discuss “others on the system” who fit the irresponsible 
“work-shy” caricatured images that initially fuelled reforms (and were later fuelled by 
reforms).  Going into the interviews, I was anticipating that I would encounter some 
“working class conservatism” (Gough, 1979)  in the form of in-group hostility (Bishop, 
1994), but I was completely  unprepared for how frequent, and in some cases how severe, 
this phenomenon would be.    Early in the data collection process I came to understand 
why my thesis supervisor had persisted in suggesting that I explore the merits of the 
governmentality paradigm and began to appreciate his patience when I was too mired in a 
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different theoretical orientation and conceptualization of power to understand that power 
does, in fact, pass through the people it has constituted.  While it was becoming clearer 
what theory would come to guide my research, I was still facing the problem of method 
and coding over three hundred pages.               
      The coding and analyses processes were heavily informed by Rubin and Rubin‟s 
superlative (1995) Qualitative Interviewing:  The Art of Hearing Data.   The extended 
discussion in a chapter aptly entitled “What Did You Hear?  Data Analysis” on 
recognizing concepts within themes proved particularly useful.  One particular passage is 
worth exploring in detail as it came to prove indispensable to my coding and analysis, and 
ultimately, to arriving at the central argument of my dissertation, 
Sometimes people describe a core idea but don‟t label it 
with a single word or phrase, so you then create a label 
yourself for the concept . . .  When looking for concepts and 
core ideas that interviewees have not labelled with the 
specific word, ask yourself first, „what is the interviewee 
talking about?‟  Then, is the idea important?  If it is 
important, can I summarize this idea with a word or phrase 
that suggests the meaning of the underlying idea?  If the 
answer to that question is also yes, you have yourself a 
concept (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 231). 
  
Supplementing Rubin and Rubin‟s practical directives, I also asked myself how 
frequently this unnamed idea presented itself among different respondents.  I found the 
qualitative data I had gathered was exceptionally amenable to having an application of 
this analytical process, so much so, that I found the process of coding to be exciting 
because I began to feel that I had stumbled upon some important insights.  Virtually all 
respondents expressed the core ideas of being treated harshly or rudely (both within and 
beyond the welfare bureaucracy) because of their impoverishment or welfare receipt, and 
described why this de-contextualized harsh treatment was unfair given the realities of 
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their lives. Yet the core explanation given by virtually all respondents when asked “why 
do you think poor people are poor?” was “because there is something wrong with them”.  
Often, that “something” was taken to be an irresponsible aversion to work.  When I 
looked at these recurring passages repeatedly, and asked myself what the interviewees 
were talking about, I determined that they were talking about, and exhibiting, classism.  
Looking closer, I asked,  “within [this] one category . . . how uniform are the examples?  
Do the illustrations suggest some nuance of meaning in concept or theme?  (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995: 252) I answered by creating two subsidiary coding categories: 
“experiencing classism” and “exhibiting classism”.  When I asked if these ideas were 
important, the obvious answer was “yes”.  Summarizing these themes was possible, and I 
recognized that I had stumbled upon an under-researched concept – and a very real but 
un-named cultural phenomenon -- to write about. 
     Qualitative Interviewing:  The Art of Hearing Data also proved invaluable in 
providing another practical directive for my analysis that also proved to be an integral 
component in the cultivation of my central argument,  
When you are looking for underlying meanings and themes, 
it can be useful to pick out and analyze stories . . . A story if 
often thought out in advance and designed to make a point, 
usually one that cannot be made in a direct way . . . . Stories 
often communicate significant themes that explain a topical 
or cultural arena.  Because interviewees seldom preface 
stories with “I am going to tell you a story”, you have to 
learn to recognize them.  (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 231). 
  
     On countless other occasions it became easy to pick up on what was occurring during 
interviews because I had the good fortune of being armed with the insights of Rubin and 
Rubin (1995) whose extensive experience in qualitative research show that it is common 
for respondents to articulate their views through the medium of a story. When I 
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specifically began to look for stories within the qualitative data, they were clearly 
abundant and I went back to Rubin and Rubin (1995: 233) to make sense of the stories, 
“Once you notice a story, try to figure out what lessons it is trying to communicate.  In 
cultural studies . . .  stories often present moral themes.”   When I began to examine the 
underlying meanings and themes  of these stories (which we will examine in detail in the 
findings chapters 5 – 7), my central argument – armed with a pivotal concept unnamed in 
the data -- started to take shape.     
     When I continued to analyze and re-analyze the qualitative data in N6, the recurring 
patterns I noted about the relatively common meanings about poverty, welfare, and taxes 
it started to became clear that “culture and social structure were mapped into the mental 
structures of the persons studied” (Denzin, 1997: xvi), social structure being a recurring 
pattern of perception or behaviour that are external to individuals but that exerts a 
coercive influence on their lives.  My interview data suggest that there are structured and 
patterned attributions for impoverishment, and this phenomenon transcends my project.  
“Research consistently shows that Americans tend to associate poverty with personal 
deficiency and failure and to hold the poor in low esteem.”  (Soss, 2005: 38)  There was 
clearly something happening in my data that was larger than the interviewees who were 
providing me with their insights.  I went back to Rubin and Rubin again because I 
recalled that they had given direction on hearing themes, “When you hear themes, ask 
yourself which ones go together.  Related themes help you build towards a broader 
description of an overall theory”  (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 234).   The illustration provided 
was directly germane to my investigation,   
Themes provide explanations for how or why things 
happen.  „People are poor because they are lazy‟ or „People 
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are poor because companies buy equipment and lay off 
workers‟ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 234). 
   
     As I concluded my analysis, I began to locate my finding within what other 
researchers had discovered.  I thought about how social psychological theory on prejudice 
and poststructural theory on discourse, together, could explain what was happening,  
In the final stages of analysis, you organize the data in ways 
that help you formulate themes, refine concepts, and link 
them together to create a clear description of a culture or 
topic.  This material is then interpreted in terms of the 
literature and theories in the researchers field (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995: 251). 
 
Chapters 5-7 are the culmination of merging theory and method to highlight my findings 
within the context of the existing literature.   
The Rationale For an Autoethnography Written in the form of a Confessional Tale. 
   
“The most admirable thinkers within the scholarly community . . . do not split their work 
from their lives.  They seem to take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, and they 
want to use each for the enrichment of the other” (Mills, 1959: 195) 
  
     An autoethnography is an “autobiographical genre of writing and research that 
displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural” (Ellis 
and Bochner, 2000: 739).  Confessional tales (Van Maanen, 1988: 73-100) acknowledge 
openly that, 
Ethnographic writing of any kind is a complex matter, 
dependent on an unaccountable number of strategic choices 
and active constructions (e.g. what details to include or 
omit; how to summarize the present data; what voice to 
select; what quotations to use) (Van Maanen, 1988: 73) 
 
Confessional tales make the above named decisions, that are frequently latent and 
unaccountable in different writing genres, manifest and accountable by re-counting them 
as they occurred throughout the “confessional” research process.  Far from compromising 
the integrity of scholarship, this accountability puts the reader in a more informed 
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position to assess the merits of research because the processes and logic of arriving at the 
central conclusions are more open to analysis and critique.   This genre of writing can 
differ in the extent to which emphasis is placed on the research process (graphy), personal 
(auto), and cultural (ethnos) (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 740).  While most of this thesis 
will focus on the cultural given that the primary research question is investigating the 
impact of cultural influences on subjectivities, at select points I also document aspects of 
my personal biography (auto) and the research process (graphy).  Part of my rationale for 
doing so is concisely stated thus, 
Qualitative researchers try to be conscious of the 
perspective they bring to a study.  For that reason, they 
often explain their own background and particular interest 
in the research question as part of the report (Locke, et al 
2000: 99). 
 
The positivist „doctrine of immaculate perception” (Van Maanen, 1988: 73) should, at the 
time of this writing, seem methodologically passé.  My academic rationale for turning to 
an autoethnography is bolstered by a realization posited in the form of a rhetorical 
question, 
Why should we take it for granted that an author‟s personal 
feelings and thoughts should be omitted?  After all, who is 
the person collecting the evidence, drawing the inferences, 
and reaching the conclusions?  (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 
734). 
 
Comprehensively researching the subject matter of governance through discourse in the 
realm of child welfare, Cradock candidly acknowledges in his doctoral dissertation that 
“it would be dishonest of me to pretend that my occupational experience and the tacit 
knowledge this experience created have not coloured my deliberations” (Cradock, 2003: 
14).  I seek to emulate this candour and will reflexively account for the undeniable reality 
that in arriving at the conclusion that classism is embedded in welfare policy and 
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discourse, I collected the evidence, I drew the inferences, and I reached the conclusions.  
My valuations lead me to conclude that everyone deserves access to an adequate standard 
of living and that everyone deserves to be treated with decency.  My evidence has led me 
to draw the conclusion that OW has produced results diametrically opposed to these 
values.  
     Equally important, the processes that led me to pose the question I posed and arrive at 
the conclusions that are at the foundation of my work will be transparent so that the 
readers can decide if I have adequately controlled for personal bias and thoroughly assess 
the merits of my reasoning.  This personal and methodological transparency, according to 
Geertz, is grounded in the argument that, 
If you want to understand what science is you should look 
in the first instance not at its theories or its findings, and 
certainly not at what its apologists say about it; you should 
look at what the practitioners of it do  (Van Maanen, 1988: 
73). 
 
Methodologically, these select personal accounts will serve the function of an open 
reflexivity that is transparent about what led me to carry out this research, my experiences 
conducting this study, and the logic and reasoning behind my analysis and conclusions.  
The first step in controlling for researcher bias, is to acknowledge that all researchers 
have pre-dispositions and acknowledging what those predispositions are (and how they 
will be managed) enhances the credibility of the end result produced by the researcher.  
The reflexive honesty and transparency necessitated by this process leads to a greater 
self-understanding necessary for understanding others and the world in which self and 
others exist.  Notwithstanding select excerpts of reflexivity, this research will remain 
primarily interview based focusing more on the cultural. 
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The Habit of Truth 
 
     Notwithstanding researcher bias I will commit to “the habit of truth” (Locke, et al, 
2000: 25) as there could be no scholarly accumulation of reliable knowledge without this 
commitment.  Adam (1978: 5-6) writes an extended passage that warrants examination, 
Traditional selections of evidence tend often to perform an 
unwitting cover up of the behaviour examined here.  A 
certain romantic liberalism runs through the literature, 
evident from attempts to paper over and discount the very 
real problems of inferiorization.  Some researchers seem 
bent on „rescuing‟ their subjects from „defamation‟ by 
ignoring the problems of defeatism and complicit self 
destruction.  Avoidance of dispiriting reflection upon the 
day-to-day practice of dominated people appears to spring 
from a desire to „enhance‟ the reputation of the dominated 
and magically relieve their plight. 
   
While I must confess a desire to rescue poor people from defamation, I realize that I am 
not going to do that by “ignoring the problems of defeatism and complicit self 
destruction” that did appear within my data.  My desire does not extend so far as to ignore 
harsh realities or engage in unwitting cover ups.  Adam (1978: 6) goes on to cite Memmi, 
“As for most social romantics . . . the victim remains proud and intact through oppression:  
he suffered but did not let himself be broken.”   
    I consciously have made a significant effort to include in my qualitative data analysis 
evidence that does not support my central argument (i.e. there were instances when some 
respondents defended not only themselves, but other poor people as well) and I have 
included interviewees‟ voices when they spoke highly of OW.  I explicitly discuss that 
one respondent in my study did acknowledge having a drug addiction problem and that 
another respondent acknowledged that his decision to apply for social assistance as 
teenager was not a good (or necessary) one in hindsight.  I don‟t attempt to paint every 
interviewee or poor person as a saintly hero.  But I do attempt to convey my argument 
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that the label “poor person” or “welfare recipient” creates culturally sanctioned meanings 
that too frequently predispose people to see the polar opposite image of a saintly hero.  I 
have included many stories from respondents articulating their beliefs about “others” 
living in conditions of impoverishment.  I offer an interpretation for many of these stories 
(presented verbatim) that will enable to the reader to draw conclusions about the fairness 
of the analyses emanating from both the research respondents and myself.           
 “How are qualitative studies to be evaluated in the contemporary post-structural 
moment?” (Denzin, 1997: 4) 
 
     Denzin (1997: 9) suggests that the traditional methodological criterion of “validity has 
been replaced with the words authority and legitimation”.  Authority and legitimacy are, 
in turn, seen as the extent to which a study has reproduced, simulated, or mapped 
something significant in the social world that had previously gone uncharted.  Further, 
These understandings are based on glimpses and slices of 
culture in action.  Any given practice that is studied is 
significant because it is an instance of a cultural practice 
that happened in a particular time and place.  Its importance 
lies in the fact that it instantiates a cultural practice [or] a 
cultural performance (Denzin, 1997: 8). 
 
The reader can make the determination if this monograph has legitimately instantiated the 
cultural practices of classism as they appear in the words of welfare. 
     Authority and legitimacy, moreover, are earned by the transparency of the research 
process and an openness and candidness about the reasoning that brought the researcher 
to the question en route to the answer.  Just as the world as we know it has been socially 
constructed, so has the research that examines that world.  Further, all credible research 
must be placed in the context of scholarship and be clear about what contributions are 
being added while simultaneously remaining cognizant of its own limitations and aware 
of ground that has remained uncharted.    
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Strengths and Limitations of this Study 
 
    Like any research, this project has both methodological and theoretical limitations.  In 
confessional tales, “missing data, incompleteness, blind spots, and various other 
obscurities are admitted into the account” (Van Maanen, 1988: 91).  The nature of social 
analysis is such that not only is it impossible to cover all aspects of a given issue in one 
report, it is also equally untenable to acknowledge all that is missing from a particular 
analysis.  Nonetheless, being aware of how different perspectives were downplayed or 
missing from an argument lends credibility to the insights produced.  Here are some 
insights that were given only limited attention in my analysis. 
     First, by zoning in on how classism (as a single analytic form of oppression) is 
embedded in welfare policy and reproduced in public discourse this manuscript gives 
only a thin coverage of other inter-related prejudices and glosses over insights that could 
have been provided by other theoretical lenses.  While no project can be all 
encompassing, there are insights (expanding on the limited discussions from theory 
chapters three and four) that were not fully developed in my analysis.  Here are select 
perspectives from other authors and theoreticians that could have been further developed 
in my work.   
     A gender based evaluation (Greene-Sang, 1999) would have detected particular 
patterns in my qualitative data that are reflective of larger sociological inequalities.  Some 
of the women in this study came to OW because they left an abusive relationship and the 
realities of providing child care seriously undercut their capacity for competing in the 
labour market.  This was not the case for any of the men in my study nor had this 
experience been reported by any man in the extensive welfare scholarship informing this 
research.  While Armstrong and Armstrong (1990: 7) note that „women still bear the 
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responsibility for child care and domestic work‟ that work remains undervalued despite 
the reality that if it had to be replaced, it would cost money (Eichler, 1980).  Further, in 
not extensively examining the social realities of gender based inequality, this monograph 
limited discussion of how what appears to be a natural or given arrangement (i.e. that 
women care for children while men are largely exonerated from that task) is in fact a 
cultural phenomenon.  Welfare policies discourage all family forms except a traditional 
family wage system and while policy poses as gender neutral, there are patently 
inequitable gendered effects.  While I would not be adding anything to the literature by 
repeating the sound arguments and insights of a gender based analysis examining welfare 
reform (Hays, 2003; Lessa, 1999; McCormack, 2002; Power, 2005; Power, 2002; Greene-
Sang, 1999) I would like to limit the extent to which this limitation limits my study by 
presenting data provided by Ontario Works Oxford.  This data shows a consistent pattern 
that concretely evidences that as children get older and thus require less caregiving, 
parents overwhelmingly return to the labour force. A careful analysis shows that entry 
into the labour force is frequently undercut by the demands of caregiving.   
Demographics of OW Oxford Caseload, January 2007, 2008, and 2009 
(Source:  Electronic Correspondence with Lynn Chenier from OW Oxford). 
Month # of 
singles 
# of 
sole 
support 
parents 
# of 
couples 
with no 
children 
# of 
couples 
with 
children 
# of 
adults 
# of 
Dependent 
adults. 
Children 
0-6 
years 
 
 7-12 
years 
 
13-
17 
years 
total 
#of 
children 
Jan. 
„07 
407 384 28 32 911 11 372 212 103 687 
Jan. 
„08 
469 392 25 42 995 6 396 222 107 725 
Jan. 
„09 
608 415 31 70 1225 18 442 220 134 796 
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A careful analysis of these numbers shows that as children get older and the demands of 
caregiving thus lessen, the need for social assistance receipt becomes much less common.  
Notably, for each year of available data, there are more than three times as many sole 
support parents with young children (0-6 years) in receipt of assistance than sole support 
parents of older children (13-17 years).  The gendered caricatures of the “lazy welfare 
Mom” not only minimize caring labour, but ignore the reality that most single parents 
return to the labour force after they have met the most time consuming demands of their 
caring labour during the formative years of their children.  While the extent of gender 
analysis is limited in this study, at various stages throughout the manuscript I will point 
out the gender inequalities that are embedded in welfare discourse and were experienced 
by several respondents.   
 Racial Inequality in the Labour Market 
     A segmented labour market theory would look at the racial distribution of 
impoverishment in Canada to note the patterns of racial inequity.  While the classic 
Vertical Mosaic (Porter, 1965) imagery in Canada has shown some improvement The 
Vertical Mosaic Revisited (Helms-Hayes and Curtis, 1995) shows that racial inequality 
has not entirely flattened the mosaic.  This study had only one person (4.16% of the 
sample) who reported being from Aboriginal descent.  According to Hurtig (2008: 37) 
3.8% of Canada‟s population is Aboriginal.  Aboriginal people are the most economically 
disenfranchised ethno-cultural group in the country.  Thirty five percent of on-reserve 
Aboriginals are on welfare (Hurtig, 2008: 38) but the MCSS could not provide data about 
the racial composition of social assistance recipients.  According to Poverty and Policy in 
Canada:  Implications for Health and Quality of Life,  
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Poverty rates for Aboriginal Canadians are higher in 
relation to overall Canadian rates.  The Canadian 2000 
census revealed that 31.2% of Aboriginal Canadians living 
in families were living in poverty as compared to the 
overall Canadian rate of 12.9% (Raphael, 2007: 64).    
 
     While chapter 4 briefly acknowledges that a class analysis of welfare reform could 
reveal compelling insights, and suggests that the strengths of Marxist and Foucaultian 
conceptualizations of power should be merged to arrive at the conclusion that the public 
discourse of neoliberalism is patently ideological, a closer look at my qualitative data 
reveals that another powerful Marxian concept could very easily be applied.  If 
hegemony, as Gramsci (1971) defined it, is an uncritical acceptance of „common sense‟, 
that reflects the cultural domination of one group over another, then hegemony was 
rampant throughout the qualitative data in this monograph, particularly in the most 
revealing responses explaining poverty.  The accepted rhetoric of the common sense 
revolution could truly be taken as a case study in hegemony.  To fully draw out the merits 
of this argument would require a fuller analysis of another theoretical paradigm and is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  The final chapter of this manuscript, however, will 
discuss how this notion should be explored in future research.       
     Notwithstanding the limitations noted above, the verisimilitude of my analysis is 
partially enhanced by comparable research (McCormack, 2002; Copeland, 2003; Hays, 
2003 and Kingfisher, 1996) that corroborates my claim that there is a notable disjuncture 
between the way people living on social assistance present themselves as materially and 
morally more worthy than they have been treated, while concurrently leaving the cultural 
stereotypes of impoverishment unchallenged by invoking negative views of “the other” 
lazy people scamming the system.   
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     Further, the transparency of the process of my methodology and analysis allows the 
reader to assess openly assess the merits of my reasoning and central conclusions.  Like 
Neysmith et al (2005) the intentional use of extended verbatim excerpts from 
interviewees also permits the reader, to a large extent, to carry out their own analysis of 
the content of my qualitative data.       
     Finally, the authority of my analysis partially lies in grafting well established social 
psychological theory on prejudice with poststructural theory on discourse to an applied 
qualitative data set.    My qualitative analysis of empirical data then arrives at the 
conclusion that classism is insidiously embedded in welfare discourse and reproduced by 
– survives in -- the “words of welfare”.  Mills (1959: 201) once argued that “imagination 
is often successfully invited by putting together hitherto isolated items, by finding 
unsuspected connections.”  My aim, by the end of this monograph, is to convince the 
reader that Gibran was expressing a profound observation when he noted that “the 
obvious is that which is never seen until someone expresses it simply” (Bowman, 1998: 
193).  As a final note on methodology, I concur with the assertion that,        
Although it is often extraordinarily difficult to explicate the 
standards of evidence, the criteria of relevance, paradigms 
of explanation, and norms of truth that inform such 
distinctions, informed judgments can be made . . . there are 
some things than can be known (Hawkesworth, 1989: 555). 
   
The reader can examine my methods and reasoning to decide, in the following three value 
added chapters, if I have adequately evidenced my central argument that classism is 
latently embedded in welfare policy and insidiously reproduced in public discourse. 
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Chapter 5 
Subjugated Knowledges:  Respondents’ Views of Self 
 
“It can be argued that poverty is not [just] a matter of low well being, but of the inability 
to pursue well being precisely because of the lack of economic means” (Sen, 1992: 110). 
      
     The aim of this chapter is to make the discourses of respondents (who are consistently 
marginalized in the policy making process) visible and connect their voices to others who 
have written about, and understand, poverty from a grounded experiential knowledge 
base – in other words, to promote “an understanding of poverty from those who are poor” 
(Baker – Collins, 2005).  In so doing, I will take up Foucault‟s (2003: 7) call for an 
“insurrection of subjugated knowledges.”  To achieve this aim, I will first review the 
recurring themes, and the few anomalies to those recurring themes, of how respondents 
described the circumstances of coming to social assistance, the material and social 
realities of subsisting „on the system‟ both within and beyond the welfare bureaucracy, 
and the barriers conversational partners reportedly faced in attempting to re-enter the 
workforce in a manner that would enable them to leave welfare.  Twenty two (of twenty 
four) respondents had compelling rationales for applying for social assistance and they  
articulated these rationales -- i.e. job loss, health, relationship breakdown, child care 
demands -- with detail and clarity.  Twenty three respondents advised that the material 
realities of social assistance were extraordinarily difficulty and all twenty four 
respondents spoke of being treated harshly because of their poverty and / or welfare 
receipt.  Respondents also did a commendable job detailing the material, health, and 
childcare barriers that realistically precluded re-entry into the labour force. 
     After presenting the embodied stories of research participants, I will review a small 
but compelling literature from subaltern actors who have experienced poverty and make 
connections between those subaltern voices and the subjugated knowledges of the 
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respondents in this research.  Considering this literature, it becomes clear that the 
subjugated perspectives of the people in the research sample transcends the respondents 
with whom I spoke (and are comparable to others who have experienced 
impoverishment).  The task of establishing the commonalities in the subjugated 
knowledges of economically and socially disenfranchised people functions to break many 
of the stereotypes that are written into welfare policy and implicit in the “words of 
welfare”. 
     Respondents‟ narratives, contrary to popular images, overwhelmingly suggest that the 
rationales for coming to the system were not grounded in a lack of personal 
responsibility.  There were several stories about why people ended up on social 
assistance, and it was clear from virtually all respondents that coming to the system were 
frequently precipitated by undesirable circumstances beyond their control (i.e. health 
problems, relationship break down, caregiving demands, loss of a job via company 
closure or lay off, etc.).  Many respondents reported that they only resorted to applying as 
a mechanism of survival when they were left with no other viable options.  Surviving on 
the system was described as very difficult, for a number of reasons that we will examine 
in detail, and demanded informal support networks for virtually everyone.  Even with the 
assistance of those informal support networks, it was common for needs to remain unmet.  
Daily life, both materially and socially, on the system was frequently portrayed as 
uncomfortable, often to the point of being incapacitating “precisely because of the lack of 
economic means”.  Notwithstanding the dependency discourse of the “common sense 
revolution”, the barriers to exiting welfare were never reported as being too comfortable 
on welfare.  Several respondents talked about their grocery shopping patterns (or lack 
thereof when they were completely out of money) and, notwithstanding the rhetoric of 
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material opulence that originated in American welfare politics, there was no discussion of 
steaks, elk, or venison.  Even when reportedly shopping very carefully and very modestly, 
there was often “month left at the end of the money.”  In hearing the subjugated voices of 
respondents in this chapter, and later connecting their voices to others who have written 
about, and understand, poverty from a grounded experiential knowledge base, I will join 
Baker-Collins‟s (2005) compelling project of promoting “an understanding of poverty 
from those who are poor.”  This project, I contend, is necessary because policy has been 
formed with misunderstandings from those who are not poor.       
     To understand how respondents assess and interpret their own lives in relation to the 
public perceptions of impoverishment and welfare, during the course of semi-structured 
interviews with twenty four respondents, I asked them among other things (see appendix 
1) what brought them to social assistance, what their life was like living „on the system‟, 
what barriers they faced to employment, what they believed would assist them, and how 
they managed to survive on a social assistance income.  Respondents, almost without 
exception, answered these questions, with compelling detail.  When probed to expand on 
a thought or experience, respondents filled in the necessary details to tell their story.  On 
several occasions conversational partners would push back against the dominant 
discourse. 
     There were two themes that were widespread among respondents.  First, there was a 
consensus (save for one exception) that the material realities of life of welfare were 
exceptionally uncomfortable, often to the point where well being -- and thus the capacity 
to move forward -- was compromised.  Several respondents (almost one third of the 
sample) made a point of emphasizing that OW workers and administrators should be 
forced to live on a social assistance income for a brief period so that they could come to 
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understand what they misunderstand about the daily living realities of impoverishment:  
namely, that it takes material resources and a certain level of well being to secure, get to, 
and maintain regular employment.  Second, the social and cultural realities of life on 
welfare, both within and beyond the welfare bureaucracy, were similarly seen as very 
negative.   Virtually all respondents spoke of being on the receiving end of degrading 
stigmata associated with welfare receipt and impoverishment.  The harsh social realities 
were articulated clearly in such statements as “you are treated as if you are the lowest 
form on earth” and seen as “less than human.”   It is to respondents‟ stories we now turn. 
Coming to OW 
 
“Legitimate reasons for needing public assistance are increasingly hard to articulate in 
such a [mainstream]discourse, and the positive benefits to one‟s family and society are as 
well” (Schram, 2006: 130). 
 
     One of my opening questions to research respondents enquired about the factors 
prompting them to apply to social assistance.  Most respondents thoroughly answered this 
question with ease, detailing the specifics of the circumstances that initially brought them 
to OW.  It was common for respondents to point out that applying for social assistance 
was a last resort -- and one of desperation -- when previous means, for reasons beyond 
their control, no longer enabled them to meet necessary living expenses.  In short, coming 
to OW was often described as a last-ditch act of survival (i.e. “It was my life, and I was 
doing what I had to do” (Heather).  The specific details of respondents‟ stories about 
coming to OW will be categorized here into the five most common themes: health 
challenges, loss of employment, relationship break down, child care responsibilities, and 
other factors.  Several respondents reported experiencing more than one of these factors 
concurrently:  i.e. Adrienne‟s health problems of fibromyalgia and osteoporosis 
reportedly played a role in her relationship breakdown when her ex-husband chose not to 
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remain with her (and because he was a wage earner had the freedom to leave their 
relationship quite easily).  Alison also reported a relationship breakdown coinciding with 
news from her doctor that she had a cancerous tumour.  Diane had a severe leg infection, 
requiring intense medical treatment and antibiotics, coincide with a divorce while 
attempting to carry out child care duties.  While these three examples are among the most 
compelling, hearing the detailed nuances of respondents‟ stories as they articulated them, 
the circumstantial plight of people is put in a context that is too frequently ignored, or lost 
to sight, when respondents are categorically defined as dependent welfare recipients.  
Contrary to the logic underlying “personal responsibility” welfare policy shifts, the 
rationale for applying to social assistance was not, “I just don‟t feel like working 
anymore.”  Virtually all respondents were aware of this common cultural perception and 
categorically rejected its application to their circumstances.  Each respondent had a much 
different story – grounded in their personal experience -- about what brought them to 
OW, and most were eager to provide contextual details.  In telling their stories, which we 
will now examine, respondents consistently resisted and rejected the dominant discourses 
of welfare in relation to their embodied experience.  
Health Challenges  
 
“Different people feel that different factors affect one‟s ability to secure employment.  
What factors do you feel have affected you?”  (Interviewer) 
 
“My health.”  (Alice, research respondent) 
 
     Research has repeatedly shown a strong association between poverty and ill health 
(O‟Connor and Olsen, 1998: 164; Social Planning Council of Toronto, 1999: 7; Raphael, 
2007: 205-237).  Health officer Dr. John Millar has argued, 
We have reached a point where you can think of poverty 
and low income the way in the past we have thought of 
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smoking.  It‟s as causally related to people‟s poor health as 
smoking and lung cancer.  It‟s that solid (Capponi, 1997: 
42). 
 
Health factors, resulting from illness and / or injury, were prominent in the explanations 
for applying to OW among the respondents of this study.  While there are certainly some 
variations in these stories, there is also an underlying theme.  To adapt, and paraphrase, 
the compelling wisdom of John Sweeney, “If you don‟t have your health, nothing else 
matters.”     
     Prior to delving into respondents‟ stories, it is important to return to theorizing on the 
tenuous nature of classification and categorization to show that there are very deep 
shortcomings in the manner in which a binary either / or „disability status‟ – eligible or 
ineligible -- is legislatively constructed (Lightman, 2009).  As we examined earlier, 
categorization frequently works by dominant conceptual opposition creating a totalizing 
binary presuming a pregiven homogeneity.  We have established that Foucault made it 
clear that as soon as we question many of the assumptions implied by pre-given by 
classifications, they immediately break down.  This theorizing has a very direct 
application to disability policy because the bureaucracy of the application process rigidly 
classifies one a fully disabled (and eligible) or, much more often, able and thus ineligible 
(Lightman, 2009) and persons whose health challenges do not fit with the eligible 
categories are denied support (or channelled in Ontario Works with less support).        
     Alice‟s appearance was a good fifteen years older than the age (59) she reported at the 
start of our interview.  Alice greeted me at the door of her modest bachelor apartment.  
When I came in the first thing that I noticed about Alice was that she moved, hunched 
over, very slowly and gingerly – like she was in some kind of physical discomfort.  She 
wore an old and tattered beige shawl and had noticeably dry skin, a wrinkled forehead, 
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scraggly greying hair, and hardened dark brown eyes.  Alice advised of what brought her 
to OW following seven years of employment – initially full time but then part time -- as a 
Community Support Worker with the Red Cross.        
Yes.  I can tell you it was my doctor.  I have arthritis and I 
have a medical history of different things that make it 
difficult for me to work.  One of those problems is that I had 
a hip replacement 11 years ago and that was partially the 
result of a long term circulation problem.  And another 
problem was because of having children
18
 I had a 
prolapsed uterus and bladder so I had surgery there and a 
[medical device that was not audible in audio recording] to 
support my bladder so I am not able to do heavy lifting.  I 
also have carpel tunnel syndrome in my wrists and severe 
arthritis in my thumbs so that means I couldn‟t do lifting.  
So on November 1, 2006 my doctor signed a form to say 
that I would no longer be able to work for the Canadian 
Red Cross that I had worked for the previous seven years.  
Then I received unemployment insurance until March 1 and 
then my doctor said that I would need to find another line of 
work that I could go back to on March 1.  So I joined OW to 
help me get a job and get some financial support because I 
had no income after unemployment insurance ended 
[Alice]. 
 
Alice advised that her former employer (The Red Cross) understood her challenges from 
the onset of her health problems, “They were very good to me.  They allowed me to work 
part time and have modified duties.”  While Alice‟s doctor deemed that she was not fit to 
return to her previous line of work, he encouraged her to seek alternative (less physically 
demanding) employment, which she was in the process of doing at the time of our 
interview in the summer of 2007.  Alice described how her present health dilemma makes 
it difficult for her to secure employment, 
 There are some days when I am able to function and some 
days I actually even feel pretty good, but that is definitely 
                                                 
18
 An injury or health problem incurred in the process of production within the labour market would have a 
much higher chance of securing material remuneration than a health problem or injury incurred by the 
labour of reproduction.  
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not every day.  There are some days when it is painful just 
to get out of bed.  Today was one of those days.  Now how 
many bosses are going to understand that? 
 
  The “either / or” orthodoxy of current disability policy clearly did not do justice to the 
nature of Alice‟s episodic disability.  Like others in my sample, Alice languished in a 
state of being “Not Disabled Enough” (Lightman, 2009) from the standpoint of satisfying 
eligibility requirements. 
     Frances arranged for our interview to take place at a local coffee house.  I arrived 
shortly before the arranged interview time.  I saw Frances pull up with her boyfriend in a 
loud and rusted pickup truck that appeared to be 20 years old.  Frances was a heavy set 
woman of 47 years who also moved very slowly.  She described the circumstances that 
brought her to OW, 
I have degenerative disc disorder.  Even with this disorder I 
was a bartender and a waitress for fourteen years and my 
doctor said that I was unable to continue working.  Because 
I couldn‟t stand for long periods of time and I couldn‟t sit 
for long periods of time.  I couldn‟t find a job that would 
suit me when I needed to take a break and when I needed to 
lay down.  My doctor said that I couldn‟t stand on my feet 
all day so if you can‟t find a different job you are going to 
have to quit work.  So I ended up on social assistance which 
in turn just, as of last week, got me on to disability. 
[Frances]    
 
Frances reported that she had been trying for four years to qualify for disability, and that 
her doctor had been fully supportive of her application from day one.  Frances was the 
one respondent I interviewed who had qualified for ODSP.  After a prolonged application 
process that lasted several years, Frances became eligible for ODSP after she committed 
to being interviewed for this research but prior to the interview taking place. 
     I interviewed Gloria in her one-bedroom subsidized housing unit that she shared with 
her cat.  Gloria was a 51 year old woman with completely gray hair.  Her apartment was 
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full of pictures of her three children, whom she stated regularly help her with additional 
groceries or securing rides to her many medical appointments.  She too was trying to 
qualify for disability, 
The main reason I applied is that I have health problems 
interfering with my work . . . Since my 30‟s I have had two 
major and one minor operation.  My back and legs went 
completely out six years ago.  Now, I have osteo and 
rheumatoid arthritis. [Gloria] 
 
Gloria also advised that her application to ODSP had the full support of her doctor.  
Gloria advised, 
I would love to go back to work but that isn‟t going to 
happen.  My body is too old to work but I am too young to 
retire, and that is a terrible to have to deal with everyday. 
 
Gloria was one of several respondents who noted that her health clearly precluded a 
secure attachment to the labour force, but her health challenges were not readily visible.  
Health problems are not always obvious and some people may appear in good health yet 
be unable to work.  This problem frequently evokes suspicion from others (Kimpson, 
2000). 
     Heather was a 27 year-old woman whom I interviewed at her residence.  Heather 
rented a room in a large 4-bedroom home that she reported was approximately one-
hundred years old.   She arranged for our interview to take place when her roommates 
were not home (and later explained the rationale that she was embarrassed about being on 
OW).  The challenges that reportedly brought Heather into contact with OW were not 
physical, but certainly presented her with a self-reported different set of barriers, 
What brought me there was that I was working at my 
“Chicken Diner” job for about four and a half years and I 
am bi-polar and I suffer from anxiety.  So basically I ended 
up having a nervous breakdown.  And that is how I first left 
work.  They did hold my job for me which was so nice of 
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them.  So anyways I went on unemployment but that only 
lasts for 15 weeks and once that was up I was still not ready 
to go back to work.  So that is why I ended up having to go 
on welfare.  This was the first time I have had to ever go on 
social assistance – like I had no choice.  I had no income 
coming in whatsoever.  I had to do something to get money 
to pay rent and bills. [Heather] 
 
     What was clear from Heather‟s account that she suffered from incapacitating stress 
related challenges and that is why she had a significant interruption in her work history.  
Her disability was not readily visible and was clearly episodic, and thus was not eligible 
for ODSP.  Yet Heather spoke of her challenges in a way that appeared to buttress her 
esteem.   
    Immediately after detailing her particulars of coming to OW, without prompting, 
Heather directed the discussion toward the undesirable stigma and cultural realities of 
unemployment:  “Being out of work or away from your job is not all that people seem to 
think it‟s cracked up to be.”  When asked to explain what she meant by that Heather 
advised, 
 if you don‟t have a job people think that you are a nobody 
and you seriously feel like a nobody.  Like, when I read 
your thing for this study I wanted to talk to you for sure, but 
do you think I seriously want to tell people, like my friends, 
why I can‟t go into work?  It‟s embarrassing to say the 
least.  And to be nickel and diming your way through life 
everyday is brutal.  Like when I was working I was not rich 
but I could go shopping and get everything I needed and 
even a few things I wanted.  Now, I have to call my Mom 
and Dad to get everything, and I don‟t like doing that but 
what choice do I have? 
 
What do you call them for specifically? [Interviewer] 
 
I go over there for supper almost every night.  So my 
groceries are basically just breakfast cereal or granola 
bars and my lunches are sandwiches like cold cuts and 
eggs.  And even with about twenty-five free meals from 
157 
 
Mom every month it is still tough.  I will be going back to 
work soon and I am very happy about that.       
 
Heather advised that she was very grateful to “Chicken Diner” for holding her job for her 
while she made provisions to manage the challenges she faced.  She was making 
provisions to return to work.  Notwithstanding the clear rejection of neoliberal rhetoric 
that is palpable in Heather‟s self-description – i.e. “being out of work or away from your 
job is not all that people seem to think it is cracked up to be” – as we will see in the next 
chapter, Heather‟s subjectivity as it pertained to “others” was deeply impacted by the 
rhetoric she rejects here.        
      Other respondents‟ detailed stories of health problems directly attributable to a work 
related accident or resulting from the physical repetitive strain of carrying out their work 
duties.  James, for example, worked in a factory and advised,   
Five years ago I was involved in an industrial accident.  
And I had a severe dislocation of the right leg and hip.  
After knee surgery and hip surgery and therapy and four 
years of struggling to get back to work the doctors finally 
decided that I would never return to work and that I would 
file for disability.   [James] 
 
James, a middle-aged man who opted not to provide his exact age, was the third 
respondent who advised that he had the full support of his doctor in attempting to qualify 
for disability, yet remained in the eyes of bureaucracy as “not disabled enough” 
(Lightman et al, 2009).  
     Lori, 48, was a petite and frail woman who detailed how the physical demands of her 
vocational life gradually ruined her health.  A look of chronic tension, as suggested by 
raised eyebrows that resulted in a wrinkled forehead, remained with Lori throughout 
much of our hour long interview.   Lori spoke with a soft and slow sound of defeat in her 
voice, 
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I worked at Mackie Automotive.  I was lifting.  We had a lot 
of stock that came in and I was lifting boxes that were from 
30lbs to 90lbs. And I had to put them on rollers so it was 
me lifting them and the way I had to twist to get them onto 
the rollers is what injured my back.  Now I was put on what 
was called light duty jobs.  But I was having major spasms 
and couldn‟t turn my head.  So I was out of work.  I went to 
a chiropractor and he wanted me out of work for 6 to 8 
weeks.  And the company would not allow that.  They forced 
me to see a company doctor and the company doctor put all 
these restrictions down and working in a factory there is 
nothing you can do.  It is all repetitive work.  So I went 
back to work.  They put me on a different job and I had to 
do pushing and pulling which I wasn‟t supposed to do.  I 
had to do bending which I was not supposed to do.  And I 
was in tears. [Lori] 
 
Lori advised that her physical health and capacity to function normally was gone and that 
she “live[s] every day in either physical discomfort or outright agony” that she described 
as “unbearable.”  Lori advised that she had taken so many Tylenol 3‟s that her body has 
become somewhat immune so that they now have only a minimal affect on her pain-
reduction.  Ironically, the concern about people not pulling their weight in society 
overlooks the reality that, literally, pulling too much weight for too long can clearly 
undercut one‟s capacity to keep working.  Like virtually all respondents, Lori did not see 
herself as being anything remotely close to lazy or work-shy.  Like several respondents 
she remained in a bureaucratic limbo as her application for ODSP was being processed. 
     Rick, a big burly man of 56, walked with a pronounced limp that necessitated a heavy 
reliance on an oak cane that he had made and painted himself.  He moved, hobbling 
slowly, into the coffee house where we arranged to meet and, told his story,      
I was in an accident back in the 1970‟s and I smashed my 
leg and I had a lot of surgery over it and had the screws put 
in there [pointing to low part of leg]. It was very bad for 
quite a while. Rehab helped a bit to the point where I could 
function most of the time.  Then last year I stepped the 
wrong way and my knee started popping out of joint and I 
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just couldn‟t go back to work.  Now I have to have more 
surgery. [Rick] 
 
Rick, like several other respondents, was also waiting to see if his application to ODSP 
was successful.  Rick explained why he felt his ODSP application should be successful,  
I have worked all my life whenever I was able to.  Any time 
I have had off work has been because I was not able to do 
it.  I can‟t do physical work anymore and that is all I know. 
 
It was not clear from the interview if Rick‟s doctor was supporting his application and a 
follow up call to Rick to enquire resulted only in learning that his number had been 
disconnected.   
     Gina was a 46 year old woman who opted to be interviewed in her three bedroom 
subsidized housing unit, where she lived with her two public school-aged children.  
Although in a different unit, Gina was living in the same complex she had grown up in.  
Gina detailed how her employment history also came to de-rail her into ill health and 
unemployment via injury,   
Well I had been working at a nursing home for 9 years 
doing a lot of personal care and lifting and I had had 2 
injuries, one to my back and one to my shoulder.  I was on 
worker‟s comp and then my doctor put me on modified 
duties but then it [her injuries] was too bad and I still 
couldn‟t do it. 
 
Gina‟s doctor advised that she could not return to the physical care duties of her nursing 
home work but encouraged her to secure a different line of employment.  Gina re-iterated 
a common sentiment, 
 I spent 9 years [working] at Versa Care [nursing home] 
and if I was able to go back I would do it in a minute.  I 
miss the people I worked with and I miss the people I cared 
for and I miss earning my pay-cheque.  I have never wanted 
to be a burden on anyone – that‟s not how I was raised. 
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While Gina‟s views clearly suggested that her physical health precluded carrying out her 
previous employment duties (and in this way challenged stereotypical assumptions) yet at 
the same time Gina still sees herself as a “burden” and states that she was raised to not 
burden anyone (in this way her subjectivity is very much infiltrated by public discourse). 
     While it is not known how representative these composite sketches are of the factors 
that prompt people to apply for social assistance, what is known very clearly is that health 
related employment barriers are subjugated in the public discourses of welfare reform.  
Further, recent research finding suggest that it is common for people struggling with 
significant health challenges to face an additional bureaucratic challenge of “not [being] 
disabled enough” (Lightman, 2009).   Electronic contact with the Ontario Ministry of 
Community and Social Services
19
 (2009) revealed that (at the time of this writing) 5 285 
people have applied for the Ontario Disability Support Plan and are awaiting confirmation 
of eligibility.  In more than one respect, several respondents in this research were badly 
disserved by the inadequacy of binary classification (disabled / abled) to adequately 
account for the realities of their experience.  
Loss of Employment 
 
“I got laid off and there is not too much else out there but I have been looking everyday 
because you have to.” (Mike) 
 
     Several respondents spoke of previous employment unexpectedly ending and detailed 
the specifics of entering an undesirable (and unwanted) period of unemployment.  Being 
laid off, having contract work expire, or having one‟s employer close down were some of 
the factors beyond respondents‟ control that prompted them to apply for OW.  Notably, 
                                                 
19
 As noted in the acknowledgements to this research, as a condition of receiving data from the MCSS I 
agreed to be clear that the analysis and views expressed in my dissertation do not necessarily reflect those 
of the Ministry. 
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several respondents pointed out that they did not apply for social assistance until they 
were, financially, left with no alternative.  Mike, 57, detailed the particulars of his story:   
I was working at True Cheese.  They make cheese and stuff 
like that.  I was in shipping and receiving but I got laid off.  
I didn‟t make that bad of money there so I had a little bit 
saved but when that ran out and there was still no work out 
there, I had my bills to pay so I had to go down there and 
get some help.  [Mike] 
 
Mike reported that he liked his previous job and wished that it was still available.  In 
advising that he was regularly looking for work, Mike opposed the notion that a lack of 
motivation was at the heart of his challenges. 
 
     Janet, an aboriginal lady of 44 (and one of only two non-white respondents in my 
sample
20
), explained that although she previously had a good paying job in a refinery, it 
was contract work – which Duffy, Glenday, and Pupo (2005) show is becoming a more 
common form of employment in the 21
st
 century.  Janet too pointed out that she had 
exhausted all of her resources before finally applying to OW, 
I was working on a two year project at the Esso refinery 
and we all knew that eventually it would be finished and 
over with.  I was making good money, twenty bucks an 
hour.  And when the project ran out I made that money last 
for about three months until I got to the point where I 
wasn‟t able to pay my bills.  I wasn‟t able to find work in 
this area, especially the type of work that I do.  So I 
basically got very broke and desperate and went to Ontario 
Works [Janet]. 
 
                                                 
20
 Loretta was the other respondent who was non-white.  Neither woman alluded to their racial minority 
status throughout our conversation.  There are a number of reasons why this may have been the case.  It 
would be safe to speculate that at some point in their lives, both Loretta and Janet faced additional barriers 
to employment that intersected with their class and gender.   
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Janet deemed that her expired contract work, combined with the fact that it was difficult 
to find work in her area was what had brought to into a state of unemployment.  Her 
views about why other poor people are poor will be explored in the next chapter. 
     When John, 49, was asked what brought him to apply for OW he told the particulars of 
his story.  His midnight service sector shift that he had carried out for three years was 
simply eliminated.  Although his story is part of a larger sociological pattern in that the 
secondary labour force is becoming even more precarious for those who labour within it 
(Duffy, Glenday, and Pupo, 2005), John expressed his surprise, and disappointment, 
about the undesirable route he took to OW,  
Unemployment actually.  I was just out of a job and at my 
age work is hard to find nowadays so I had to go on 
welfare.  I was working at an Esso Service station there on 
Norwich Ave for about three years.  I got laid off.  I was the 
midnight guy and they stopped being open 24 hours -- so it 
was good bye to me.  It‟s not like I ever wanted to be here 
and it‟s not like I ever thought that I would  [John]. 
 
John‟s proclamation that he never wanted to be on social assistance, and never thought 
that he would be, distanced himself from the caricatures of welfare receipt painted by 
public discourse that he would later take up.  Like many respondents, while defining his 
self-image as responsible (and noting that the circumstances that brought him to 
unemployment were not his fault) he was, at different times, implying a different image 
of the “Other”.  Later in the interview John‟s inferences became bolder statements about 
other people on welfare.  In the following chapter we will examine John‟s perspectives on 
the welfare receipt of others. 
     Keylee, a 33 year old former delivery driver, reported that she found herself out of 
work when the company she worked for changed ownership and business slowed down to 
the point where her position became expendable, 
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Well going back to November 2004 I got let go of my job.  I 
was working here in Tillsonburg for what is now called 
carquest.  It used to be Johnson automotive and I was one 
of their delivery drivers and I was there for three years.  
When they became Carquest they slowed down and so they 
didn‟t need all of the drivers. [Keylee] 
 
These particular examples are part of a more general econometric trend whereby the “bad 
jobs” of the secondary labour force are turning into “no jobs” (Duffy, Glenday, and Pupo, 
2005).  Not one of these respondents was happy about being on social assistance nor 
could they reasonably be blamed for the circumstances that brought them there.  As we 
will review later in this chapter, what respondents deemed unreasonable blame was 
nonetheless difficult for many to avoid both within and beyond the welfare bureaucracy.    
Relationship Breakdown 
 
“Social welfare policy has been enlisted in what seems to be an eleventh hour attempt to 
enforce the traditional values of work and family that have propped up what Nancy 
Fraser, Linda Gordon, and others have called the industrial “family wage system” that is 
based on the traditional two parent family in which the mail “breadwinner” earns 
enough to support his wife  the “homemaker”, and their children”  (Schram, 2000: 1)      
  
      Several respondents spoke of a harsh (and sometimes abusive) relationship 
breakdown as the primary factor that brought them to OW:  and in making this claim 
uncritically accepted the cultural logic that they were primarily responsible for caregiving 
both during and after their interpersonal relationship.  As one might expect, the 
relationship breakdowns precipitated crises in more than one area of respondents‟ lives.   
In some cases, health and relationship breakdown coincided and made applying for OW 
the lesser of choosing between two evils:  going on “the system” or remaining in an 
undesirable relationship.  For Adrienne, who opted not to disclose her age, the loss of her 
health was exacerbated by the loss of her relationship,                
I got sick after the pregnancy and that prompted a lot of 
changes.  He didn‟t want a sick wife and I got very bad.  I 
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have osteoporosis and fibromyalgia.  So that is how I got 
here.  By the time my daughter was two I was very sick.  So 
when I left my husband I went to the county where I was 
born cause I had family back there and I went to the court 
house so that my ex-husband could have access to see his 
daughter and I applied for welfare and then disability. 
(Adrienne) 
 
Adrienne advised that she was abused by her ex-husband.  She opted not to provide 
details when probed and I respected her decision and re-directed our conversation.  
Schram (1995) points out the American welfare bureaucracy does not track the number of 
people coming to social assistance because they are fleeing an abusive relationship to 
protect themselves and their children – another disturbing subjugation in mainstream 
discourse.  Adrienne clearly did not blame herself for exceptionally undesirable 
circumstances for which she was not responsible, and thus rejected de-contextualized 
notions of personal irresponsibility in relation to her situation.  Yet at the same time 
Adrienne‟s subjectivity was deeply infiltrated by neoliberal discourse in that she did not 
seem to draw out the gendered imbalances that have material effects when caregiving 
labour is minimized and devalued.   
     Uma, a 39 year old woman, also had a serious health matter coincide with a 
relationship breakdown.  When asked what brought her to OW Uma advised, 
 I had some health problems and I ended up on sick leave 
from work here [Tim Horton‟s coffee shop where interview 
was taking place].   I have been here for quite a few years, 
but I ended up with a leg ulcer and I ended up being off 
work.  But also I was having marital problems and ended 
up being separated and leaving my husband and I had no 
other income because not being able to work, where else 
was I going to go?  So that is why I went to Ontario Works.  
I went into welfare and asked for help [Uma]. 
 
At the time of this interview, the gendered scholarship on the work / care dichotomy was 
not at the forefront of my mind and thus I missed an opportunity to probe Uma‟s view 
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that she “was not able to work” even when she was concurrently parenting and dealing 
with a serious health problem.  I directed the conversation toward her health challenges.  I 
was not familiar with what a leg ulcer was so I asked Uma to clarify, which she 
proceeded to do in graphic detail, 
It is very gross actually.  I had a hole [in my leg] and at its 
worst it was over two inches across and I could stick the 
end of my finger down inside my leg.  And you could see 
right down inside.  It was gross.  It was oozing.  And the 
nurses had to come in three times a week and change the 
dressing on it and keep it clean. It was very painful when it 
was at its worse because it got infected and that is what 
made it get so bad.  It felt like somebody had a hot knife 
and was stabbing it inside my leg.  That is why I went 
through a spell when I couldn‟t work.  
 
Uma advised that her husband as not understanding or supportive during her illness and 
she reported that near the end of their marriage he became emotionally abusive.  When 
probed for details Uma explained,  
He would deliberately and consciously say things to hurt 
me.  And he knew how to do it and he did.  I just decided 
that I could not live with him anymore.  It was not worth it.  
I had to get away from all the fighting for my kids‟ sake 
because it‟s not good that they would see the way he treated 
me.  Like when they started to become withdrawn, and I 
mean both of them 24 – 7, and they were never like that 
before, there was no doubt in my mind that something big 
had to change so I did what I had to do and got them away 
from that environment.  The thing is, he is not a bad dad to 
them in some ways but the way he treated me in front of 
them was hard on them and he was too blind to see that. 
 
Uma told her story in a manner that certainly appeared she was making what she believed 
was a responsible – not irresponsible – parental and life decision that was clearly in the 
best interest of her children and herself.  Sanford Schram, a leading expert in welfare 
policy analysis, writes “I know of no research estimating the extent to which welfare 
taking is associated with attempts to escape abusive relationships” (Schram, 1995: 7).              
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     Relationship breakdown also brought Donna, 36, to the OW system.  I interviewed 
Donna in her three bedroom subsidized housing unit.  Donna was one of two respondents 
who came to participate in this research by way of snowball sampling, as her brother was 
an earlier respondent and carried out the request I made to all respondents to refer anyone 
else that they knew on social assistance to my study.  She reported that she did not receive 
the flyer advertising my study.  Donna stated that it was a relationship break up that 
brought her to OW, “I went on it because my spouse left me and I was a single Mom with 
four kids” (Donna).   
     Donna opted not to expand upon the details of her story beyond that her ex-husband, a 
mechanic, unexpectedly left her in 2006.  Notably, because Donna‟s husband was the 
breadwinner in the family, he was free to leave the relationship.  Despite the fact that 
Donna‟s caregiving enabled her ex-husband to earn a living, she was not permitted the 
same freedom.  Donna‟s ex-husband was not financially supporting, or having any 
contact with, any of his children.  Schram (2006: 44) writes “While the work / care 
dichotomy need not be gendered, it is.”  Prior to her husband leaving Donna was not 
“dependent” on welfare.  Her husband was the breadwinner and she was a stay at home 
Mother in a traditional family-wage structure.  While conventional wisdom would suggest 
that Donna was “dependent” on her husband, there is not nearly as much stigma attached 
to that form of dependence.  Further, it is too frequently overlooked that traditional 
familial arrangements – male bread-winner / female caregiver – overlook the mutual 
interdependence in that it is undervalued care-giving that enables the breadwinner to earn 
and if that care-giving had to be replaced it would cost money (Eichler, 1980).  
(Momentarily, we will examine child care challenges as one of the factors that preclude 
some people from entering the labour market).     
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     Dorothy, an older woman who did not disclose her exact age, reported initially coming 
to social assistance for financial reasons following the undesirable circumstances of a 
divorce,   
The reason I had to [originally] apply for social assistance 
was in 1992 my ex husband was paying me alimony and 
child support and without going through the courts he just 
dropped the alimony and just paid child support.  [Dorothy] 
 
Dorothy advised that she had made several attempts to provide for herself and her 
children and that included going back to school after the divorce to earn a social service 
diploma.  Dorothy was working part time at the time of our interview and having her 
income supplemented by OW.  Dorothy stated with a quiet certainty that she knew very 
well she had made significant efforts to better herself and give her children the best life 
possible.  At the same time, Dorothy did not seem to question the cultural belief that 
caring labour (despite the fact that she had devoted a significant portion of her life to 
doing it) should be worthy of more adequate material remuneration.    
Child Care Challenges 
 
     Roxanne, 28, advised that she had two jobs prior to having the first of her first of three 
children.  When the father of her first child left her and the baby, Roxanne did what she 
felt she had to do to survive and applied for social assistance.  Roxanne recalled very 
clearly that she did not plan on being abandoned, and that she was most certainly not 
happy about the situation,   
When I had my eldest son I was 17.  I had been working two 
jobs previous to having him but when the baby was born I 
couldn‟t really work. I still remember very clearly the day 
that my Mother said to me „you are going to have to get 
welfare‟ because my first born son‟s father had taken off 
and I couldn‟t work so I had to get some kind of help to be 
assisted.  That‟s how I ended up on the roller coaster.  I 
didn‟t plan on him leaving and I didn‟t know he would.  The 
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jobs I had at the time were $5.75 / hour and that wouldn‟t 
pay for daycare.  He was making $11.00 / hour so we would 
have been OK.  I already knew back then I was very very 
upset about having to apply for welfare because I already 
knew back then it would be very difficult to get away from 
it, once you‟re on it, it seems anyway.  I have been on and 
off trying to work, trying to support my family.   [Roxanne] 
 
Again, there is a gendered power imbalance here:  wage earning gives one the freedom to 
exit a relationship easily; primary caregivers have this freedom severely restricted and 
this restriction is exacerbated by the catch-22 reality that caregiving also undercuts one‟s 
capacity to become a wage earner.   
     While Roxanne did not deem herself to be an irresponsible Mother or person, she did 
seem to take up elements of dependency discourse in suggesting that “I already knew 
back then it would be difficult to get away from it.” Despite the fact she explicitly stated 
that there was nothing desirable about her circumstances, welfare receipt was still likened 
to some kind of desirable drug that would be a difficult habit to kick.  While Roxanne had 
re-entered the secondary labour market on a number of occasions the instability of that 
labour market escaped critical scrutiny. 
       Gina, 27, while not elaborating on the details of her interpersonal history, also 
advised that the realities of paying for the daycare (of two children) on a limited income 
made applying for social assistance the lesser of two undesirable situations,   
I was a single Mom.  I couldn‟t find work and get the kids 
into daycare because when you make around minimum 
wage it is hard to pay for daycare, or really, it‟s not hard 
but pretty much impossible.  Like you seriously just can‟t do 
it.  I just applied for it [social assistance] cause I was told 
about it and told that I could get assistance.  I think my kids 
are better off with me instead of a stranger anyway  [Gina]. 
 
Tina saw herself as a responsible mother who was making the best of a bad situation.  
Weighing all factors, social assistance (as uncomfortable as it was) made more practical 
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sense than working in the secondary labour force only to have the overwhelming majority 
of earning go toward paying strangers to care for her young children.   
     While the public discourse that originated in the United States would pejoratively refer 
to Mothers like Roxanne and Gina as „welfare queens‟, stepping outside of that discourse 
and into the material and social realities that these mothers were facing, one could very 
reasonably posit that any reference to royalty is grossly misleading.  Further what is 
thoroughly subjugated in mainstream discourse is that raising children is work (with “24 
– 7” demands) that significantly undercuts marketability in the world of paid labour,  
The nature of women‟s unpaid work and its time demands 
define women as unreliable employees legitimately 
confined to a narrow range on low skilled, poorly paid jobs 
(Forrest, 1998: 228).  
 
Both Roxanne and Gina, like many poor single mothers in their circumstances, had spent 
time in those low skilled and poorly paid jobs.  It is a remarkable cultural phenomenon 
that the logic and tax rage of neoliberalism, combined with the public discourse on 
welfare, effectively portrays the belief that families like Roxanne and Tina‟s have it too 
good and too easy to the point that they are exploiting the rest of society.  A gender based 
analysis reveals that while OW poses as gender neutral, there are clearly gendered effects 
(Greene-Sang, 1999).  At virtually all stages of life, the rates of poverty are higher for 
women than men (Greene-Sang, 1999).  Child care responsibilities are culturally 
prescribed for women (and exonerate men from these demands), yet this is not accounted 
for in social policy.   
Other Factors 
 
     In terms of the other factors that brought respondents to the welfare system, there was 
in fact one story that seemed to have a notably less compelling rationalization for the 
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initial application.  One thirty-two year old respondent, Darryl, was quite honest and quite 
blunt when he described his initial contact with welfare,   
Well I moved out of my parents when I was 16.  I was a 
typical 16 year old.  Thought that I knew it all and wanted it 
all.  I‟ll admit that now [laughs].  So on my 16th birthday I 
moved out.  I moved in with a relative at that time.  And I 
tried to work at that time and I couldn‟t find nothing and I 
had to get some sort of money so that is when I applied for 
social assistance (Daryl). 
 
Here, Daryl himself is acknowledging that his decision to initially apply for social 
assistance was not a good one.  Very few people would disagree with Daryl‟s self 
assessment.  Accessibility to social assistance for teenagers, as it has for all recipients, has 
become more restrictive since the time of Daryl‟s initial application.  But in talking to 
Daryl, and observing the surroundings of his bachelor apartment, sitting on his couch that 
was tattered and likely older than I was, and trying to talk over the rattling refrigerator 
that Darryl‟s landlord had not yet repaired, I couldn‟t help but feel that the symbolism of 
welfare receipt – the categories, the linguistic tags, the labels of primary potency --  blind 
people to the finer details of daily living realities that are screened out by the words of 
welfare discourse.  Daryl had, in fact, initially made an irresponsible decision when he 
was young.  Later in life, Daryl made notable efforts to rectify his earlier immaturity by 
going back to high school and getting his diploma.  To believe that Daryl, and people like 
him, have been unduly rewarded for acting irresponsibly, or have lived opulence, bears no 
connection to the reality.  At present, Darryl‟s health realistically precludes a re-entry into 
the work force. 
     Ryan, 29, came to OW after he quit his job.  Initially, he was somewhat vague about 
the details prompting his resignation, 
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Well I had lost, I had been working at Drumbo tech 
company and me and my boss didn‟t get along.  He was just 
certain ways that he shouldn‟t have been so I ended up 
leaving that job.   
 
When probed for the details of his departure from work, Ryan told his 
story in a manner that was quite candid, 
Well I had worked at Acme tech for 4 years.  Two years that 
I worked there I was an admitted drug addict but I was just 
doing stupid stuff but I wasn‟t getting myself into trouble.  I 
was always at my job and I was always doing my job and 
when I went to work I was always clean.  But some people 
told my boss I did drugs.  And I mean to the extent where 
we‟re doing this job putting up tents and he comes out and 
this lady comes and she‟s got a handful of twenties and she 
hands it to us and he says “Oh now you can go and buy 
some crack.”  The customer was standing right there.  And 
literally that is how he was treating me day in and day out 
on that job and I couldn‟t handle it.  I really should have 
went to the labour board about it [Ryan]. 
 
The label of “drug addict” is a noun that has the same slice-cutting power as the term 
“welfare recipient.”  Allport suggests (1954) that what sometimes makes a prejudice hold 
good is that people will feel that their beliefs are not prejudicial, but rather are 
legitimately grounded in a well deserved reputation given that the targeted group really 
does exhibit reprehensible behaviour.  Ryan‟s candour may seem to confirm that there are 
some people on social assistance who do, in fact, in fact have a substance abuse problem.  
This is undeniably true.  But research on the topic of substance abuse and welfare receipt 
has demonstrated that “the percentages of welfare recipients using, abusing, or dependent 
on alcohol or drugs were relatively
 
small and consistent with the general US population 
and those
 not receiving welfare benefits” (Pollack and Reuter, 2006).  Despite the fact 
that drug use exists in all walks of life, all walks of life do not become associated with 
addiction.  Hays writes, 
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Although public opinion polls suggest that Americans 
believe drug abuse is one of the central problems of welfare 
recipients, nearly all government researchers agree that 
problems of disabilities and of domestic violence are both 
more prevalent (Hays, 2003: 199). 
 
Drug or alcohol problems are (like welfare receipt) frequently spoken of as symptomatic 
of a character deficiency (Valverde, 1998), yet there is usually something other than 
immorality that precipitates using (Fleury, 2009).  The undesirable realities of Ryan‟s 
existence were palpable in his defeated and appearance and the underprivileged 
surroundings of the cheap room her rented:  these harsh realities are antiseptically 
screened out by the categorical labels attached to his identity.  Ryan‟s self conception, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, had been influenced by neoliberal discourse and his 
views on “Others” was deeply influenced.   
Life “On the System” 
 
     If there was one theme in this research that was more agreed upon than any other 
among the twenty four respondents who participated, that theme was articulated clearly in 
responses to the question “How do you feel about the amount of your monthly social 
assistance check?”  With only one exception, there was a consensus that the amount 
people were expected to live on was substantially inadequate and this had an 
incapacitating detrimental effect on people‟s well being and undercut their capacity to 
move forward in their efforts to leave social assistance.  This finding confirms Piven and 
Cloward‟s (1993: 291) argument that “insufficient income [i]s [often] the principal 
problem” of welfare receipt, and is entirely consistent with what respondents who took 
part in the Social Assistance Review Committee (MCSS: 1988) told the government of 
David Peterson.  Subjugated knowledges, as we reviewed in chapter three, are 
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knowledges that are ignored or discredited and seen as not having reached a satisfactory 
level of legitimacy.   
     Almost all respondents suggested that survival techniques like depending on the 
support of family (and friends) were entirely necessary (mirroring Hays, 2003 and 
McCormack, 2002).  Being resourceful and frugal was described as necessary survival 
strategies by most respondents.  Loretta reported, “I could give seminars on how to 
stretch a dollar and get the biggest bang for a buck.”  Loretta looked directly at me when 
she made this statement and she spoke with a quiet, but powerful, conviction.  I recall 
during this point in the interview thinking about some of the factors that brought me to 
this research.  I recall during my childhood that my Mother was, of necessity, very frugal 
and would scour free weekly newspapers looking for the best prices on anything that was 
a necessity.  Non-necessities almost never made their way into our home.  The Tsbouchi 
“welfare diet” bothered me a great deal because I believe the rationale behind it was 
extremely tenuous, the images it invoked unfair, and the intent behind the scheme 
malicious.         
   The material harshness of welfare receipt was often exacerbated by a social harshness.  
Many spoke about being treated as “less than human” within and beyond the welfare 
bureaucracy as a direct result of being a poor or a social assistance recipient.  This is 
consistent with earlier research that pointed to systemic “rituals of degradation” (Piven 
and Cloward, 1993; Herd, Mitchell, and Lightman, 2005).   Further, while “arbitrary 
terminations have always been a conspicuous feature of the public assistance system” 
(Piven and Cloward, 1993: 309) this phenomenon seems to have been accelerated 
according to the experiences of several respondents who reported regularly receiving 
form letters cutting them off social assistance for the vague reason of “insufficient 
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information.”  It was also common for recipients to report receiving inexplicable letters 
stating that they had been overpaid a large sum, with the accompanying demand that sum 
must now be paid back to OW.  These subjugated regularities, material and cultural, that 
constituted the “regimes of practice” carried out by OW made daily life “on the system” 
almost the opposite of the cushy, desirable, and luxurious life-style painted by Regan-
inspired rhetoric of welfare discourse.  In relation to their embodied experience, welfare 
stereotypes were deemed as being misleading and inaccurate.      
     While income insufficiency was all but unanimous among the respondents of this 
research, there were some notable exceptions to the “rituals of degradation.”  Several 
respondents mentioned that they have had experience with more than one worker, and 
that some of the workers with whom they had contact were very understanding and 
treated them kindly. This finding confirms Piven and Cloward‟s (1993) contention that 
80% of people on welfare reported having acceptable workers in an unacceptable system.  
There were two stories in particular where workers reportedly recognized an unmet need 
of a client, ensured that need was met, and this enabled the client to move forward.  
Further, some clients reported receiving new, and more understanding, workers on the 
rare occasions when they launched complaints about an occurrence whereby they were 
treated with a blatant indignity.  Prior to examining the frequently reported material and 
cultural harshness of the daily living realities of life on welfare, we will first examine the 
anomalies when some clients reported helpful and positive experiences.               
Needs Were Met 
 
     The two moments of highest praise for OW service delivery came when previously 
unmet medical material needs became met.  These positive realities enabled forward 
movement.  Uma, the lady who had a serious leg infection and thus had to leave her 
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service sector work at a coffee chain told her story of what enabled her to be returning to 
work at the end of the month this interview took place (June ‟07), 
Well, Kim was a help with me actually at one point.  
Because the welfare system wouldn‟t help me at the start.  I 
have to wear the core stockings for my legs because of the 
leg ulcer I had.   And I have a weak spot now from it being 
there.  I have to wear support stockings.  Well they are 
$250 for two pairs of support stockings and welfare 
wouldn‟t cover them.  But I went and I talked to Kim and 
she said, „you know what, we‟ll see what I can do under 
OW‟ and she actually was a big help there.  And she was 
able to actually get me my stockings under OW where 
welfare wouldn‟t cover it at first.  What they don‟t realize is 
that now I can head back to work because I got the 
stockings.  Like thank God Kim was there. 
 
Poor health, as a barrier to work, and health supports as facilitating a return to the labour 
force, are not a part of mainstream discourse. 
     Ryan told a somewhat comparable story (from his earlier experience) of how OW 
facilitated meeting a previously unmet need, and this facilitated securing employment that 
otherwise would have been by-passed, 
What happened was I had been pounding the pavement 
looking for work and there was nothing and I was getting 
pretty unhappy about it.   But then one day my buddy called 
me and he said “Ryan, I got a six-month [construction] job 
for you if you can start Monday but you need certified work 
boots.”  The thing is, I wanted this job so bad because it 
paid almost $17.50 / hour and it was just a 25 minute walk 
away.  But the catch was, I had no money for work boots 
and, to kick the cat while he‟s down, not even a hundred 
bucks credit to my name.  So what I did was call my worker 
Helen, and she was really nice.  She said, “Ryan, call them 
back and tell them you‟re taking the job, and I will be out 
there with a cheque for your work boots before Monday.”  
So they were good that way, like if you try to help yourself – 
they really do try to help you too.  Like Helen congratulated 
me and she was good about it. 
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These examples of medical and material needs being met to facilitate employment were 
the exception, rather than the rule, in the qualitative interview data informing this 
research.  In fairness, I should supplement these stories recounting positive moments 
when OW made provisions for unmet needs to be met with further observations from my 
direct experience as a social worker with the Children‟s Aid Society of Oxford County.  
As Karen Swift (1995) has observed, a large part of child protection social work entails 
securing resources for families whose needs are not being met.  In my direct experience, 
an advocacy based phone call or letter to Ontario Works Oxford usually produces very 
quick results in accessing resources for the families that I have worked with.  Most 
recently, this involved accessing additional support to purchase a new bed for a child on 
my caseload whose head lice was emanating from her bed.        
     The different barriers respondents reported precluding their attachment to the labour 
force will be examined later in this chapter.  First, there are two other examples where 
respondents reported that OW righted a blatant wrong and (at least partially) met a need 
for recognition. 
Reporting, and Responding To, Indignity 
 
     While there were several stories of respondent‟s being treated with indignity by 
workers, on the two reported occasions where client‟s launched complaints to 
management, OW management acknowledged the wrong and made provisions to, at least 
partially, rectify the situation.  Dorothy told her story, describing what she called the 
worst time of her life, 
In 1999, my father [who lived in Western Canada] died.  
My brother in law was going to send me a plane ticket.  And 
my worker at the time said, „I am telling you if you take that 
ticket that is going to be considered income and we will 
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deduct it from your check.‟  So I didn‟t get to go and say 
good bye to my father. 
 
Technically, Dorothy‟s worker could not be reprimanded for this particular incident as he 
was merely enforcing the rigid deduction regulations that were in place about receiving 
gifts with any monetary value.  There were no practical provisions for extenuating 
circumstances on humane grounds:  welfare bureaucracy superseded humanity.  
Dorothy‟s worker, however, later crossed the line whereby his harshness could no longer 
be excused, “My worker told me that if he had his way every person on social assistance 
would have to account for every piece of toilet paper that they use.”  Dorothy advised that 
her blood pressure was inordinately high and when she saw her doctor later that same 
day, she told him what had happened, “My doctor said, „that is the third time I have 
heard that guy‟s name [Dorothy‟s worker] this month, and I have had enough.‟” Dorothy 
explained that her doctor called Oxford MPP, Ernie Hardeman
21
, to complain about the 
indignities several of his patients endured, the MPP in turn called the OW office, and in 
this particular case the worker was forced to apologize to Dorothy.  Dorothy‟s strong 
agency, here, enlisted the support of a resource in the form of a person deemed culturally 
worthy of respect and this made Dorothy‟s frustrations appear more legitimate.  Dorothy 
was provided with a new worker and reported that she was pleased, and felt somewhat 
vindicated, with this resolution.  When asked if the worker who had treated her rudely 
had lost his job as a result of his blatant rudeness, Dorothy advised that he was still 
working at OW.  It would be hard to imagine a comparable scenario of an employee 
                                                 
21
 In chapter 7 we will review how, during the 2007 Provincial election,  Oxford County Conservative MPP 
Ernie Hardeman drew upon the discursive field to sidestep my public challenge to him to attempt to try to 
live on a social assistance income for one month.  I advised that I would also carry out the challenge myself 
if Hardeman agreed to do it.  In the following chapter we will examine his reply in the context of 
understanding how a discursive field, and “truth”, operates. 
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keeping his or her job if they were serving a different disenfranchised population and 
made an equally ignorant remark about that population to a person they were supposed to 
be serving.   
     Heather told a comparable story that culminated in a comparable resolution,  
The first time my worker came to see me she was ignorant 
to me to say the least.  She told me that she didn‟t work 40 
hours per week and pay taxes so people like me could 
pretend they can‟t work and just sit at home and eat bon 
bons.  Basically, she was being a complete bitch and I 
wasn‟t about to take that from her.  I told her that I had 
worked my whole life and was going back to work as soon 
as I was able to.  I must have been yelling because she 
looked scared.  But she was still very rude again and I 
didn‟t deserve that so I called the office to complain. 
 
When I asked Heather about the outcome of her complaint, she advised that OW provided 
her with a new worker.  Given my knowledge of Dorothy‟s story from an earlier 
interview, I asked if the worker was forced to apologize and Heather replied, “No, but she 
should have been.”  Heather was not aware if any disciplinary action was taken against 
this worker.  Both Dorothy and Heather presented as having a positive feeling of being 
somewhat vindicated when the illegitimate indignities they faced were legitimately 
acknowledged as undignified.  OW Oxford management, and Conservative MPP Ernie 
Hardeman, both deserve credit for at least partially rectifying these particular wrongs.  As 
we will see very clearly in the next chapter, Heather was certainly not immune from 
picking up, thus reproducing, the narratives that she was showing a very strong resistance 
to here. 
     When hearing these stories I could not help but reflect on the wisdom of Sheila Baxter 
(1997: vii), “Standing up to injustice and abuse and corruption gives you power.”  Like 
Dorothy and Heather, many respondents faced comparable indignities they deemed very 
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unfair, both within and beyond the OW administration, but unlike Dorothy and Heather 
they unfortunately did not (for various reasons) speak out against them.  It is to these 
stories that we now turn. 
Experiencing Classism 
 
“How would you describe your experience with the welfare system?” (Interviewer) 
“Completely degrading.”  (Adrienne, research respondent). 
     Adrienne advised that she went to great lengths to hide the reality that she was on 
social assistance, and when asked to elaborate she was quite blunt, “because you are not 
accepted”.  When asked to explain, Adrienne discussed how the stigma of 
impoverishment had negatively affected both her and her adolescent daughter, 
It is very hard to hide the fact that you have no money.  To 
have friends my age who are not on assistance, like to meet 
new people and for them to come into my house and to see 
only dollar store stuff.  Their kids all have cell phones and 
they all know right away when they come in that I am poor 
and that my daughter is poor.  And it has such a negative 
effect on my daughter.  She was like „you know Mom, I 
can‟t date any guys that come from wealthy families.‟  I was 
like “Why?”  And she said „cause we‟re poor.‟  And I am 
like „No honey, that‟s not the way it works.  You date 
whoever you want to date.  You are entitled to the very 
best.‟  You know but it certainly is a huge blow, huge, to her 
self esteem that I can‟t really have friends.  It is hard to 
make friends with other families, because it is so obvious 
that we have nothing and people judge you for that – they 
do. 
 
Interestingly, as much as this caring mother claimed that class should not impact her 
daughter‟s dating choices, research on the class components of interpersonal relationship 
and matrimonial partner selection suggests otherwise (Brehm, 1992).  Doctoral 
dissertations “Restaging the Welfare Diva:  Case Studies of Single Motherhood and 
Social Policy” (Lessa, 1999) and “Disciplining Single Mothers on Welfare:  Neoliberal 
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Strategies of Governance in a Consumer Society” (Power, 2002) both highlight the 
enormous gap between the “welfare queen” identities that are constituted by the meaning-
making of welfare discourse and the unrecognized material realities that make the 
demanding (and time-consuming) role of care giving even more challenging.  In both 
studies, much like the respondents in this research, the women under investigation 
proceeded to both take up and resist dominant discourses.  
     Alice was the older woman whose poor health had worn her down and whose 
impoverishment was palpable in her clothing and appearance.  She described her 
experiencing volunteering at a child care center and experiencing an “otherness” among 
the children she was trying to serve, 
The kids told me that they would not listen to anything I 
said and that they would not eat anything that I cooked for 
them.  They would only eat what their mother cooked.  The 
thing that made me hand in my notice is that I had their 
breakfast on the table.  I had asked them to eat breakfast.  I 
went upstairs to use the washroom when I came back down, 
three kids were sitting in a different room eating the 
lunches their mother‟s had packed with the breakfasts 
untouched.   
 
To be sure, it is not particularly uncommon for pre-school children misbehave or fail to 
follow directives.  Further, there can be no doubt that certain people are simply not able to 
establish rapport with some children for different reasons.  But given that Alice reported 
that the children she was referring to did not exhibit the same defiant behaviour with 
other caregivers, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that Alice‟s physically noticeable 
disenfranchisement was discernable, and undesirable, even to very young children who 
determined that they would not eat what this lady had prepared for them.  The impact of 
this rejection appeared to deeply bother Alice.  She appeared hurt telling her story.   
     Alison articulated being treated harshly within the welfare bureaucracy, 
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I asked how I am supposed to live on $324 / month.  And 
she [Alison‟s worker] says to me „Well, you have to go door 
to door collecting pop bottles and turning them in or you 
can go to the soup kitchen or food bank.‟  And I thought, 
geez, you are just a nice person there aren‟t you?  And I got 
away from her.  They just ended up getting me someone 
else.  And I told my social worker about her too.  And then 
she was rude to me.  She said „How can you afford a cat 
when you haven‟t got enough food to eat anyway?‟  And I 
says „Well I got to have somebody here with me don‟t I?”  I 
am on my own.  I am alone.  And the cat was perfect 
company.  And she said „well it costs money to feed them.‟  
And I said „well then I‟ll starve and I‟ll give my cat my 
food.‟ 
 
Alison‟s pronounced facial discomfort – a wrinkled forehead and stoic expression -- was 
congruent with her words and suggested that she was quite upset when telling this story.  
When I re-assured Alison that nobody should have to be vilified for owning a cat, she 
said „thank you‟ and appeared pleased that someone else had confirmed her reasonable 
perspective that a cat-ownership should not be considered an unearned luxury that 
warrants chastising.  According to Alison‟s account, her question of how she was 
supposed to live on $324 / month is what angered the initial worker.  The workers smug 
reply appeared to gloss over the realities that are ignored by the symbolism of welfare 
receipt.  Alison went on to explain why this harsh treatment bothered her, 
That [rude treatment] made me feel like I was nothing.  
After all these years I have struggled to survive and I raised 
my children and 32 foster children.  And you can confirm 
that with Children‟s Aid.  And I would still be doing that if I 
could but I can‟t do it anymore.  I just felt that after all I 
have accomplished to be put down to go to Ontario Works 
and to be put down for having to apply, that made me feel 
that I was worthless. 
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Alison was one of the few respondents who inferred strongly that caregiving labour 
should be valued more than it is.  Alison also opted to talk about some of the details of 
her distant background given that the stigma of impoverishment was not new to her, 
I went to a class re-union a few years ago and I said to my 
grade 8 teacher „I told you I didn‟t turn out to be a bum.‟  
He wasn‟t very nice to me when I was growing up.  We 
didn‟t always have nice clothes.  We weren‟t always clean.  
And I used to hide in the cloak room at lunch when I didn‟t 
have lunch because I didn‟t want anyone to know. 
 
Like many respondents, Alison‟s story made it clear that undesirable social hardships (i.e. 
being the brunt of harsh judgements) were part and parcel of material hardships.  Given 
the caregiving that she did with her own children, and 32 foster children, Alison‟s story is 
perhaps the quintessential example of how caring labour is in dire need of being 
restructured (Neysmith, 2000) so that it is valued, carried out, and remunerated more with 
equity.   
     Daryl advised that his undesirable status as a social assistance recipient worked against 
him, ironically enough, in the process of gainfully seeking employment, 
I went to the local McDonald‟s.  I was dressed nice, you 
know.  I took my resume with me.  I filled out their 
application and I got an interview.  So I went in for the 
interview to flip hamburgers or clean, or whatever, and I 
thought that it was going pretty good.  Then they asked me 
what I was presently doing and I told them that I was trying 
to get off welfare.  Well, it was a mistake to tell them that.  
At the end of the interview the manager looked at me and 
said “I am sorry Mr. Taggart, I can‟t hire you.”  And I go 
“what do you mean?  Why can‟t you hire me?”  He said 
that I was not qualified to flip their hamburgers.  I asked 
him why, and I he just said “I am sorry, I cannot hire you.” 
 
Darryl expanded on his story and further advised that the manager who interviewed him, 
 
wouldn‟t tell me why [he wouldn‟t hire me], but he didn‟t 
have to because I could tell from the moment I told him that 
I was on welfare that there just would not be a job for me.  I 
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went back and got my grade 12 because I want to work, but 
it is not quite that simple. 
 
It seems that if there was a legitimate reason to withhold employment from an unqualified 
candidate, hiring personnel would be free to disclose their reasoning.  Daryl reported that 
he was given no explanation.  In Poor Bashing: The Politics of Exclusion, Swanson 
(2001: 83) has shown that “people are turned down for jobs because they are on welfare.”  
When it is assumed that people who are applying for jobs don‟t want to work, there can 
be no clearer example of a prejudice stubbornly ignoring corrigble evidence. 
     Notably, Daryl was one of the few respondents who defended, not only himself, but 
others in his predicament, while concurrently inferring that others may fit the less than 
favourable caricatures of welfare recipients, 
You know, there are some [people] who support us and 
some who just don‟t care because they got a job and they 
are financially stable and they just basically call us lazy 
bums who are not trying.  Well I am sorry, but not all of us 
are lazy and many of us do try.  Like, there are some people 
out there who are like that but that is not all of us.  I miss 
working.  If I could go back to work I would.  I am bummed 
out all the time because there is nothing to do and even if 
there was something to do I don‟t have the money to do it.  
 
Like most respondents, there was both resistance and accommodation to the cultural logic 
of neoliberalism in Darryl‟s perspectives.  But Darryl was one of the select few who 
offered more resistance than accommodation when speaking about “Others.”  Without 
explicitly naming the phenomenon of classism (this term is clearly not available in the 
discourse accessible), Darryl did a commendable job speaking out against prejudicial 
views of the poor.     
     Uma also expressed concern about “not being treated as a person” within the welfare  
 
bureaucracy.  She advised, 
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It‟s awful.  And you know I was in an abusive situation with 
my husband.  I was in really rough shape when I left.  It 
wasn‟t physical but it was mental and emotional stuff and I 
was trying to deal with the fact that I had this leg ulcer that 
was not healing.  Dealing with that and then trying to find a 
place to live and then food to put on the table and then like 
everything to be a Mom and then go to welfare.  I went 
there on my own to ask for help.  And you feel like you are 
being treated like dirt.  There was time when I ended up 
telling my nurses because I was so upset about stuff.  They 
don‟t treat you like a person and they don‟t care.  The 
welfare system just does not care about people.  They really 
don‟t and it was awful.  
 
I asked Uma specifically what it was that made her so upset that she decided to talk to her  
 
nurses (who were treating her leg infection), 
 
When I phoned them and asked them how am I supposed to 
live with what I was getting.  Like one check I was supposed 
to live on $300 / month.  And I said, „how am I supposed to 
pay bills and pay rent?‟  It doesn‟t do anything.  And her 
answer was „go get a loan from the Salvation Army.‟  But 
then they would count that as income and deduct it off and I 
would still have to pay the Salvation Army back and how 
could I do that?  You end up in a vicious circle and it is 
never ending. 
 
Uma‟s frustration stemmed from what she perceived as an unreasonable response to a 
reasonable question that was ultimately an ignored problematic at the forefront of her life 
and the lives of her children.  Notably, this same question was reportedly posed by other 
respondents and it solicited a comparable response from workers.  As we established 
earlier, privileged irresponsibility affords advantaged people the opportunity to ignore 
and disregard the disadvantages that they do not face.     
     Diane also spoke about her embarrassment of living in poverty and the shame she felt 
in not being able to provide her children with all the school supplies that most children 
take for granted.  She summed up how she felt this way, 
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The situation I was in because of mental and emotional 
abuse and stuff that is why I left.  And you know what?  I 
can see why some ladies are scared to leave.  It‟s like, 
„where do you go for help?‟  If you go to the welfare system 
you still feel like dirt.  The way they treat you.  And it‟s not 
right.  I should feel better being away from my husband.  It 
didn‟t lessen my worry.  It didn‟t lessen the burdens off of 
me.  They didn‟t and they don‟t allow for what that is like. 
 
Uma shared her views on what she feels are unfair societal judgements, 
 
There are some people whose views on it [welfare] are very 
wrong.  They think that because you are on welfare that you 
are no good, that all people who are on welfare are dumb, 
lazy, stupid and need to get off their fat ass.  And that is not 
fair because I am not dumb, I am not stupid and I am not 
lazy.  And I do work and I have always wanted to work but I 
ended up on the welfare system not because I wanted to.  
It‟s not like I said “Oh let‟s go do this”.  For me it was the 
furthest thing that I wanted to do.  But that is still not what 
some people think about people on welfare.  That is not how 
they think of them and that is not right. 
 
Here, Uma was clearly positing a strong resistance to neoliberal views.  But this 
resistance was quite enigmatic in the context of our entire interview.  I followed Uma‟s 
statement (above) about harsh views of welfare recipients with the natural probe “Why do 
you suppose some people feel that way?”  Her remarkable response, whereby she 
reproduces the views to which she had just expressed such a strong aversion, will be 
examined thoroughly in the following chapter. 
     Interestingly, Dorothy expressed some insights that strike at the heart of The Nature of 
Prejudice (Allport, 1954), and also at Foucault‟s claim to question the unquestioned 
groupings with which we have become so familiar.  When asked to describe the strengths 
and weaknesses of OW Dorothy promptly claimed that “they are painting everyone with 
the same brush.”  When asked to explain she advised “they assume that we are all lazy 
and that all we do is take money we don‟t deserve.”    When probed to elaborate, Dorothy 
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explained that she was five minutes late for an appointment at OW with her worker and 
“she yelled at me and asked how I ever expected to keep a job.  I told her that I already 
have a job, that‟s why I am late.”  Dorothy explained that she felt vindicated,  
because an officer manager there knows me and luckily she 
heard the worker yelling and she came over and said to the 
worker, „she has gone back to school [Dorothy had 
graduated from a Community College with a diploma in 
social services] and worked her butt off.  How dare you.‟ 
 
As she had done invoking the support of her Doctor earlier, Dorothy exercised agency by 
making reference to how a person in a position of notable responsibility shared her 
perspectives.  
     When Frances was asked to describe her experience with OW she replied that it was 
“very unpleasant.”  When asked for particulars she reiterated two common themes, 
There is not enough money.  It is utterly ridiculous what 
they expect you to live on.  I guarantee you that they could 
not do it themselves.  And they just treat you like you are 
the lowest form of person on earth because you need 
assistance.   
 
   Can you give me an example? [interviewer] 
 
I have to check in three days per week and show them 
where I have applied or I am cut off.  The stupid thing is 
that is time I could be doing something like looking for a 
job rather than showing up like I am a friggin criminal on 
probation and telling them I am looking for a job.  Here‟s 
another example, OK, Oxford County is really bad because 
when you are on social assistance and you are going to find 
a new place to live they make you take this form and get 
your new landlord to fill it out.  Now when I lived in 
Norfolk County all I needed from my landlord was a rent 
receipt.  So my landlord never had to know that I was on 
social assistance.  In Oxford County you have this great big 
orange form that the landlord has to fill out.  So he knows 
you are on social assistance and I am not kidding when I 
say that to more people than you realize you may as well be 
a leper.  It should be more discrete.  Why should the 
landlord have to know? 
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Frances felt that the general public seems to think that “you are the lowest form of human 
being if you are on welfare” and thus was very opposed to having her landlord made 
aware of her situation.   
     Gloria also told of experiencing a familiar story, 
When there are no supervisors in the office they are snobby 
with you and will talk over your head.  The first interview I 
had up there [OW office] the guy made me feel that small 
[holding index finger a few centimetres from thumb]. 
 
What happened? [interviewer]. 
 
He wanted to know how long I had worked in the brake 
shift plant and I am nervous and I forgot how many years 
and I said a few years and he gave like a sarcastic huff.  He 
never asked me about up until then or after then.  I left the 
plant because of an operation.  He made me feel like I 
hadn‟t worked much and that is not true.  They should 
understand that not everybody who is on welfare is lazy.  
But if you are on unemployment insurance or welfare they 
still have their nose up in the air.    
 
Like Dorothy had in an earlier interview, Gloria made reference to front line workers 
being more ignorant when their supervisors were not around.  Because supervisors 
generally have a higher status than front line workers, and rude treatment was reportedly 
more common when supervisors were not around, Gloria was perhaps attempting to add 
credibility to her claims.  Further, Gloria noted, here, that not everyone on welfare is lazy 
but like most respondents her subject position oscillated between resistance and 
accommodation because she later reported that “most people could find work if they 
really wanted to.” 
     Janet spoke of experiencing an unwarranted judgemental rudeness from a municipal 
politician, and several others, in her township when she was facing the “they all have big 
cars” reasoning for vilifying poor people, 
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I have always drove old vehicles.  It is very difficult but I 
have managed to keep a legal vehicle on the road.  This is 
one of the things I think welfare looks at and goes „well how 
can you have a legal vehicle on the road when you don‟t 
have any money?‟  And other people will stigmatize that 
and go „well you can‟t be poor if you have a legal vehicle.‟  
Well the thing is you have to keep a vehicle on the road 
especially if you live in certain areas [Janet lived in the 
country of Oxford county] because you have to get back 
and forth to work or else you are never going to work.  You 
are never going to be able to work.  So I make my vehicle a 
priority.  And I know a lot about vehicles so I fix a lot of my 
own stuff.  And I actually had the Mayor say to me, well I 
ended up with a huge parking ticket and I said I don‟t know 
how I am going to afford this parking ticket and the Mayor 
came out and said to me,“Well how can somebody on 
welfare afford a vehicle anyway?”  I was very insulted by 
that. 
 
Did you end up having to pay the ticket? [interviewer]. 
Yeah, I paid the ticket.  I have two brothers that help me 
out.  They are very supportive they have helped me through 
some really rough times.  I don‟t like to ask them but 
sometimes I have no choice. 
 
Interestingly,  while carrying out my role as a child protection social worker, I was pulled 
over by police officers on two occasions during working hours:  one time for having an 
expired licence plate sticker and one time for doing 65km in a 50km zone on my way to 
interviewing a child for a child protection investigation.  An office mate had earlier 
advised me (based on her earlier experience) that if I was ever pulled over by the police, 
to advise the officer that I am a child protection social worker because they will almost 
always let trivial traffic violations go for “us”.  On both occasions, I escaped with a verbal 
warning to get my plates renewed and to slow down respectively.  Unlike Janet, I easily 
could have afforded to pay these tickets.  Unlike Janet, I did not have to.  I reaped the 
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benefits of my white middle class privilege.  Janet expressed significant disenchantment 
with this mentality.  
     John, like Daryl had earlier, advised of the harshly ironic reality that the mere fact of 
being a social assistance recipient undercuts his job search, 
There are certain places you can‟t go in.  They won‟t 
accept you.  The fact that you are on welfare – they are not 
going to accept your resume.  You bring that up to your 
worker and you do it [apply] anyways.  It doesn‟t matter if 
you get the door slammed in your face or not you drop that 
resume off.  To me, some of the workers in there think that 
they are higher than what you are.  You know, it don‟t 
matter.  They make yourself feel belittled or whatever you 
want to call it.  It is OK with them.  They don‟t have to go 
out and face it. 
 
You mentioned that some places won‟t accept your resume 
if you are on welfare.  Can you tell me about that? 
[Interviewer] 
 
OK, for example there is a shop downtown.  It‟s an 
aluminum place on Dundas Street.  You walk in there, like I 
did with my resume, and he knows you are on welfare. 
 
How does he know? [interviewer] 
 
People know what you are doing and what you are and 
when people find out that you are on welfare you may as 
well be a parasite.  And this guy just happens to know and 
he pinpoints you right there.  Basically, he is „get the hell 
outta my shop.  Get the hell out.‟  That‟s it.  And you tell 
your worker that there is those type of people out there and 
all they say is that you still need 14-18 job searches per 
week or you are cut off.  I don‟t like to use the word be-little 
but at the end of the day that is what they do more than 
anything. 
 
Later in this chapter we will examine some of the barriers to leaving social assistance, but 
for now it should be noted that the stigma of being on social assistance in the first place 
can be one of those barriers.  The respondents who endured this barrier deemed that it 
was exceptionally unfair. 
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The Material Realities of Social Assistance 
 
“Nearing the end of the month there are some days where you just have to get your body 
used to skipping meals.  It‟s not good for me and there are days when I feel lifeless like 
there is nothing in me anymore.   And I just lie in bed because getting up burns energy I 
know I am not going to have.” [Alison]  
 
     If the social realities of being on social assistance were harsh, the material realities 
were equally as bad, or perhaps even harsher.  Depending on the nature of an unmet 
material or health need, this could be a constant and chronic problem from which there 
was seldom, if ever, any reprieve.  What poverty amounted to for many respondents was 
having important living needs that were not adequately met or, in some cases, never met 
at all.  While the harshest conservative critics, fuelling a public discourse that re-ignited a 
harsh public opinion, would de-contextualize a story like Alison‟s to zone in on the fact 
she acknowledged lying in bed and draw the conclusion that this was at the heart of the 
problem.  Yet this victim blaming (Ryan, 1976) mentality is woefully inadequate at the 
level of interpretive sociological meaning, “Adequacy at the level of meaning requires 
examination of the “in order to” and “because” motives of the actors” (Adam, 1978: 4).  
In this particular case, welfare policy makers would be well served to understand that “in 
order to” get out of bed (assuming that one has a bed to sleep in) and start the day, it is 
necessary to have adequate food to access “because” one will be burning energy that they 
will not be able to replenish.  Hearing the stories below, the “in order to” and “because” 
motives of actors that have become “distorted in the discourse” (McCormack, 2002) start 
to become clearer.           
     Adrienne, who had come to social assistance because a host of health problems 
coincided with the dissolution of her marriage, articulated what bothered her about her 
experience with OW, 
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They have a special diet allowance which is now $10.00 
and that will cover an extra couple days but it doesn‟t 
matter how carefully you shop – and believe me, I shop very 
carefully because you have no choice but to be that way -- 
and if you only buy things on sale, there are still quite a few 
days left at the end of the month where there is no food and 
no money, and so I scrape together the remains of what is 
left in my cupboards and sometimes there isn‟t anything 
left.  There are days when I have to drink 20 glasses of 
water because my stomach is so empty.  And I have to tell 
you that when my daughter is hungry I thank God everyday 
that she can go to her Dad‟s, because if she couldn‟t . . . 
[starts to cry] 
 
When Adrienne re-gained her composure articulated another concern that was negatively 
impacting her well being, 
They have a drug benefit plan, but they cut back 
dramatically on what they cover.  And for someone like me 
that is just about the worst thing that they could possibly 
have ever done.  So now people like myself are on drugs 
that they shouldn‟t be on because the ones they should be 
on aren‟t covered.  But they are the best the doctors can do.  
Doctors are scrambling to keep us as healthy as possible. 
 
And they have a basic dental plan, but it does not 
completely cover your dentures, and they won‟t even tell 
you how much it covers.  You have to go and get your teeth 
pulled first and then come in with an estimate for the 
dentures and they say that we‟ll get back to you.  And you 
know teeth are not just cosmetic, people need them to chew.   
 
Uma cited an extensive list of comparable concerns, first about not being able to provide 
everything that she would have like for her children (even when she worked full time in 
the secondary labour force) and later about her specific disenchantments with OW over 
repeatedly having her family‟s legitimate needs ignored,  
And at Tim Horton‟s, this is funny too . . .  Because I work 
for Tim Horton‟s they have a camp and they say how they 
send kids to camp.  The thing is I didn‟t even know about it.  
And I have always been low income.  We didn‟t know about 
Tim Horton‟s kids for camp.  My kids never got to go to 
summer camp because I couldn‟t afford it, and yet I work 
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here and I help send kids to camp but my kids never got to 
go. 
 
Uma offered a social critique of her concerns with OW along with establishing the 
difficulties in the material realities – and the unmet needs -- of her everyday living, 
I can‟t get dental work done.  I had a tooth go very bad and 
they eventually helped out a little and I had to fight for that 
and I still owe my dentist.  My kids can‟t get all of their 
dental stuff done. I have very sensitive teeth and I ended up 
with a lot of pain in my mouth and I thought it was a cavity 
or whatever.  And to get dental work done it was, like, well 
you have to go to the dentist and get it checked out, and 
then you send in an estimate to welfare and they‟ll see 
whether or not they will cover it. 
   
Adrienne contrasted having unmet needs to the positive way her medical needs had been 
met earlier.  Adrienne had already told this story earlier in the interview, but she 
obviously must have felt compelled to repeat it, 
The only good thing that helped me with welfare is that they 
did buy the drugs and they did get me my stockings when I 
needed them.  Like that medical stuff I didn‟t have to worry 
about because that was covered.  Like when I needed 
antibiotics welfare was good for that and I just had to pay a 
$2.00 fee on the welfare system and the rest was covered.  
For my legs, I didn‟t have to worry about the cost of 
therapy because it was covered.  But now that I am being 
cut off of welfare [Adrienne was returning to her full time 
work at Tim Horton‟s at the end of the month this interview 
was taking place] I can‟t even get that.  But I was told that 
if something came up and it was quite costly I could phone 
in and see if maybe I could get a drug card covered – to see 
if maybe they‟ll cover it.  It wasn‟t that they will help, it was 
maybe they might help.  So it is pretty stressful to think 
about it and how can I not think about it.   
 
Adrienne also articulated a reality of working life in the secondary labour force, 
And I make minimum wage here and you have to apply for 
benefits from Tim Horton‟s and if you are accepted they 
take $35.00 / month off your pay cheque to cover the cost of 
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benefits
22.  When I found out about that I couldn‟t spare the 
$35.00 / month but I wish now that I had been able to. 
 
Here, gender and class disadvantage were intersecting to exacerbate Adrienne‟s 
challenges in that the work she did in the secondary labour force was undervalued and not 
adequately compensated, and the work she did as a Mother was also prone to a 
comparable plight.  Home-life, the labour market, or social assistance did not providing 
Adrienne with an adequate material existence.  
     Mike claimed that not having a vehicle, given his geographic location, undercut his 
capacity to secure employment, 
Let‟s face it.  You got to go out of town.  Unless you got 
somebody to get you into Toyota here then you got to go out 
of town.  If I had a car I‟d have a job and I wouldn‟t be 
here today.  See they also stopped the bus passes now.  See, 
I used to have a bus pass and if it was too far to walk I‟d 
get a bus.  But see, if I can get that job at Super 8 they are 
going to give me money for a bus pass after that, so that‟s 
all right you know.  But that only lasts for a little while and 
I won‟t make enough at Super 8 to pay for my rent and food 
and a bus pass.  So it‟s a no win situation.  If I was younger 
I could walk an hour to work and an hour back but not now. 
 
The idea that access to a reliable vehicle expands the geographic radius in which one is 
able to work is something that is not part of the welfare debate, and although a few 
respondents cited a lack of transportation as a personal barrier to employment, this barrier 
was not mentioned when discussing the “Other.” 
     Donna described, in a powerful way, how she felt when the inadequacy of her income 
forced her to go to the local food bank.  Despite the fact that nobody at the food bank was 
rude to her, the cultural stigma was ingrained in how she perceived her situation, 
                                                 
22
 Most places of employment in the secondary labour force simply do not offer health benefits (Duffy, 
Glenday and Pupo, 2005; Newman, 1999) 
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That is the most embarrassing thing that you could ever 
have to do.  It‟s horrible.  The people there are nice but to 
have to go in there and tell them that you can‟t feed your 
kids, you can‟t afford toilet paper.  Nobody should have to 
go through that.  Spend a day in our shoes and find out 
what it is like.  Poor people don‟t want to be poor.  Maybe 
some people don‟t mind but most poor people don‟t want to 
be poor.  Do you think that I want to take my kids to the 
welfare office and tell them that I need help? 
 
In stating that “poor people don‟t want to be poor”, and adding the caveat that maybe 
some don‟t mind, Donna was among a minority of respondents whose rejection of 
neoliberal discourse was clearly more prominent than her accommodation when 
discussing the “Other”.  Notably, almost one third of respondents posited some variation 
of the refrain that their critics should “spend a day in our shoes.”  I thought enough about 
what respondent‟s were saying, here, to issue that challenge to the PC MPP of Oxford 
County in the 2007 election.  We will explore this exchange in Chapter 7.  Because the 
marginalization of the poor is accomplished through words about poverty, and those 
words do not adequately articulate the harshness of impoverishment and gloss over (with 
antiseptic slogans) the disabling effects of being without adequate resources, I truly 
believe that simulating a period of living on a social assistance income would be an 
invaluable and humane learning experience for many policy makers.    
 
Survival  
 
     Several respondents reported that they had no alternative but to rely on the assistance 
of family, close friends, and / or odd jobs to secure additional material resources to 
compensate for the inadequacy of their income.  There was a conviction among many that 
this was absolutely necessary and there was a frequently cited refrain, emblematic in 
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Heather‟s view, that people at OW “should try to live on this amount and live like this for 
even just a bit.  I can guarantee you that they couldn‟t do it.”   
     Several respondents also gave graphic and compelling details of shopping very 
carefully and being as frugal as possible by doing things like buying only what is on sale, 
seeking out and using every coupon available if it was for a needed item, using cloth 
diapers, cutting children‟s hair to save $10.00, getting clothing from Goodwill, and food 
from the food bank.  Despite these survival strategies it was often still a common 
experience to go without. 
Regimes of Practice    
 
     Many respondents reported receiving inexplicably vague form letters from OW 
advising that their benefits had been cut off for providing “insufficient information.”  No 
written details were provided to respondents about what information they allegedly failed 
to provide and calls to the office often resulted in waiting two or three days to get an 
explanation from their worker.  On some occasions, the letter had reportedly been sent in 
administrative error, and on other occasions, there were what respondents believed to be 
exceptionally trivial bureaucratic technicalities, with Roxanne‟s case being the most 
blatant, 
A couple months after my twins were born I got a letter in 
the mail stating that I was cut off for “insufficient 
information.”  I had no clue what they were talking about 
and I was completely hysterical because this was my only 
source of income and I have kids to take care of.  And what 
made me the angriest is that I am good with keeping up 
with everything that they ask.  So I called my worker and I 
don‟t get a call back.  I call again.  No call back.  Three 
days later I get a call stating that they need to see the 
original copy of the birth records and not the copy I gave 
them.  That‟s all it was.  Meanwhile for three days I am 
going crazy thinking that my only source of support is gone.    
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     Receiving these types of letters, with little detail, was a common occurrence among 
respondents.  Adrienne, for example, reported, 
I get letters saying I am cut off every few months.  But the 
letters are never clear what for.  They just say that your 
benefits have been terminated based on section so and so.  
The first few times it happened I was freaking out about it 
and I called in and eventually got it straightened out.   
 
And what needed to be straightened out? [Interviewer] 
 
Really stupid stuff.  Like they claimed that I wasn‟t 
reporting income from my insurance company.  I told them, 
“you guys must know something that I don‟t because I am 
not getting money from any insurance company.”  
Eventually it all got straightened out and they said it was 
just an administrative error.  Just stupid stuff like that.   
 
Form letters terminating benefits were quite common.  Several respondents told other 
stories of bureaucratic challenges they felt were frustrating.  Loretta, 28, for example, 
advised, 
It was a month and a half before I received my first check 
and I waited until I had nothing before I even went there.  If 
it wasn‟t for my landlord I would have been homeless.  So it 
was the middle of April when I got my first cheque and 
there were a lot of misunderstandings with that.  The intake 
supervisor when she did my application did several errors.   
 
Can you tell me about that? [interviewer] 
 
She misread my financial statement and she thought that I 
had $600 in the bank when all that was was my overdraft.  
So she misread that and then she did not take into account 
my bills of the hydro and gas in my expenses.  I was in rent 
geared to income and she thought that my rent was all 
inclusive but I told her that it wasn‟t.  So my first cheque 
was a lot less than what it should have been and with the 
bills piling up and no money that was a lot of stress.  Now 
they did make that up later.  But then after they made it up I 
began receiving all these letters saying that I had not 
submitted statements.  But as it turned out they were all 
their mistakes. 
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Darryl told a comparable story, 
 
Over the years I have had so many suspension letters 
putting my benefits on hold, and for what?  It is ridiculous.  
It‟s like, OK, what did I do now?  
 
What do the letters say? [interviewer] 
 
They don‟t say anything.  They just tell you that you are 
suspended and that you have to call.   
 
So what happens when you call? [interviewer] 
 
OK, well the latest one, somebody must have called in and 
told them that I am working and not reporting my income, 
so I get a letter saying that I‟m cut off.  I know that I have 
not done anything wrong and I have done everything that 
they told me to do and I still get these letters.  Like I told my 
worker on the phone, „if I was working I would tell you.  
Actually, you would be the first person I would tell.  You 
have got all my letters from the doctor and you know I can‟t 
work, you know I‟m on oxygen, so what am I put on hold 
for?‟      
 
You mentioned that this was the latest incident.  Can you 
tell me about other incidents?  
 
There were times when they cut me off for no friggin reason 
and I would have to go without for three friggin months.  I 
was like, OK, when I was living on London Street I gave 
them proof of where I was living and how much rent I was 
paying.  And all of a sudden when I moved they claimed 
that I had been over-paid $3000.  And so I went there and I 
was hopping mad and at the same time I am trying to keep 
my cool.  And I said “why do you guys think I owe you 
$3000?”  And they said, “there was no proof of where you 
were living and if you were paying rent or not.”  And I said, 
“excuse me I gave all that to my worker and I gave you 
guys everything you asked for.”     
 
Daryl reported that OW is taking $35.00 of his check every month to pay back the 
$3000.00 they claim he owes them.   
     Diane reported facing a comparable frustration whereby a confounding debt she 
allegedly owed to OW was being taken of her already minimal check, 
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There was me and I have my two children.  They had me 
living on less than $1100 / per month.  And when we were 
on welfare before they reported that something had 
happened with some mix up and we owed then $1000.00.  
But I don‟t know what happened and I don‟t know what 
they are talking about.  But then they took $100 off my 
cheque every month to pay it back.  And they have to 
change the petty things they do.  Like if you are a day late 
with your income statement – even when they know you 
have no income – you are cut off. 
 
It was also common for respondents to report feeling frustrated with having to regularly 
check into the office to provide updates on their job search.  There was no regular pattern 
as to the frequency of check in requirements.  The range of required job search check-ins 
varied from daily to monthly.  A few of the prospective applicants awaiting to hear about 
their eligibility to ODSP, and a few others who already had employment, were exempted 
from job searching at the time of our interviews.   
Training Placements (or lack thereof) 
 
     Given that one of the rationales supporting the notion of workfare is that participants 
will receive training that will enable them to secure employment – and this argument was 
certainly trumpeted loudly by the proponents of the common sense revolution – 
respondents were asked about their experiences with workfare placements.  Training 
placements were so rare among respondents (none of the twenty four people were 
currently in a placement and only three reported ever having been) that many did not even 
understand the open ended question “Can you tell me about your OW placement?” and 
confused mandatory job search requirements (which have always existed even prior to 
OW) with training.  In short, nobody gained marketable skills or met important contacts 
through training that did not exist except via political optics and rhetoric.  This finding 
confirms those from the Social Planning Council of Toronto (1999). 
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     When Alice was asked about her placement, she replied, 
I am not in placement at this time.  I have been.  But I am 
not at this time. 
 
When you were in placement what kinds of things were you 
doing? [interviewer] 
 
I went through the intake and they gave me a log sheet that 
you need to fill out -- a participation activity log. 
 
And is that the same as job training or is it just verifying 
that you went to look for work? [interviewer] 
 
No.  It‟s just saying that I went to look for work.  I didn‟t 
get job training. 
 
Donna‟s comments were also typical, “That‟s the thing.  They don‟t give you training.  
They just send you out there to look for a job.” 
     Darryl advised that a few years earlier, “they had me pruning trees.”  When asked to 
elaborate on this training he said, “well the exact same thing that I was doing for three 
months other guys were making $13.00 or $14.00 bucks an hour for.”  When asked if he 
received meaningful training Daryl advised, “it takes five minutes to learn how to prune a 
tree. The training I received was five minutes long to work for less than minimum for 
three months.”  When asked if he had made important connections at placement Darryl 
advised that there were no connections there that could assist him, and that making it 
known that he was on welfare in the first place was the antithesis of assistance. 
     Loretta advised that she had formerly done a brief placement as a dish washer at a 
soup kitchen that she was forced to used.  Loretta reported that she took the initiative to 
arrange the placement herself and OW approved it, and a worker came out to see her 
placement on one occasion.  When asked if she gained new skills, Loretta advised “No, I 
already knew how to wash dishes.  I have been doing that since I was eight.”  When asked 
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if she met important contacts via placement Loretta advised, not surprisingly, that she 
hadn‟t.  Soup kitchens tend not to attract very many potential employers.  The reported 
lack of meaningful workfare training via OW confirms the findings of Herd, Lightman, 
and Mitchell (2005), Quaid (2002), and the Social Planning Council of Toronto (1999). 
Attempting to Exit Social Assistance 
 
     Given the material and social harshness that respondents reported having to endure, it 
was common for virtually all conversational partners to express a desire to get off of 
social assistance.  There were often barriers that reportedly precluded this from 
happening.  Daryl talked about some of the obstacles he faced to employment.   
like I will look at the London Free Press at the library just 
around the corner because it‟s close and the paper is free 
and London‟s where the jobs are.  But, hello, how exactly 
am I supposed to get there?  Ideally, there would be work 
for me in Woodstock but there isn‟t. 
 
The lack of work where he lived, and the lack of material means to drive or relocate to 
where he may find better work undercut Daryl‟s job search.  Darryl continued utilizing 
free resources (i.e. newspaper at the local library) to continue looking for work and thus 
he was not without agency despite having very limited means.  
     When asked what barriers Adrienne faced to employment she listed two, 
 
My health.  And a lack of money to go there and do it and to 
even get there.  You know because even if it is a job where 
they want you know a criminal record check or you know 
when you work with children or when I worked at a shelter  
it costs money and if you don‟t have it you are out of luck. 
 
If health problems are a factor that bring some people to social assistance, it stands to 
reason that if adequate health supports are not put in place to make people better, then 
illness and injury will remain barriers to achieving “self sufficiency.”  Further, there are 
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monetary costs to securing and getting to work and if those costs extend beyond the 
means of job seekers then they will be, as Adrienne mentioned, “out of luck.”     
     Alice articulated what she felt were exceptionally frustrating barriers for her, 
 
 I am supposed to be computer literate?[sighs / sneers with 
a look of disappointment]. I am 59 years old.  We never had 
computers growing up. I don‟t have a computer now.   I 
have explained to them [OW] that I don‟t know how to use 
a computer and that cuts me out of a lot of jobs.  And they 
say, you know, we will help you when you come in.  And 
then when I go there and ask them to help me they go too 
fast.  I don‟t even know where the pointer or the disk is to 
help me find what they are looking for.  And they just click 
on here and click on there and I can‟t even understand 
what they are clicking on to so I am not able to keep up 
with it.  I am from a generation that didn‟t have computers 
growing up and I don‟t have one now and that makes it 
more difficult.  Plus my arthritis and carpel tunnel -- that 
also makes it very difficult for me. 
 
Do you have any health supports?[interviewer] 
 
Well it is all out of my pocket but I can claim it on income 
tax.  I wear compression stockings for circulation in my 
legs and those are $112 each pair.  And I have another pair 
coming in the mail shortly which I put on my Visa bill.  And 
I wear $400 orthotic insoles in my shoes to walk without 
pain in my feet.  And the chiropractor allowed me to have 
them for free so I didn‟t have to declare those on my income 
tax.  And I wear wrist supports and they are $40.00 each 
and I pay those out of pocket until I declare them.  And I 
wear the [medical device that was not audible in audio 
recording] and I have worn it for three or four years now 
and that is $80.  And I take whale cartilage for my arthritis 
because if I don‟t there is pain radiating up my back and 
that is $27 for 100 capsules. 
 
   Alice felt that expectations for her to re-enter the labour market were unfair, and what 
was making her even more disenchanted (and adding to a host of stressors presented by 
her ill health) was that the limited computer training that she was provided was not suited 
to her capacity, health, or interest.  There was reportedly a profound lack of empathy for 
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her situation.  Interestingly, most respondents reported receiving no practical training 
whatsoever and this is consistent with (Herd, Lightman, and Mitchell, 2005) and the 
(Social Planning Council of Toronto, 1999). 
     The barriers that brought Alison to social assistance, and kept her in a scooter for most 
of her waking moments, also kept her out of the workforce, 
I am not doing very well.  I have gotten worse.  The 
radiation on my back weakened my spine and I have 
rheumatoid arthritis.  I am in extreme pain a lot and have 
to take a lot of medication. 
 
Alison was the woman who was vilified for her former worker for owning a cat.  She 
recounted her extended work history that entailed almost a quarter century of being a 
Foster Mother, 
All I have ever done is take care of kids.  That‟s all I know 
how to do.  Like I said, I would be a foster mom again in a 
heart beat if I was in better shape. I had to quit two years 
ago this spring. I look like I am in good shape right now.  I 
have gained so much weight.  But I can‟t get up and move 
and walk very fare because it is extremely painful doing it 
and it hurts for days afterwards. 
 
     In addition to the stigma of being a social assistance recipient that reportedly 
handicapped his capacity to secure work at MacDonald‟s, Daryl also reported health 
problems as a barrier to securing employment.   
Last year I had lung failure twice.  I have only one lung.  
When I was first born my left lung collapsed.  They had to 
destroy my left lung.  Right now it is just sitting there doing 
nothing.  My left lung don‟t work. 
 
Do you have any health supports? [interviewer] 
Yeah, I am on Oxygen 2 right now because if I wasn‟t I 
wouldn‟t be here.  I have got my big machine I use to sweep 
with that I wear around the house and when my oxygen is 
low I can really feel it so I have a tank that I carry with me 
when I need to use it. 
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     Diane‟s health had recently taken a turn for the better, and because her children were 
now young adults she no longer had child care barriers.  Diane was happy about returning 
to work but recounted challenges she had faced earlier in her life, 
Well one of the things I had to consider when looking for 
work was my hours because when my kids were younger 
they needed me and my life revolved around them.   So I 
had to consider them and work as much as I could when 
they were in school and try to be home when they were 
going to be home.  Even when they were early teens I didn‟t 
want them home alone – especially at night in our 
neighbourhood.  My husband was a truck driver and I 
never knew when he was coming or going so there was not 
much help there and they needed adult supervision so that 
was a big factor for me finding a job.  Days was the only 
thing that worked for me and when I got it at Tim Horton‟s 
I took it. 
 
 
     Dorothy articulated what she felt were impediments to moving from part time 
employment on the front line of the service sector, to full time employment that would 
enable her to leave social assistance,    
My age. The fact I have fibromyalgia.  And even if I was 
younger and had my health, if I had gotten a bachelor‟s 
degree instead of a diploma I would have had a better 
chance of full time work instead of part time at $12.00.  I 
have gone online at my daughters and looked all over.  The 
government website. OACAS.org, charity village.com, all 
the nearby papers version on the computer for job like 
CMHA and community options for justice, and to get good 
work you need your bachelors.  I am close to retirement age 
so it doesn‟t make sense now.  They are not going to hire 
me.  And now there is no retirement age.  People can stay 
as long as they want.  How the hell are people like me 
gonna get in? 
 
While Dorothy was certainly correct in that a bachelor‟s degree in social work would 
certainly have made her more marketable than a social service diploma, it must not be 
forgotten that we are now living in the first generation where university educated 
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graduates are unemployed and underemployed in large numbers (Duffy, Glenday and 
Pupo, 2005). 
     Frances was pretty clear about why she felt she could not secure employment and why 
her situation, and well being, was looking very bleak, 
To get out there again I would need to have my health back.  
I just can‟t work.  I really miss my bartending and 
waitressing job but i just can‟t do it.  I am dying sitting here 
right now actually. 
 
Would you like to get up and stretch? [Frances had earlier 
advised that she can‟t sit for long periods] 
 
Yes, I better.  
     Gloria echoed the sentiments of several earlier respondents when asked what she 
would need to re-enter the labour force, 
With the operations I‟ve had, and especially, I have never 
recovered from having a tipped uterus.  And I have live like 
this for so long I don‟t think anymore that there are any 
miracles in store for me.  And with the way I have lived it 
has worn on me.  There is so much stress that I have gone 
through it is impossible to cover it all, but let me just say 
this and this is what I want you to promise me that you will 
write into your report: more support when I needed it 
would have given me more life and more of a chance. 
 
Gloria‟s views clearly oppose the perspective that making poor people poorer is helping 
them by given them a needed push into the labour market.  Her perspective is entirely 
consistent with a compelling editorial by a woman named Susan Scruton in an anti-
poverty journal called “Perception” (Vol. 25 # 3, 2002), “I know from experience that 
people need more, not less, in order to extricate themselves from poverty.”      
     Roxanne detailed what she felt was an employment barrier by articulating how she 
feels impoverishment impacts people, 
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I think that anyone living in poverty, well I think you are 
affected by depression because that‟s exactly what it does.  
Like to be starving and have no food or just crappy food 
and realize that there another week and a half before you 
have any money.  Financial stress can knock me right 
down.  People think that‟s just physical but it is also 
emotional.  It can be hard some days to just get out of bed 
because that takes energy you don‟t have.  Once you had 
your breakfast, if you even get that, you might not be eating 
again until tomorrow.  And when you force yourself to get 
out of bed anyway there is nowhere to go, no money to get 
there, and if you walk you are burning your energy that you 
might not be able to put back. 
 
There could be a compelling comparison, here, to an earlier respondent‟s predicament 
when she formerly owned a car, and reportedly could not run it when she could not afford 
gas.  People are comparable to cars in that if they are not properly fuelled they will not 
operate effectively or, perhaps, not at all.          
Connecting Subjugated Knowledges to the Subaltern Literature on Poverty 
 
“The majority of Canadians don‟t understand what poverty is, what it does to those who 
endure it, how it effects their children and grandchildren” (Capponi, 1999: ix)   
 
     Jacqueline Homan (2007: 4) writes that, 
Much of what has been said or written [about poverty] has 
come from those who have never personally experienced 
the negative effects of classism and the social injustice of 
poverty in particular.  Thus, their writings and opinions are 
from the perspective of being on the outside looking in. 
 
Sheila Baxter (1997: viii) articulates her personal frustration with directly experiencing 
this phenomenon, 
We, the non-academic working class poor don‟t have many 
books that speak our true voices.  Often when somebody 
like me writes, our thoughts are re-constructed by others 
who feel that education brings the authority to interpret our 
meaning.  I have so many memories of speaking and being 
interpreted.  People say things like, „What Sheila is trying 
to say is . . .‟ or „What Sheila means to say is . . .‟or „What 
Sheila meant was . . .‟  When I speak from my working 
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class perspective, I know what I say and I know what I 
mean. 
 
In analyzing Baxter‟s comments I could not help but reflect upon her claim that poor 
people don‟t have many books that speak their true voices.  While it must be 
acknowledged that impoverishment is experienced in different ways by different people, 
and it is fallacious to assumed that there is one truly representative voice, there are also 
some common themes that emerge when one examines the interpretive phenomenological 
literature on poverty as written by those who have experienced impoverishment.  As a 
PhD candidate writing about poverty, I was well aware of how the voices of poor people 
are rarely heard in the academy and attempted to compensate for this reality early in my 
doctoral studies by putting together a PhD comprehensive exam reading list that included 
the experiential insights of poor people.  My list was ignored by faculty and the eventual 
reading lists through two sets of comprehensive exams totalling the equivalent of one 
hundred books included only one source (albeit a powerful one, Kelley, 1997) written 
about poverty from the perspective of a person who had actually experienced 
impoverishment. 
     In fairness, there was much scholarly and analytical value in the other ninety nine 
sources on my reading list and I can‟t lose sight of the fact I could not have completed 
this dissertation without the academic knowledge base I accumulated making my way 
through those reading lists.  I maintain, however, that the academy could, and should, be 
doing a better job desubjugating subjugated knowledge as it relates to impoverishment.  
As we noted early in this monograph, Kelley wrote about his disenchantment with the 
academy, journalism, and organized politics for producing “culture of poverty” views of 
urban ghettoes that were harsher than the game of “the dozens” he played in those urban 
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ghettoes.  Other authors have written to make their voices heard, so let‟s examine what 
they have said.     
     Stephen Oates, a Martin Luther King, Jr. biographer, notes that in his later years King 
became more determined to merge the Civil Rights Movement with stronger anti-poverty 
activism  and recounted the challenges that emerged when the King‟s voluntarily 
relinquished several trappings of an upper middle class existence to temporarily simulate 
the discomforts of economic disenfranchisement,  
Coretta and the children had moved into the [ghetto] 
apartment with King, intending to stay until the fall.  Right 
away, the [normally well behaved] children started 
whining.  There was nothing to do except play outside in 
patches of black dirt.  Even the pitiful playground was 
black dirt.  The streets were too congested and dangerous 
for them to release there stored-up energy there.  Because 
the ghettoes had no swimming pools or parks, there was no 
place for them to escape the torrid heat.  Confined too often 
to King‟s small, suffocating flat, the children fought and 
screamed at one another and even reverted to infantile 
behaviour.  „I realized that the crowded flat we lived in‟ 
King said „was about to produce an emotional explosion in 
my own family‟ (Oates, 1982: 394).   
 
    Perhaps the strongest commonality that runs through the subaltern literature on 
impoverishment (Kelley, 1997; Capponi, 1999; Baxter, 1997; Homan, 2007) that can be 
connected to the subjugated knowledges of the 24 respondents interviewed for this study,  
would be that poverty can perpetuate itself when the lack of material (including health) 
resources to move forward are absent and the extreme discomforts of impoverishment 
compromise the well being necessary to escape poverty.  Those who have written about 
their experience with impoverishment, and virtually all 24 conversational partners who 
took the time to discuss their lives with me, were consistent on two key themes:  there 
were undesirable factors other than “personal irresponsibility” that brought them face to 
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face with poverty and a lack of material and health supports are undercutting their 
capacity to escape impoverishment.     
     In arguing that the effects of the daily living realities of impoverishment are often 
mistaken for the cause, Homan (2007: 126) argues “These [disabling effects of poverty] 
are all critical factors ignored by the so called expert politicians, think tanks, and society 
at large.” While neoliberal images of rugged individualism are posited as solutions, and 
tenets of „personal responsibility‟ is written into welfare policy, Homan perceptively 
notes, “You simply can‟t pull yourself up by your bootstraps – you have no boots to begin 
with” (Homan, 2007: 176).  Homan‟s metaphor is powerful and it is worth considering 
why the legitimacy of her logic, evidenced by many of the embodied stories we have 
examined in this chapter, has not been recognized in public policy. 
“Privileged Irresponsibility” 
 
     Tronto (1993: 120-21) suggests that “privileged irresponsibility” can be seen when 
“those who are relatively privileged are granted by that privilege the opportunity to 
simply ignore certain forms of hardship that they do not face.”  Given that material and 
cultural hardship is “distorted in the discourse” (McCormack, 2002) of welfare reform, 
grounded insights in the final sections of this chapter will attempt to counter this 
undesirable reality.        
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     The Interfaith Social Assistance Reform Coalition (1998: 107) solicited input from 
grade four and five students in North Bay.  This input was solicited not only because 
there was an glaring gap in the literature ignoring the voices of children in poverty, but 
also because “One of the hardest things for these mothers is to see the hardship of their 
lives affecting their children” ISARC (1998: 107).  Here is how children at a school in a 
disenfranchised North Bay community responded when asked to talk about being poor.        
Poverty is . . . 
 
Wishing you could go to McDonald‟s 
getting a basket from the Santa Fund 
feeling ashamed when my Dad can‟t get a job 
not buying books at the book fair 
not getting to go to birthday parties 
hearing my Mom and Dad fight over money 
not ever getting a pet because it costs too much 
wishing you had a nice house 
not being able to go camping 
not getting a hot dog on hot dog day 
not getting pizza on pizza day 
not going to Canada‟s Wonderland 
not being able to have your friends sleep over 
pretending that you forgot your lunch 
being afraid to tell your Mom that you need gym shoes 
not having any breakfast sometimes 
not being able to play hockey 
sometimes really hard because my Mom gets scared and she cries 
hiding your feet so the teacher doesn‟t see that you don‟t have boots 
not being able to go to cubs or play soccer 
not being able to take swimming lessons 
not being able to take the electives at school (downhill skiing) 
not being able to afford a holiday 
not having pretty barrettes for your hair 
not having a backyard 
being teased for the way you are dressed 
not being able to go on school trips. 
                 (Source:  ISARC, 1998: 107) 
  
It seems very reasonable to conclude that the overwhelming majority of children who are 
not deprived of the experiences listed above are probably going to have a happier and 
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healthier childhood that translates into academic achievement leading to higher education 
and retention of their middle class status as they become adults.   In 1989 the Canadian 
House of Commons unanimously pledged to “achieve the goal of eliminating poverty 
among children by the year 2000” (Hurtig,1999: 57).  By the deadline date nearly one in 
five Canadian children lived in poverty – an increase of 564 000 since 1989 (Hurtig, 
1999: 57).  Today, the goal of ameliorating child poverty is not even on the agenda.  The 
province of Ontario has set the goal of decreasing child poverty by 25% over the next five 
years.  The headline for the Ontario “Growing Stronger” campaign is “breaking the 
cycle”.   
Conclusion 
     By examining the qualitative data from these twenty four respondents, and connecting 
their insights to other economically disenfranchised people writing about their 
disenfranchisement, it is reasonable to draw the grounded conclusion that (for many) the 
undesirable factors that bring people to social assistance, the material and cultural 
harshness of everyday life on the system, and the barriers to escaping impoverishment are 
all obscured by policy directives that espouse de-contextualized notions “personal 
responsibility” as the primary solution to poverty reduction.   
     Every single respondent in this research positioned themselves as worthy and 
deserving amidst the cultural and policy practices that too frequently suggest otherwise.  
Examining the specifics of these discursive strategies of resistance is revealing.  To 
concisely sum up respondents‟ stories,23 41.6% of people who participated in this 
                                                 
23
 The numbers in this concluding summary (quantifying the discursive strageies of conversational partners) 
were secured by going back through my coded data in N6 after it was determined that my write up did not 
cover each of the 24 respondents‟ perspectives on every issue.  The write-up included the most compelling 
illustrations of a given theme and the omissions were similar variations of the same theme.     
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research (n=10) cited some form of health problem as a primary barrier to labour force 
participation.  Almost half of this group stated that their poor health was a direct result of 
their participation in the labour force, and in doing so strongly rejected the dominant 
notion associated with welfare receipt that they were afraid of work.  Several of the 
people living with poor health made a point of stating that their doctors were fully 
supporting them and this strategy did seem to lend an aura of credibility to their claims.  
While poor health was the most frequently cited employment barrier among the 
respondents in this study, injury and / or illness was not experienced as a singular or 
discrete challenge.  A lack of material resources was cited as problematic by 23 of the 
total 24 respondents, and for people with poor health living in poverty often frustrates 
attempts to have health restored.  For three women in this study, health breakdown 
coincided with relationship breakdown. 
     People would also push back against the dominant discourse to point out that they did 
not leave their job, but for reasons that were clearly beyond their control their job had left 
them.  This was the case for 33.3% of conversational partners (n=8) and peoples‟ detailed 
stories effectively re-negotiated the disembodied stereotypes linked with social assistance 
receipt:  for several respondents, part of this renegotiation seemed to directly counter the 
“culture of poverty” perspective when conversational partners made a point of 
emphasizing that their parents had taught them the value of work.  Like the problem of 
poor health, job loss was not experienced in isolation as a sole problem.  Three of the nine 
respondents who were laid off, or let go because of company closure, also stated that their 
age was working against them in attempting to secure other work.  One women had job 
loss occur at approximately the same time she became a widow.  All nine respondents 
who had lost their jobs stated, with slightly different variations of the same underlying 
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theme, that the discomfort of economic deprivation was undercutting their well being and 
capacity to transcend their present circumstances.  One respondent was clear that cuts to 
her health supports “were the worst thing they possibly could have ever done.”    
        Relationship breakdown was cited by 16.6 % of respondents (n=4) in this study as 
the primary reason for having to access social assistance.  All four of these respondents 
were women.  Two of the four had health problems coincide with relationship breakdown 
and all these women were, or previously had, devoted a significant portion of their lives 
carrying out the demands of caregiving.  Two of these four women also suggested that 
present child care challenges precluded a secure attachment to the labour force as they 
argued it was not practical to hand over a sizable portion of their minimum wage check to 
a stranger so that their children would receive less care than they were giving them.  
Notably, only one of these four women (and only one out of a total of twenty four 
respondents) inferred that caring labour should be valued more than it is.  All of these 
women talked about how poverty negatively affected themselves and their children. 
        Two of twenty-four personal stories from conversational partners seemed to have a 
notably less compelling rationale describing the factors precipitating the initial 
application process.  One respondent was quite candid stating that he was young and 
foolish when he initially applied for social assistance as a teenager.  Another respondent 
acknowledged that he had a drug problem, precipitating harsh treatment from his boss, 
which lead him to voluntarily exit his job.  Yet both of these weaker rationales for the 
initial application process were buttressed by qualifications that, after having made 
mistakes, there was significant effort put into rectifying them:  i.e. “going back to high 
school” to graduate and “pounding the pavement” looking for work.  
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     We have established that public policy, public opinion, and the “perversity thesis” 
have been oblivious to the daily living realities of poverty that are frequently associated 
with “the inability to pursue well being precisely because of the lack of economic means” 
(Sen, 1992: 110).  Not one respondent in this research, nor any of the subaltern authors 
who have provided similar insights, reported that life was comfortable living on social 
assistance and many were clear about the unrecognized discomforts of impoverishment.  
The graphic stories people told to get their points across were compelling.  
     Yet there was a recurring, and quite remarkable, phenomenon whereby respondents 
would marginalize their own experiential knowledge about coming to OW, subsisting on 
the system, and attempting to exit social assistance and privilege the mainstream “words 
of welfare” when talking about “the other” lazy and fraudulent social assistance 
recipients.  The stories respondents told about “Others” often had a much different tone.  
As we established in chapter four, stories are frequently told with a purpose and are often 
a reflection of how people see the world.  
     The proceeding analysis in Chapter 6 will confirm insights from The Survival of 
Domination in that, “members of inferiorized groups become the target not only of 
aggression from the superordinate, but from fellow members” (Adam, 1978: 112).   
Further, I will show how “Domination constructs its own underpinnings with this „poor 
man‟s snobbery‟ (Adam, 1978: 106) that is invoked when dominant hegemonic24 
discourses are adopted. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 This monograph concludes by suggesting that the theoretical legacies of Foucault and Gramsci should be 
merged to better understand that discourses are frequently hegemonic and this is patently clear examining 
the words of welfare.  
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Chapter 6 
Respondents’ views of the “Other”:  Taking Up Dominant Discourses 
 
“Welfare recipients‟ views of welfare [and taxes] are not much different from those of the 
general public.  These ideas about welfare mothers are reproduced among recipients, 
despite the difference that their experience suggests to them” (McCormack, 2002: 171). 
 
     The aim of this chapter is to examine the impacts that the predominant public 
discourses of welfare reform and the everyday practices of OW – which have functioned 
to constitute a deeply ingrained problematic of pathology and fraudulent immorality 
among the poor -- have on the subjectivities of social assistance recipients.  Welfare 
discourse is firmly embedded in a larger neoliberal cultural narrative primarily attributing 
material success to an unbridled (and de-contextualized) individualism and ultimately 
operating under the logic of Thatcher‟s (in)famous dictum that „There is no such thing as 
society‟.  Failure, particularly in the form of unemployment and impoverishment, is 
ultimately interpreted as a reflection of some form of personal or moral deficit:  twenty 
one of twenty four respondents in this research attributed the impoverishment of others to 
some form of personal trouble.  In addition, these deficits are portrayed as an unduly 
excessive burden on the upstanding citizen who is a hard working taxpayer:  twenty one 
respondents bought into this argument.  Further, welfare discourse delivers the message 
that labour within the labour market is valued, caring labour beyond the labour market is 
of minimal value:  the work of production matters, but the work of reproduction is of little 
worth (Bezanson, 2006).  Only one respondent seriously questioned the perspectives that 
devalue caring labour.  The everyday practices of OW are ultimately about person-reform 
that decontextualizes the person being reformed from the structural and material barriers 
that they face.  In this chapter we examine the effects of the signifying systems, symbols, 
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and images that are part and parcel of the classifications associated with “words of 
welfare”.   
     A central finding of this research is that while respondents would overwhelmingly 
resist and discredit the dominant narratives of impoverishment and welfare receipt in 
relation to their own circumstances, there is a frequently recurring (and I would suggest, 
quite remarkable) about-face phenomenon when respondents spoke of “others” living in 
poverty. Many respondents accommodate, draw upon, and thus reproduce the same 
cultural narratives – about the work-shy, fraudulent, „welfare scrounger‟ (Hall, 1988) -- 
they had earlier deemed inaccurate and unfair when applied to their personal 
circumstances.  The disjuncture between respondents‟ embodied knowledge examined in 
the previous chapter and the impact of disembodied public discourse in this chapter will 
set the stage for exploring “the question of the nexus between power and subjectivity 
[that] has been a central preoccupation of philosophy and social theory for a very long 
time” (Adam, 2002: 100) in the final chapter concluding this monograph. 
     Prior to delving into the substantive content of this chapter, a brief return to an 
important aspect of Allport‟s theorizing is necessary to contextualize much of the 
qualitative data under investigation here.  If two of the defining traits of prejudice are 
definite hostility and rejection that is based on categorical group membership – “people 
are judged not as individuals but rather on presumed group membership” (Allport, 1954:5 
– then it becomes difficult to see some of the particular stories respondents provided as 
prejudicial.  In some cases respondents were articulating what they perceived to be 
reprehensible behaviour about an individual that was grounded in what they knew, or 
directly observed, about a particular person.  In some cases this was a snapshot moment 
of observation, and in other cases it was grounded in an understanding generated by a 
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longer acquaintance with a person whom the respondent stated that they knew.  In some 
cases, the antipathy respondents expressed towards others was quite draconian.  Perhaps 
because the very nature of classifications /categories (Bowker and Star, 1999) and 
stereotypes (Allport, 1954) draw our attention to some aspects of social life and 
concurrently avert our gaze from other angles, it was common for respondents to lose 
sight of the fact that – even based on their own accounts – the people whom they were 
describing were certainly not living a desirable or enviable life.  
     My analysis of these stories zones in on the generalizations and judgements that were 
posited by respondents – particularly their attributions for the impoverishment of others 
and concern for the „taxpayer‟ --in light of the inductive evidence they presented to arrive 
at their conclusions.  It is insightful to interrogate what respondents did not notice, and / 
or did not say, in their accounts about others living in poverty.  Perhaps the most 
remarkable phenomenon that occurred on several occasions throughout many interviews, 
is that respondents would subjugate their own knowledges (which they articulated early in 
the interviews) about the route that they had taken to welfare receipt and impoverishment. 
This curious omission in their poverty attributions amounted to respondents articulating 
stories about others who purportedly fit the stereotype of the „welfare scrounger‟ (i.e. who 
didn‟t really need to be on the system and was living the good life at the expense of 
taxpayers).  Notably, stories about others living in the disabling circumstances of 
impoverishment, through no fault of their own, were a rarity.      
     Allport himself articulates an important point that is germane to the qualitative data we 
will examine later in this chapter, 
It is not easy to say how much fact is required to justify a 
judgement.  A prejudiced person will almost certainly claim 
that he has sufficient warrant for his views.  He will tell of 
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bitter experiences he has had with [people whom he has had 
contact].  But, in most cases, his facts are scanty and 
strained.  He resorts to a selective sorting of his own few 
memories, mixes them up with hearsay, and 
overgeneralizes (Allport, 1954: 7). 
 
Through the use of interview probes, it became patently clear that in some cases this is 
precisely what respondents were doing.  In other cases, it seemed that respondents 
concerns about particular individual engaging in self destructive behaviour had more 
merit.  Allport‟s insights from The Nature of Prejudice include the important proviso that, 
we can never hope to draw a hard and fast line between 
„sufficient‟ and „insufficient‟ warrant.  For this reason we 
cannot always be sure whether we are dealing with a case 
of prejudice or non prejudice (Allport, 1954: 8). 
 
Allport (1954: 19) further acknowledges that sometimes stereotypes originate in a “kernel 
of truth.”  While I seldom question the facticity of what was observed and reported by my 
respondents when they spoke about “others” on welfare, I could not help but feel that 
many of the assessments and conclusions respondents drew from these observations were 
concurrently informed by, and reproduced, the rhetoric of the common sense revolution 
and the cultural logic of neoliberalism.  In the verbatim excerpts of qualitative data that 
follow, I will present the respondents‟ views supplemented additional analysis showing 
how cultural beliefs had infiltrated their perspectives.    
Picking Up and Reproducing Public Narratives 
 
     Public narratives about individual pathology and medicalized attributions of poverty, 
widespread welfare fraud, and “tax rage” --  whereby the meaning imbedded in the very 
categorization “taxpayer” denotes being unduly victimized (McQuaig, 1995) -- were 
taken up by virtually all respondents.  Clearly, many respondents shared something of a 
common meaning regarding impoverishment, welfare, and taxes and this common 
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meaning seemed to transcend (and be larger than) the individual subject positions of the 
people expressing their views.  In other words, culture had a coercive influence on 
shaping meanings, interpretations, and the perceptions that respondents frequently came 
to adopt, verbalize, and ultimately reproduce.  Neysmith et al (2005: 170) posit a 
profound theoretical observation that is inextricably linked to the logic and reasoning 
behind my central argument analyzing the perpetuation and “survival of classism”, 
as participants draw upon available discourses to make 
sense of the world around them (media, government 
messages, texts and images) they are, at the same time, 
challenging and producing them.  All of the stories rely on 
the way in which people “make meaning” and on our 
capacities, as researchers, for hearing these practices at 
work.  While experiences have a material reality, once they 
are communicated and continue to be retold, they take on a 
new shape.   
 
     Building upon the work of Neysmith et al (2005), this chapter examines the regularly 
patterned meaning making practices at work in respondent‟s stories that are shaped by the 
discursive field upon which those stories are told.  Ultimately, in the final synthesis of 
this dissertation (grafting post-structural theory on discourse with the social psychological 
theory on prejudice) I account for what this culturally sanctioned meaning making 
amounts to.  The self-reported material realities of impoverishment clearly take on a new 
shape when stories about welfare “Others” are told.  Classism, I contend, is so deeply and 
insidiously embedded within this re-shaping process that it goes unrecognized.  
     While the dominant narratives were not entirely absolute, there was minimal defence 
of “others” who were “on the system”.  Many respondents, perhaps as a strategy for 
dealing with their oppression, were careful to explicitly distance themselves from those 
“Others”.  This finding is entirely consistent with Kingfisher (1996), McCormack (2002), 
Hays (2003), and Copeland (2003) who all found notably comparable variations of the 
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“bad-people-exist-but-I-am-not-one-of-them” (Kingfisher, 1996) account of welfare 
receipt from single mothers on social assistance.  Specifically, many respondents who 
participated in this research detailed the particulars of their circumstances exonerating 
themselves from the common charge that they were irresponsible, but it was common for 
respondents to add some variation of the caveat “but there are people like that out there.”  
This argument rejects the dominant narratives (i.e. “this doesn‟t apply to me”) yet also 
accommodates and reproduces mainstream meaning and the resulting stereotypes (i.e. 
“but those kinds of lazy people who „scam the system‟ are out there – and I‟ve seen 
them”).  As we examined earlier in this manuscript, the ratio of welfare fraud 
investigations relative to criminal convictions under the Harris regime was 122: 1.  No 
respondent argued that the extent of fraudulence in the welfare system is grossly 
overstated in public discourse.  Power was clearly operating, here, by the repressive 
presence of what it did not say.        
     The stories that respondents told to evidence the existence of “those lazy scammers” 
are presented throughout this chapter.  On some occasions the stories were detailed and 
on other occasions vague.  Through the use of interview probes some claims, as one 
would expect, appeared to have more substance than others.  While I do not call into 
question the facticity of most of the stories that were reported by respondents when they 
invoked their accounts of “bad-people-exist-but-I-am-not-one-of-them” (Kingfisher, 
1996), I note that vilifying others on social assistance was infinitely more common than 
drawing the conclusion that others also had an undesirable route to OW works, an 
undesirable existence on the system, and intractable barriers realistically precluding a 
return to the work force.     
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     In comparing my findings with the studies listed above (Kingfisher, 1996; 
McCormack, 2002; Hays, 2003 and Copeland, 2003), it is reasonable to draw the 
conclusions, as we will in the final chapter, that subjectivities are not unencumbered by 
institutional discursive structures and those institutional discursive structures are 
insidiously embedded with (and conduits of) classism.  This phenomenon was clear 
particularly when respondents were asked to explain the impoverishment of others.     
Explaining Poverty 
 
“When problems arise, do participants view them as personal issues and / or do they 
point to the influence of social, economic, and political forces?” (Neysmith, et at. 2005: 
170) 
 
      There was one question that provided more intriguing, and perhaps more revealing, 
answers than any other during interviews:  “Why do you think poor people are poor?”  
While this question was not initially included in my semi-structured interview guide, 
during the course of my first interview it became clear that it would be worth posing.  
Tina‟s story about ill health bringing her to OW when she argued that she should 
legitimately be on ODSP, curiously, did not lead her to draw the conclusion that maybe 
other people also had an undesirable route to impoverishment that was beyond their 
control.  It was truly remarkable how common some variation of this phenomenon was 
throughout the course of twenty four interviews. 
     The indelible imprint of both personal responsibility discourse and the medicalization 
of dependency were consistently prominent, albeit in different variations with different 
levels of intensity, in virtually all of the respondents‟ causal explanations for poverty.  In 
short, to answer the profound, and revealing, question posed by Neysmith et al (2005) in 
the epigraph above, poverty attributions were overwhelmingly seen as a personal issue by 
virtually all respondents.  The natural corollary is that respondents ignored larger 
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sociological and economic attributions for the causes of impoverishment and uncritically 
accepted the logic of a gender blind social policy devaluing caring labour.  The lack of 
economic or gendered analyses, I will contend in the next chapter, is deeply embedded in 
personal responsibility discourse that permeates neoliberalism in general and welfare 
reform in particular (being written directly into welfare policy).  Let us now examine 
these accounts.  In some cases it is very possible to draw a hard and fast line between 
prejudice and non prejudice.   
Respondents‟ Attributions for the Impoverishment of Others 
 
“As many studies have documented, the distinction between the deserving and 
undeserving poor is an enduring aspect of political culture” (Steensland, 2008: 232). 
 
     Adrienne‟s highly medicalized, and “culture of poverty” perspectives – presented in a 
general and disembodied way -- held that impoverishment exists essentially because, 
Some people have mental illnesses and some people have 
physical illnesses.  I think that some people have 
personalities where they don‟t have the drive or stamina.  I 
mean we are all different and we all function differently and 
we all have different personalities.  You know I think that 
some people have been born and raised on the system and 
that seems normal to them you know.  And I have seen that.  
And that is sad.  But you know I think that a lot of poor 
people are poor because they are sick or are missing 
something. 
 
When probed for details, Adrienne advised that she did not presently know other people 
on welfare, yet the long-standing cultural dichotomy between the deserving poor who 
can‟t work (i.e. those who are ill) and the “undeserving” (Steensland, 2008) who could 
work but “have been born and raised on the system” (and allegedly not socialized into the 
morality of work) was clear in Adrienne‟s perspectives.  Despite the fact that her own 
story suggested precisely the opposite -- her parents had reportedly instilled “the value of 
hard work” in her -- Adrienne felt that poor people were incapacitated by how they have 
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been culturally socialized:  yet the incapacitating material realities of impoverishment, 
that Adrienne had directly experienced herself, were not mentioned.  Further, Adrienne 
ignored her harsh experiential reality that society opts to not adequately provide for many 
enduring an illness.  As we examined in chapter 3, discursive fields are marked by 
boundaries about what can, and cannot, be understood.  Adrienne was clearly answering 
this question from within the boundaries of a culturally sanctioned discursive field and 
made no reference to the caring labour that she had carried out herself when her children 
were younger. 
     Alison initially posited a medicalized conception of poverty and suggested that, “I 
think that most of them [poor people] have mental health problems.”  Alison was one of 
the few respondents who argued that there may be a number of reasons why poor people 
are poor, however, she was among the many whose perspectives were oblivious to 
structural explanations for poverty.  Alison was surely drawing upon the discursive field 
in articulating several potential reasons for poverty (familial socialization, alcohol abuse, 
low self-esteem) and simultaneously added a personal anecdote evidencing her 
disenchantment with how she was treated during her formative years, 
Well, there‟s a number of reasons you know.  It could be the 
way that they grew up.  It could be problems with alcohol 
abuse.  Not having self esteem.  It took me a long time to get 
out of what I grew up with.  Like I said, I went to a class 
reunion a few years ago and I said to my grade 8 teacher „I 
told you I didn‟t turn out to be a bum.‟ 
 
The “culture of poverty”, alcohol, and low self-esteem are all key players of the 
discursive field and Alice‟s perspectives, here, were clearly drawing upon culturally 
sanctioned explanations.  Alice acknowledged that since her health had took a turn for the 
worse she had been quite isolated (with the exception of regular contact with her children) 
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and did not presently know anyone else on social assistance.  Again, impoverishment, 
ipso facto, was attributable to some form of a personal trouble and not considered to be a 
social issue.  Allport (1954) reminds us stereotypes draw our attention to only certain 
aspects of available information.  Categories (Bowker and Star, 1999) like “poor person” 
similarly draw attention to the cultural meaning and symbolism embedded in a given 
classification.  The cultural meaning and symbolism embedded in the categorization 
“poor person” includes the assumption that there is some form of personal deficit.  Alison 
was quite clear that she had spent her entire adult life caring for children:  first, her own 
and then for many years as a foster mother to 28 different foster children.  Alison made 
no mention of the fact that caring labour is undervalued.     
     Daryl had a unique observation and I initially thought I might have located a case of 
counter discourse, but he concluded with repeating a mainstream narrative that ran 
directly counter to his personal experience.  When asked why poor people were poor 
Daryl replied, 
For the ones who can‟t work, because we are not getting 
enough money.  That, and because there are some people 
who choose to spend their money in different ways. 
 
                        Can you expand on that? [interviewer] 
Well, you need a roof over your head.  So you got to pay the 
rent.  That should be your first thing, but for some people 
it‟s not.  And then you need electricity to cook with and see 
with.  You need heat to keep your ass warm in the winter 
time.  And you need to eat so there is food.  So those should 
be your four main bills that you should pay.  And clothes.  
And anything after that, well, cable is just a pleasure, the 
telephone is just a pleasure, those things should come last 
but some people just don‟t get that. 
 
To be sure, Darryl was initially rejecting the harshness of the common sense revolution, 
here, by pointing out that there are people who are not able to work and they are “not 
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getting enough money.”  At the same time Darryl also inferred that others were mired in 
an undesirable plight because of their inability to budget carefully.  Darryl was able to 
evidence his views by stating that he knows people in his low income building who “just 
don‟t get it” when it comes to finances.  I asked Darryl how common he felt this problem 
of poor money management was among poor people, and he initially replied with an 
uncertainty, “I don‟t know” but then suggested “but if I had to hazard a guess I‟d say it‟s 
probably pretty common.” Logic suggests that there probably are people from all walks of 
life, especially in a consumer culture, that could do a better job managing their finances.  
But this logic should be qualified by making reference to Daryl‟s earlier contention 
echoed by virtually every respondent, and replete with detailed specifics, that it was 
literally impossible to live on a social assistance income. Daryl‟s own claim was later 
superseded by the perspective that other people budget irresponsibly and are incapable of 
deferring gratification.  Despite the reality that Daryl essentially emphasized that his 
welfare check provides absolutely no gratification to defer, he still explained the poverty 
of others by making reference to the spending habits of the poor.  It appears that the 
publicly released Tsubouchi “welfare diet” that we examined in chapter 2 was not really 
questioned when the circumstances of the “Other” were discussed.  Given the benefit 
levels of social assistance presented in chapter 1, it is fair to presume that not having 
sufficient resources to manage in the first place is a far more prevalent phenomenon (as 
opposed to not being able to budget) for most people on social assistance.               
     Diane‟s individualized attributions for the causation of poverty were both overt (seeing 
laziness as the problem) and covert (seeing a lack of ability as a barrier), and almost 
seemed like a public advertisement for the “Common Sense Revolution”, 
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Some of them it is because they don‟t want to work.  
Because there is people out there that are like that.  They 
are just too lazy to get up and go to work and try to better 
themselves.  There are some people who don‟t want to do it 
and then there are some people who don‟t know how to do 
it.  Some people don‟t know where to look or how to look 
but some people just don‟t want to look.  And sometimes to 
get a job anywhere it‟s not what you know it‟s who you 
know.   
 
Diane‟s disembodied generalizations could not be supported by embodied evidence from 
her social circle.  While concluding with the view that social capital matters, at the heart 
of Diane‟s attributions was the indelible imprint of long standing cultural beliefs about 
the nature of poverty and the poor.  The logic of welfare reform as posited directly by 
Harris himself suggested that most people who are out of work don‟t know how to find a 
job or they don‟t want one.  The idea that there are not enough jobs for everyone, or that 
everyone‟s job does not pay a living wage, did not enter into the causal attribution for 
impoverishment.  Impoverishment as a „personal trouble‟ prevailed in this attribution as 
well.  The gendered work Diane had carried out caregiving as a single parent was not 
mentioned.    
     Gloria seemed to feel that poverty was primarily attributable to limited cognitive 
functioning and poor academic achievement, and accepted PC views on both the culture 
of poverty and associated providing foreign aid with domestic poverty, 
Well because, number one, not everyone has a good 
memory to breeze through school.  But there are a lot of 
them who are born into a poor family and the pattern keeps 
going on and on.  And our government should help our own 
before we help these other countries.   
 
Gloria‟s inference that a limited capacity leads to educational, and thus career, struggle 
seemed to overlook the well established patterns of social stratification within both the 
educational spectrum and the labour market.  The fairness and openness of educational 
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and occupational success was implicitly assumed.  Interestingly, the first hint of an 
explanation for poverty that transcended some form of the “personal deficit” perspective 
associated domestic impoverishment with providing too much foreign aid.  While 
disenfranchised populations sometimes lash out at each other via in-group hostility, at 
other times other out-groups bear the brunt of hostility (Bishop, 1994).  Gloria also had 
spent some of her earlier years as a single mother, but she also did not question the work / 
care dichotomy.      
      Heather espoused similar views that are quite common, 
 
I think that it has got to be education.  Education has got to 
be a huge thing.  And it‟s got to be the desire and the ability 
to take chances.  People get themselves stuck in ruts.  Like 
stuck in situations where they can‟t advance and then they 
just give up.  And I got to tell you, I have paid taxes myself 
and it pisses me off. 
 
Heather did not discuss the dispiriting material conditions that she herself had 
experienced when discussing the poverty of others, and shared the “new right‟s” sense of 
outrage regarding taxes. I asked Heather how she felt about those people who are highly 
educated but still cannot secure a living wage because of unemployment or 
underemployment (Livingstone, 1996).  Her response was quite remarkable in that she 
maintained that unemployment, even among graduates of post-secondary education, was 
attributable to some kind of personal deficiency i.e. not adequately researching the labour 
market or being unreasonably inflexible about re-location, 
But then at the same time are those people doing their 
research?  Like finding out the amount of jobs that are 
available in their field?  And if they are not in the right 
area and are not willing to relocate what do they have to 
bitch about before they go off and spend tens of thousands 
of dollars at university?  It‟s great, go to school and be 
what you want to be – I am all for that but you also have to 
be willing to bend and flex too.  Like if you want to be a 
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Hollywood movie director, you can‟t live in Woodstock.  
And if you don‟t want to move to pursue your dreams, then 
don‟t complain. 
 
Heather had clearly internalized notions of personal responsibility and perhaps stretched 
them even farther than most conservative proponents.  Most intriguing is her perspective 
that educated people should be researching the labour market prior to becoming educated, 
while simultaneously exonerating the inadequacies of the market to produce full 
employment that pays an adequate living wage.  Again, mainstream discourse worked, 
here, by effectively pre-figuring what was, and was not, important.  The belief that 
everyone can pursue their dreams successfully if they are just prepared to sacrifice had 
clearly infiltrated Heather‟s subjectivity as she was awaiting her return to service sector 
waitressing job.     
     John also reproduced a public narrative in that he had little patience for those 
“alcoholics and druggies” who “allow [irresponsible] excuses” to sidetrack what easily 
could be their route out of poverty,    
And then you got these guys, like I said, that just don‟t care.  
You know, and I get sick of all those people and we do have 
to kick them off the system.  Because you come from an 
alcoholic family that is what you are going to be.  You got 
your drinking and you got your drugs and you got 
everything else out there.  And you know that is what they 
are going to do. 
 
When probed to elaborate on his perspectives, it seemed to become clear that John‟s 
understandings were deeply infiltrated by cultural mythology and not particularly in tune 
with what he had directly observed, 
In your direct experience how many people do you know on 
social assistance? [Interviewer] 
 
I would say probably about 6 or 7 that I know, and maybe a 
few more. 
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And of all of the people you know on social assistance, how 
many have a drinking or drug problem? [Interviewer] 
 
Maybe one or two. 
 
Can you take a moment and think?  Is it one person or two 
people? [Interviewer] 
 
[pause / look of bewilderment] It‟s just one I guess. 
 
And can you tell me about that person? [interviewer]. 
 
Well he is the kind of guy who will spend his check on beer 
even when his fridge is empty.  If he has to choose between 
beer or food, he‟ll choose beer.  I don‟t think he has ever 
worked a day in his life and he probably never will.  He just 
loves his liquor too much.  
 
You mentioned that you know about six or seven people on 
social assistance, can you tell me about them? [Interviewer] 
 
Well there are some people who are just down on their luck.  
Like they just got a bad break or whatever but they will turn 
things around.    
 
It is revealing to note that despite the reality that John knew only one person on social 
assistance with an alcohol problem, he was reportedly was “sick of all those people” and 
supported the conservative stance of “kicking them all off the system.”  John‟s 
perspectives were clearly based on a “selective sorting of memories, mixed up with 
hearsay” (Allport, 1954: 7) culminating in a harsh prejudicial overgeneralization.  Based 
on John‟s own account, it would be safe to draw the conclusion (from the fact that the 
person repeatedly had an empty fridge) that the person who had made John so angry does 
not have a desirable life or an enviable material existence.  Yet this part of his friend / 
acquaintance‟s life did not seem to infiltrate John‟s subjectivity.  Here, we may have 
located an example of a stereotype originating in a kernel of truth, but what John noticed 
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(and did not notice) was partly pre-given by the symbols and meanings of “welfare 
recipient” and “alcoholic”.       
     As I did with all twenty four respondents, I asked John to tell anyone he knew on 
social assistance about my study and provided him with extra flyers which included my 
contact information should any of his friends or acquaintances wish to participate.  
Unfortunately, the person John spoke of did not contact me and thus I was not able to 
access any details of his life.  It would have been interesting to hear his story.  Notably, it 
should also be observed that amid John‟s harsh accommodation of neoliberal discourse, 
there was also a moment of resistance when he acknowledged that in other instances 
some people, “just got a bad break or whatever but they will turn things around.”  Again, 
the cultural influences of new right discourse were powerful, but not absolute.               
     Ryan‟s response was perhaps the most intriguing, given than he had detailed putting 
extensive effort into a job search and drawing the conclusion that there wasn‟t much out 
there, yet he proceeded to individualize unemployment.  Ryan had, a few months before 
our interview, completed a 6-month construction contract and had been out of work since 
that time.  He briefly, but only briefly, began his explanation for poverty through 
considering econometric / structural factors, but the neoliberal personal-deficit view of 
impoverishment came to the forefront and, ultimately, dominated the covertly classist 
logic and reasoning informing of his answer, 
I would say lack of employment.  Um, why are poor people 
poor?  I think, no I don‟t think that.  I think that it is the 
choices they make in life more than anything. It really is.  I 
think that poor people are poor because, I don‟t know, they 
don‟t want to strive to get ahead any further than they are.  
So what it comes down to really is that it‟s their own fault. 
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At the start of your answer you mentioned a lack of 
employment and then you changed direction, can I ask . . . ? 
[Interviewer]  
 
[replies before I can complete probe] I think it comes down 
to, honestly for me, the way I used to be, I think it comes 
down to self esteem too.  People have been poor for so long 
that think they don‟t deserve anything better.  You get stuck 
in that rut of being comfortably numb and just getting by 
instead of striving to get towards something else I think.  I 
don‟t know, that‟s a hard question.  Why are poor people 
poor?  That‟s really hard question.   
 
Ryan‟s thoroughly neoliberal response (almost as if speaking through the ghosts of 
Franklin or Reagan) maintained that a better work ethic, combined with a strong dose of 
entrepreneurialism, could solve unemployment,    
Absolutely.  Um, and why would there be more work for 
everyone?  Well that is a good question for me because 
there is so much snow out there right now.  Why am I not 
out there with a shovel shovelling people‟s laneway at 4am 
in the morning so they can get to work for 7am if they need 
to get out of the laneway at 6:30am?  Why am I not walking 
around with a shovel going door to door and making $10 a 
drive-way.  You could make $100.00 a day.  And I mean 
everyday is not like that but in the summer time, well, why 
wouldn‟t Ontario Works do this though?  This goes back to 
that other question --  I would set things up like they had us 
doing work, like workfare, and stuff and we‟d have to go 
out there and we‟d have to pick up garbage off the streets.   
 
So you did that? [interviewer]   
 
Yeah, I did.  But I also felt that was no other way of them 
just proving to us that this sucks and you are going to have 
to get off welfare.   
 
In rhetorically asking why he was not at his neighbours‟ driveways at 4am25 making work 
for himself, Ryan‟s response was unique in that he was inferring that he (and not just 
                                                 
25
 Because Ryan was not engaged in the work of social reproduction, he would have one less barrier to 
getting up at 4am to engage in make-shift work that could produce a minimal monetary return.   
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“Others”) was perhaps held back by an irresponsible lack of drive.  This perspective 
subordinated his earlier reports that he had “pounded the pavement” looking for work and 
“lack of employment” is a significant problem.  Despite the fact that Ryan personally had 
a negative experience with workfare, and his views are consistent with qualitative reports 
from the Social Planning Council of Toronto (1999) in that a meaningless placement 
seemed more like an excuse to cut people off support, he was still supportive of different 
workfare initiatives aimed at responsibilizing participants.  Ryan concludes that workfare 
is warranted because a “lack of enthusiasm” is the primary problem and explains why he 
re-directed his initial answer suggesting that a lack of available employment accounts for 
impoverishment, 
At the same time why wouldn‟t they set up some type of 
program in the summer:  cut lawns.  You get 4, 5, or 6 
people together and you cut lawns and you know, pay them.  
And then you get programs like that, um, whitewashing 
buildings, helping at seniors‟ homes.  Clean up the 
grounds, lawn care, and stuff like that.  I mean if there was 
more employment out there, but there really isn‟t a lot of 
employment in Woodstock.  I mean with Toyota coming and 
stuff that‟s great, but I find that usually poor people are less 
educated people and they are not going to find a job at 
Toyota – there is just no way.  At the same time, the more 
jobs that open when people go to Toyota, there‟s gonna be 
jobs opening somewhere else.  Um, the only reason I 
switched off from that, yeah, I did kind of say lack of 
employment then I switched off of that is because a lack of 
employment I think is a lack of enthusiasm more than 
anything and the people that are on the system they just, I 
don‟t know, they just get into this routine of not, well, just 
get used to money being given to them and that‟s just what 
they feel they are doing.  So yeah, it is a mistake to coddle 
them.  That‟s the reason why I switched off of that, because 
it‟s the lack of enthusiasm more than it is the lack of 
employment. 
 
Ryan‟s perspectives were a prime example of public discourse acting as a conduit of 
classism:  in his final analysis, “personal responsibility” is what mattered and it is wrong 
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to coddle the irresponsible people because that will destroy their enthusiasm for work.  
Here, the disjuncture between embodied self reports, and the views of „others‟, was 
enormous.    
     James initially suggested that some people become poor due to bad circumstances that 
they will later be able to transcend.  While many respondents‟ explanations for poverty 
accounted for some form of personal deficiency as the primary causal component of 
impoverishment, after his initial explanation James similarly drew upon the centuries old 
cultural distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, 
A lot of them it‟s just because they have been put in a bad 
situation.  Given the chance they will get back on their feet.  
And the other ones, yeah, they are just looking for a free 
handout and they are never going to change.  It‟s knowing 
what the difference between the two is that I imagine is the 
hard part for them. 
 
James was not clear what he meant by a “bad situation” (and in reviewing the interview 
data I regretted not probing at this point) but was one of the few respondents who began 
his answer explaining poverty in a situational context.  This line of thinking was qualified 
by the caveat that others were looking for a free handout:  clearly, James also moved 
between moments of accommodation and resistance.  Speaking almost as if he was one of 
the architects of welfare reform, he spoke about the challenges of being able to 
distinguish between the worthy and unworthy poor.  The “hand up not hand out” mantra 
of the common sense revolution seemed to have remnants in James view.  The blatant 
material inadequacy of the “hand out” is clearly not part of the imagery that is evoked by 
the symbolism – even among people who have subsisted within the inadequacy.        
     Janet explained her culture of poverty views and followed up with her spiritual 
strategy for coping with her situation, 
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I think that it is just basically to do with your background.  
How you were raised and what you were taught.  Who your 
parents were, where you came from, and most important 
how you were raised.  I even believe that some people are 
rich and some people are poor and it is just meant to be 
that way.  Sometimes I ask God, the creator “Why do you 
keep me here?  Why do you keep me this way?”  Maybe it is 
just all meant to be.  
 
Janet‟s account about impoverishment being a reflection of how people were raised, 
again, was inconsistent with her earlier self report that she was now very poor even 
though she and her brothers were always taught to work and “fend for [our]selves.”  The 
culture of poverty perspective ignores the reality that the same disabling material 
conditions (experienced intergenerationally) can sometimes lead to impoverishment 
reproducing itself:  cause and effect are frequently confused in mainstream reasoning.                                             
     Donna‟s explanation for poverty initially alluded to the incapacity of the poor but then 
considered the material contexts that have a proclivity to impede upward mobility.  When 
asked why poor people are poor Donna suggested, 
Because they just can‟t get ahead.  You can‟t get ahead if 
you don‟t know how.  It‟s impossible if nobody‟s taught 
you.  And then the price of everything is ridiculous.  There 
is no way that poor people are going to get ahead when the 
price of everything goes up and they are just getting less 
and less. 
 
While initially attributing impoverishment to incapacity, Donna later suggested that poor 
people can‟t get ahead when the cost of living rises and they are simultaneously getting 
less.  This argument was somewhat unique among respondents in that impoverishment 
was not solely individualized.  Yet Donna‟s subject position was not at all unique in that 
she did not see (or at least she did not suggest) the caring labour that she was doing for 
her three children as worthy of a more adequate remuneration.      
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     Keylee similarly alluded to the cost of living as a problem, but also felt that an 
inability of the poor to defer gratification was, among other factors, also a significant 
problem, 
The price of everything is too high.  And then there is some 
people who just want everything and can‟t afford it but they 
go out and get it anyway.  So I mean, you got a lot of things 
to consider. 
 
Keylee‟s personal experience, as she was very clear to make explicit, suggested that not 
having enough resources was a constant problem.  While acknowledging that the cost of 
living poses difficulties, her inference that others are impoverished by their spending 
habits seems to side step the reality many people like Keylee herself simply do not have 
the resources meet living arrangements no matter how carefully they budget.  The 
inability to live within a reasonable budget was taken to be a class related issue.  Keylee 
had become widowed approximately one year prior to our interview and had carried out 
the caring work for her children by herself, yet this exceptionally undesirable route to 
impoverishment did not impact her views when asked why poor people are poor. 
     Lori‟s explanation for poverty combined conservative welfare discourse with the 
“common sense revolution‟s” notorious “crisis in education” (Sears, 2003) stance and 
added the “deteriorating family values” argument that appeared to be echoing the 
sentiments of Dan Quayle, 
Well for some of these kids they have had both parents 
working and so they have just basically grown up on their 
own.  They don‟t get the extra time spent with family 
members.  And I mean they have these weaknesses in 
reading and math and because the teachers coddled them in 
school when it comes time for the real world they can‟t do 
it.  And they don‟t have quality time with community 
members who can keep them out of trouble, you know. 
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Even when both parents work, Lori felt, “these kids” can be prone to impoverishment by 
poor parenting and deteriorating schools that aren‟t preparing them for the real world.  
Lori could not expand on, or evidence, her vague and disembodied perspectives when she 
was probed.  Earlier in the interview, Lori had was clear that she had done the best she 
could for her children when they were younger but did not seem to feel that most 
Mother‟s and most parents usually do try to do what is best for their children, nor did she 
suggest that the caregiving she provided for her children was worthy of remuneration. 
     Mike replied to the question “Why do you think that poor people are poor?” with a 
candid response that initially seemed grounded in a simple but compelling logic, “I don‟t 
know.  No money I guess.”  Mike then elaborated on his take on the local situation, 
They opened a shelter here in Woodstock a little while ago.  
The rent is so high here and on welfare you only get $500.  
I wouldn‟t mind helping the people out but I can‟t afford it 
either.  Like the shelter you have to get in there at 7pm at 
night and they kick you out at 7:30am in the morning.  It‟s 
really hard on a person.  But then some people just don‟t 
want to work. 
 
You mentioned that poor people are poor because they have 
no money and I think that‟s undeniably true, but why do 
you suppose they have no money? [interviewer] 
 
They just give up I guess.  You know.  They went through 
the system growing up and stuff like that and they just don‟t 
care anymore.  That‟s my opinion anyways you know.  
Cause I got a lot of  people jobs.  See I build tents in the 
summer time.  So you want a job?  C‟mon, I‟ll get ya over 
here – ten bucks an hour and that‟s a lot better than 
nothing.  But then they work for one day and got the money 
and see you later.  To me it‟s laziness.  That‟s my opinion 
anyway. 
 
Like most people, Mike attributed impoverishment to a lack of drive.  Laziness was the 
presumed rationale for why people cannot, or will not, keep a job.  This is the sine qua 
non of the logic underlying workfare and the message had clearly been received, and 
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driven home, in the subjectivities of most respondents and when those subjectivities were 
verbalized, classism was reproduced.  It did not seem to occur to Mike that there may be a 
reason (other than just laziness) why the people who had worked for him briefly were not 
able to maintain full time employment.  Further, Mike seemed oblivious to the very high 
probability that the people he was referring to are not living a life of enviable luxury 
when they patch together infrequent work projects at $10.00 / hr.  Here, discourse was 
clearly operating by emphasizing what should, and should not, be noticed.    
Anomalous Structural / Circumstantial Explanations for Poverty  
 
“Not everyone, of course, is taken in.  Demagogy, when it goes too far, meets with 
ridicule” (Allport, 1954: 186)    
 
     While some form of personal deficit accounted for the overwhelming majority of 
answers respondents gave to explain poverty, this phenomenon was not entirely absolute.  
Frances, for example, consciously mocked the mainstream view that blames the poor.  
When asked why poor people were poor Frances initially replied in a facetious tone, 
laughed, and then provided her serious answer, 
Because they just want to be [laughs].  I am poor because I 
have a disability and it took me four years to finally get on 
disability.  I can‟t go out there and get a $100 000 a year 
job.  I can‟t get a $20 000 a year job because I can‟t work 
anymore.  And so I am going to be poor unless I win the 
lottery. 
 
     Dorothy‟s answer suggested that there may be something other than personal deficits 
that impoverish people.  Her answer, unlike most, indirectly hinted that there may be 
something undesirable happening in the labour market that is creating a problem.  When 
asked why poor people were poor she replied, 
Circumstances.  Let‟s face it, nowadays everybody lives on 
credit cards.  And these days everybody is one pay check or 
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maybe three pay checks away but they all are not too far 
from having to live in poverty themselves. 
 
In suggesting that many people were bordering on impoverishment Dorothy‟s reply came 
the closest of any respondent to incorporating a what C. Wright Mills (1959) called the 
sociological imagination.  Dorothy was the one case who hinted at poverty being a social 
issue as opposed to merely a personal trouble.   
     Gina also felt that unfortunate circumstances (other than simply lacking a work ethic)  
 
can bring people to poverty and explained by talking a little bit about her background, 
 
Some people run into difficulties in life.  Sometimes you just 
run into a rut.  Stuff happens.  When we moved to Canada 
my Mom didn‟t have nothing after the divorce so she had to 
go on Mother‟s allowance and raise two kids.  When I grew 
up I wasn‟t planning on being a single Mom, but stuff 
happens you know.  I can‟t work right now with my kids.  It 
wouldn‟t make sense.  
 
In addition to directly stating that people sometimes face unforeseen circumstances, here, 
Gina was also inferring that the demands of caregiving, particularly after an unanticipated 
divorce, should be valued more than caring labour is at present.  Gina was unique in that 
she seemed to suggest that the work that her Mother did caring for her, and the work she 
was doing caring for her children, should count for more than it does.  This response was 
also unique in the sense that a respondent‟s personal route to impoverishment infiltrated 
their subjectivity when making attributions for the impoverishment of others.    
     Of the twenty four different attributions for poverty I secured via interviews, coded, 
and analyzed via N6 qualitative software, Dorothy, Gina and Frances were the only 
respondents who did not explain poverty by making reference to some form of personal 
deficit.  Overall, the cultural logic of neoliberalism was predominant in the subjectivities 
of respondents‟ in that poverty was perceived as a “personal trouble” and not a “social 
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issue.”  This predominance was overwhelmingly common, yet not entirely absolute.  The 
salient impact of neoliberal thinking, intertwined with anomalous moments of resistance, 
was also discernable with respect to other issues embedded within the “words of welfare” 
(Schram, 1995).   
Welfare Fraud and “Tax Rage” 
 
“Has a week ever gone by in Canada in recent years without a strident cry from big 
business, the C.D. Howe and Fraser Institutes, the Canadian Taxpayers Federation, and / 
or the National Post that taxes are far too high in Canada?” (Hurtig, 2008: 18). 
 
     The obvious answer to the question posed by Hurtig from the epigraph above is “no”.  
Tax rage is, at minimum, a weekly ritual in contemporary Canada.  During elections, at 
all levels, it becomes a daily ritual.  In the discourse of the new right excessive taxation is 
associated with welfare (and welfare fraud) which has in turn been linked to allegedly 
excessive and unsustainable spending.  In this new right discourse anger becomes 
directed not just at the spend-thrift politician, but at the lazy welfare scrounger who takes 
what he or she has not earned.  It is the hard working taxpayer who allegedly gets stiffed 
in this scenario.  Because caring labour does not command an income, the caring labourer 
is denied the social status of a “taxpayer” and the associated moral meanings embedded 
within that cultural symbol.  If narratives are repeated often enough, people stop 
questioning them.  
     Prior to examining what the respondents in this study said about taxes and welfare 
fraud, let‟s first consider what is not considered at all in neoliberal discussions of 
taxation.  There are some exceptionally important realities about taxation that are simply 
not a part of the public consciousness precisely because rational analysis is subjugated in 
public discourse.  First, by far the most important distribution of wealth and income 
clearly takes place before taxation (Teeple, 2000: 39).  Tax rage pre-supposes that market 
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distribution was fair in the first place and thus warrants no re-adjustment.  This pre-
supposition (i.e. the unquestioned logic of market distribution) is so deeply embedded in 
discourse that it is unrecognized.  Third, what has been obscured by contemporary 
neoliberalism in recent times is that significant personal tax increases for the working 
class population have been necessary to fund corporate tax decreases and tax breaks for 
higher personal incomes (Mishra, 1990: 98).  So when the average working class person 
is angry at „welfare scroungers‟ for personal tax increases, this is a reflection of a 
phenomenon articulated in Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform,  
As the tax burden on the working class grows, the trend 
reinforces certain negative ideological views . . . An 
increasing tax burden can be [and is] used, then, as a 
rationale to build pressure for the dismantling of the welfare 
state . . .  (Teeple, 2000: 101)  
 
  Fourth, Mishra‟s (1990:31) assessment of tax restructuring in the era of neoliberal 
globalization suggests, “Stripped of rationalization and rhetoric, the government‟s 
[neoliberal] tax policies are part and parcel of a major program of upward redistribution 
of income.”  Finally, the (giving) taxpayer / (taking) welfare recipient binary whisks away 
the care-giving labour that is devalued in a gendered discourse and ignores that taking 
(and devaluing) of caregiving labour that permits some “taxpayers” to compete within the 
market.  Let us now examine the impacts of new right rhetoric.  The linguistic tag 
“taxpayer” clearly has cultural and symbolic meaning. 
Respondents‟ Views on Taxation 
 
“I got to tell you, I have paid taxes myself and it pisses me off.” (Heather)              
     After explaining that her stress related challenges legitimately brought her to Ontario 
Works, and expressing excitement about the prospect of returning to work in the near 
future, Heather explicitly distanced herself from welfare “others”, 
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I am not going to say that everybody on Ontario Works is 
like me.  You know there are people out there and they are 
using and abusing the system – just being lazy and using 
their checks for drugs, alcohol, and a good time.  Those 
people don‟t want to work.  They are just going to take their 
check and squander it.  It‟s people like me who do want to 
work who are getting a job.     
 
Notwithstanding the reality that Heather expressed detailed concern about trying to live 
on a social assistance income (even with “about twenty five free meals a month from 
Mom”) she asserted that others squandered their checks on “a good time.”  Heather‟s 
views, here, were perhaps the quintessential example of the “bad-people-exist-but-I-am-
not-one-of-them” (Kingfisher, 1996) phenomenon that was prevalent among many 
respondents.   
     I asked Heather how she felt about the general public‟s views on welfare, and she gave 
an extensive (and overtly classist) answer that is a powerful illustration of McCormack‟s 
contention in the epigraph opening this chapter that welfare recipients‟ views often mirror 
those of the larger society despite the disjuncture between the mythology and their direct 
experiential knowledge, 
Oh God, welfare bums.  Welfare people are just like poor 
bums.  They‟re dirty.  It‟s funny though, when I went on it I 
was doing what I had to be doing.  I was never once 
embarrassed.  It was my life and I had to do what I had to 
do.  I didn‟t care.  But especially working in a restaurant 
you do get those people.  I‟m sorry but you can definitely 
tell, you can tell that they are on welfare because they act 
like it.  And you know what?  I could probably almost 
guarantee that the people I served were on welfare because 
they just demand everything.  Demand it, demand it, 
demand it.  And no tip or maybe a loonie.  It is pretty sad 
but I think that the general perception is that we are lower 
– lower class type people. 
 
Although Heather called the public perception of poverty “pretty sad”, she clearly did not 
question that perception:  she reproduced it in quite a draconian way.  Being cheap and 
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unreasonably demanding were taken to be a class related issues.  Ironically, a poor person 
leaving a large tip would be seen as irresponsible.  When a middle class person is 
demanding it is unlikely that this will be taken to be a class related issue.  Heather‟s 
analysis of the reportedly rude customers she served, whereby she “could probably almost 
guarantee” that they were on welfare , and that “welfare people are just like poor bums”, 
seems to illustrate Allport‟s (1954: 8) contention that “given a thimbleful of facts we rush 
to make generalizations as large as a tub.”  I do not question the facticity of Heather‟s 
claim that she may have experienced rudeness from a person, or people, who presented as 
economically disenfranchised, but I do question the deductive reasoning of her 
conclusions.  Heather had reportedly worked in the service industry (at a casual dining 
facility patronized largely by middle class customers) for several years, and thus it would 
be informed speculation to suggest that she had probably encountered both politeness and 
rudeness from all walks of life.             
     James also drew some harsh generalizations from very limited information, in a 
manner that clearly appeared to be bringing Reagan‟s racialized American welfare queen 
north of the border, 
I watched an Asian couple pull up out front [of the welfare 
office].  She got out of the passenger‟s side of a brand 
spanking new Mercedes.  And yeah, I know, OK, it was 
probably leased but that is still $500 a month.  Plus she was 
wearing a fur coat.  Now it may or may not have been real 
fur.  But my sister is big into animal conservation and she 
owns a couple faux furs and they are like fifteen to twenty 
grand for a good one.  She struts up and puts her income 
card in and she is wearing heals and a gown.  She did not 
look like she was hard up for money.  I know that there are 
a few people around town who are driving very new cars 
and working under the table.  They are dealing drugs.  
Whatever they are doing, one way or another, technically 
it‟s illegal.  If you are earning money when you are on 
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social assistance and you are not claiming it you are 
stealing, and it is stealing from the hard working people. 
   
Again, while I do not call into question the facticity of what James reportedly witnessed
26
, 
there is a great deal in this excerpt that warrants observation.  First, James expressed 
concern that the lady he was describing pulled up in a Mercedes.  He recognized that she 
probably did not own it (stating that it was probably leased) and cited what the monthly 
cost of a lease would be.  Although James stated that the lady exited the passenger‟s side 
of the vehicle, he still presumed that she was financially responsible for the vehicle.  
Given the improbability of being able to hide a new vehicle from welfare authorities, and 
that virtually all of a monthly social assistance income would be taken up by one lease 
payment, it is highly improbable that James‟ concern was founded.  James acknowledged 
that the fur coat the lady was wearing was probably fake, but still very expensive.  In 
James‟s eyes this lady was living in luxury.  I opted to ask James how common he felt the 
problems he just reported were, and in his inductive reasoning we can draw a hard and 
fast line suggesting that his conclusions are patently classist.  He estimated the extent of 
“fraudulence”, pointed out that there are also good people on the system, and then 
proceeded to tell another extended story with a very clear purpose, 
You know I imagine that it is probably more than 50%.  But 
there are good people who will get off it quickly too.  I 
don‟t know, I might be shocked to find out that it is 
probably closer to 70% long term.  Yeah, we are here and 
we are never getting off it.  Yeah, we‟re here and bring me 
a case of beer.  And I let my kid go running around the 
neighbourhood without his diapers on because the beer was 
more important than his diapers were.  Let me tell you this 
                                                 
26
 While I believe that James was reporting an actual incident he had witnessed, it is difficult to truly 
ascertain if he really did know “a few” people on social assistance driving new cars.  Social assistance 
regulations prohibit ownership of vehicles valued at more than $10 000.  In the course of carrying out this 
research, working for several years in human services, and meeting people throughout the course of my 
personal life, I can estimate with absolute certainty that I have had contact with over 100 adult recipients of 
social assistance.  None of these people drove new cars and most had no vehicle.    
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story.  I almost got myself charged with an assault.  I was at 
a grocery store and there was a pair of drunken parents 
and a baby.  And yeah, the grocery cart was full of chips 
and cookies, and mix for their drinks.  Just add liquor and 
it‟s a long island iced tea type-thing.  And there was a case 
of pop and one case of canned baby food and a bag of 
diapers.  They were standing in front of me at the till and 
the girl is ringing all the junk food in and she read out the 
total and they looked at each other and said „we don‟t have 
that much, we‟ll put something back‟.  So Daddy picked up 
the diapers and said „oh here, put this back.  We won‟t need 
this, he can go running around.‟  I probably would have 
been up for murder if he had grabbed the baby food.  But as 
it was I just looked at the guy and said „excuse me?‟  At the 
time I wasn‟t on social assistance.  I was a taxpaying 
citizen and he was going let his kid go without diapers so he 
could have a case of beer.
27
 
 
James explained why he was so enraged by the grocery store incident he reported, 
interestingly by drawing upon the work ethic as a pre-requisite of citizenship and 
responsible parenting.  James‟ went so far as to state he supported a revival of eugenics, 
I was raised to believe that if you wanted something and 
your parents weren‟t Rockefeller then you got off your ass 
and worked until you got it.  That is what an upstanding 
citizen does. Nobody was just going to give it to you.   And 
there is no way that you should be bringing babies into this 
world unless you can show them the value of work by 
example.  You know they had a rule years and years ago 
that if you were a 3
rd
 generation welfare family the doctor 
could sterilize you.  I think that they should bring that back 
because that‟s the only way they are going to break the 
cycle. 
 
James also accepted the argument of fraudulence “in the system” by suggesting that 
people who “pose” as homeless can make a great living from the scam.  James sounded 
genuinely disenchanted when he articulated his belief that, 
                                                 
27
 I did not seek clarification regarding the facticity of James‟ story, but it should be noted that grocery 
stores do no sell cases of beer.  Earlier in the story James mentioned that the couple was purchasing liquor 
mix and I have taken this claim at face value.   
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All you see in the news now-a-days is these supposedly 
homeless people and they are out there panhandling.  I had 
a friend of mine do that down in Toronto.  Not only was he 
not homeless but he brought down five hundred or six 
hundred bucks a day panhandling.  There was a City TV 
reporter who tried it and she brought down $120 in two 
hours work.  She was like, „I am tempted to quit my job‟. 
 
It is next to impossible to gauge the facticity of each claim, but it is hard to imagine that 
there are fortunes to be made by panhandling.  I would suggest that it is logically sound to 
posit that this argument (about the fraudulent homeless generating high incomes from 
their scamming) draws attention away from the inhumanity that the economy and 
contemporary social policy have created.  
     After Diane explained that the she feels that harsh public perceptions of welfare are 
wrong-headed, I asked her why she felt there are negative views of poor people.  Her 
reply initially reproduced the views that she had just herself stated were wrong, and then 
proceeded to caution against premature judgment.  Her initial remark, here, may partially 
explain the intensity of in-group hostility that was prevalent throughout the qualitative 
data, 
Because there are people out there giving people like me a 
bad name.  That happens.  It is because people see some 
groups of people who are on welfare and they think that we 
are all the same way.  And it happens that people get 
prejudiced thoughts.  It happens whether no matter you are 
on welfare or you are a certain religious group or a certain 
ethnic background you think of people in a certain way and 
people tend to think that way with a one track mind.  They 
don‟t see the whole picture.   
 
Diane‟s reply, here, was the only one that invoked the word prejudice. Diane was the only 
respondent to show insight into how the phenomenon of prejudice operates, “they think 
that we are all the same.”  This is remarkable given that virtually all respondents spoke of 
being on the undesirable end of prejudicial / classist judgments, but the discursive field 
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from which they articulated their stories contained no space with which to specifically 
name this phenomenon.  I would suggest that the prejudice of classism has escaped being 
named in public discourse, in part, because the words of welfare predispose an uncritical 
acceptance of the “common sense” views of poor.  Schram argues, “common sense 
operates as a lexicon of signs, symbols, and images used to reinforce prevailing 
relationships of power” (Schram, 2000: 8).    
     I asked Diane to give me an example of “they are all the same” thinking, 
Like there are certain areas of town here where you go and 
people will point and say „Oh that‟s the welfare district.‟  
And just because you lived in that building everyone 
thought that you were on welfare.  It looked like a bit of a 
dive and people go „oh, that‟s the welfare people and that‟s 
why the place is a dive.‟  That is one of the first things 
people think of.   
 
While Diane‟s facial expression suggested a certain level of distress in telling this story, 
and this distress was again palpable in listening to her voice in the audio recording, she 
was not immune from reproducing the perspectives that apparently caused her distress.  
Diane was one of many respondents who claimed that poverty exists because “they don‟t 
want to work.”  
      Despite the fact that Diane (at various stages of our conversation) presented as one of 
the most insightful and progressive people I interviewed, and despite the reality that had 
been a single Mom after her divorce (her children were young adults at the time of the 
interview), the gendered aspects of poverty did not infiltrate her subjectivity.  The 
neglected cultural aspects of social reproduction were uncritically reproduced in Diane‟s 
perspectives by virtue of what she failed to discuss. 
     While Daryl expressed a number of concerns about the realities he endured on OW, he 
offered no counter discourse of the deeply embedded institutional discourse on taxes, 
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Well we can‟t really hide from that.  I mean you gotta pay 
taxes so what can I say.  I don‟t know too much about taxes 
but I mean if I was a taxpayer I would probably be ticked 
off myself.   
 
You are not a taxpayer? [interviewer] 
 
Well, not right now.  No. 
 
Do you pay any taxes? [interviewer] 
 
I haven‟t for some time. 
 
When was the last time you made a purchase? [interviewer] 
 
Well a couple days ago I brought a few bags of groceries 
home from Price Chopper. 
 
Was there tax on those groceries? [interviewer] 
 
[Stunned look]  Well I guess there was. 
This exchange partially illustrates that the taxpayer / welfare recipient binary is so firmly 
entrenched and unquestioned that the reality that people on social assistance are also 
taxpayers is invisible even to those paying tax.  There are rare moments in political  
debate when a politician will step outside of the parameters of the discursive field.  From 
within the provincial legislature, MPP Gilles Morin perceptively pointed out, "In 
attempting to be accountable to the taxpayers of Ontario, there is an implication that 
people receiving income assistance and individuals with disabilities do not pay taxes like 
everyone else in Ontario. We know that this is not true" (Ontario Hansard Issue, 1997: 
LO1112).  Certain actions and behaviours come to be associated with categorical labels.  
The reality that people on social assistance pay taxes is too frequently ignored. 
     Diane emphasized that she had previously been a taxpayer herself and thus did not 
really question a tax backlash, 
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Well I don‟t know how they can say they are being fair to 
taxpayers.  I was a taxpayer for many years and even 
though I have to be on welfare now I have put far more into 
the system than I have ever taken out.  I ended up paying 
for welfare.  No matter how you look at it.  
 
Like several others, Diane invoked the desirable status of “taxpayer” from her earlier 
years to suggest, and highlight, that she had “given” and not just “taken” from the system.  
The ingroup / outgroup binary that accompanies the symbolism of the linguistic tags 
seemed to be at the forefront of Diane‟s perspective. 
     Donna‟s views, as had been the case with several respondents at numerous junctures 
through the interview process, almost seem like they were taken straight from an 
advertisement from the Common Sense Revolution, 
How is it fair to taxpayers?  If they want to be fair to 
taxpayers then get the people off the system and get them a 
job.  Otherwise the taxpayers will keep paying for these 
people who are going to be on year after year.  How is that 
fair?  Even flipping burgers at McDonald‟s is a job.  And 
that is something.  And I know some people won‟t do that 
but others would.  I know that if I was paying into the 
system I would be really cheesed off. 
 
     Heather‟s response to the OW policy directive of taxes initially asked for a 
clarification of the question, then affirmed the right wing view, but then proceeded to add 
an important qualification, 
How?  I don‟t really understand?  How do they want to be 
fair to taxpayers?  Like fair how?  By only taking a small 
percentage of their tax?  Is that what you mean? 
 
The argument, from some peoples‟ perspective, is that 
taxpayers are treated unfairly and it is presumably that line 
of thinking that got written into the OW Act.  How do you 
feel about that? [interviewer] 
 
That is understandable.  Definitely.  But you can also follow 
that up with --  you never know what is going to happen.  I 
started working and had my first job when I was 12 years 
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old.  And I mean you do see those deductions when you get 
your pay check that you worked hard to earn you know.  
And finally I became a person that had to take instead of 
give but that was through no fault of my own.  So it is a 
hard question to think about really. 
 
     Frances also joined the concern over taxes by stating “I don‟t think that it is fair, but 
who am I?  I am not the government.”  Gloria also positioned herself among the “worthy” 
category by stating “I have paid taxes so I do see their point.”  Perhaps the most extreme 
example of neoliberal discourse predominating the subjectivity of any respondent came 
when Gloria explained poverty by stating that the poor pay too much tax, 
You got all these people paying the government taxes but 
they are not helping them in return.  You said something 
about people being poor – well that is why the poor are 
getting poorer because they are paying too much tax.  They 
are really paying too much tax. 
 
I recall that at this point in the interview feeling a strong surge of incredulity that was 
probably palpable in my facial expressions because Gloria proceeded to add the 
qualification that poor people are also poor because “their wages are too low.”  But in her 
initial line of thinking, redistribution doesn‟t ameliorate poverty – it causes it.  Her views 
reiterated those expressed in the potential solutions to homelessness articulated in the 
Provincial task force report (Carrol, 1998: 17), which suggested lowering taxes as a 
provincial initiative
28
 remedy to homelessness:  this solution, of course, pre-supposes 
(with absolutely no rationale evidence to substantiate the claim) that people are taxed into 
homelessness.     
     Rick suggested that, 
 
                                                 
28
 The provincial Tory report stated that they have taken the initiative on providing “more supports for at-
risk families, children and you” and that “the provincial tax cut has relieved 655 000 low income Ontarians 
of paying any tax at all.  Taxes have been reduced by 41% for those earning less that $14 900 per year.”   
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I think that for the taxes that people in Ontario pay they 
could take better care of their people.  We are the highest 
taxed people in the world per capita.  You know what I 
mean. 
 
In the rhetoric of the new right taxes are pejoratively linked to spending and the term “tax 
and spend” creates images of godless socialists pick pocketing hard working people.   
When Stephen Harper announced his intention to seek leadership of the federal 
conservative party in 2004 he claimed “Canada is the highest spending country in the 
world”  (Hurtig, 2008: 274).  The inaccuracy of Harper‟s statement did not undercut his 
political success (Hurtig, 2008: 274-282).  
     When Alice was asked how she felt about the Ontario Works Act‟s pledge to be fair to 
taxpayers, her reply was typical and quite revealing, 
I don‟t know the whole tax system.  I don‟t think that I could 
comment in detail but I do know that there is a problem.  I 
will say that? 
 
And what would you say is problematic specifically? 
[interviewer] 
 
Well the taxes people pay are too high – it can get 
ridiculous and for a lot of people it does.  Again, where is 
the incentive to work hard if they are just going to take it off 
your check anyway and you are no further ahead. 
 
     James shared a comparable view and proceeded to place culpability on people who 
abuse the system, 
They are trying to provide a decent service and for all the 
taxes we pay they should be able to but I am not so sure 
that it is fair to taxpayers.  You got all these guys making 
good money, like I said, under the table and they are still 
taking more and more from the system and it is not right.  
It‟s the same old story you know.  Put them in jail.  Take 
their stuff.  Put it back into society and get us our money 
back.  The funny thing is, when I was paying taxes I didn‟t 
care, but then when I needed help it wasn‟t there. 
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Chunn and Gavigan (2004: 228) argue that “the discourse and politics of welfare fraud 
have obscured the imprecision of what is considered to be fraud, and by whom” and thus 
dominant narratives about rampant fraudulence persist.  James attributed the inadequacy 
of the assistance he was receiving to the problem of others scamming the system.  
Interestingly, the popular line in public discourse is “and those people cheating the system 
are taking away from those who really need it.”   
     Ryan articulated mixed views on taxation, again drawing a sharp distinction between 
himself and “others”, 
I don‟t know, I think I am kind of torn on this because I 
know guys who have been sitting on welfare for three or 
four years and it makes me crazy that somebody is just 
sitting in their house doing nothing and having no job 
searches and basically you and me are paying, like right 
now your taxes are going to me and welfare.  So I don‟t 
know.  But then again I get $206 per month after I get my 
rent paid [Ryan rented a bedroom in a home for $270.00].  
So basically it is just over $50.00 / week and it‟s not 
enough.  I am not exactly living the high life here.  They 
have soup kitchens and stuff to help you out too and 
sometimes you have to go. 
 
Again, Ryan‟s harsh material realities took on a very different shape when he spoke of 
others “sitting in their house doing nothing”.  Ryan was certainly aware that his life and 
present circumstances were nothing to be envious of, and yet he was angry (and made 
“crazy‟) by others on social assistance while expressing sympathy for the exploited 
taxpayer who pays for them. 
Exceptions to Tax Rage 
 
     Adrienne was one of only two respondents who offered a counter- 
 
discourse on taxes, 
 
I was a tax-payer for many, many years and I am telling 
you that if I knew then what I know now I would have 
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gladly paid more taxes.  I would have willingly given more 
of my paycheque so that other people don‟t have to go 
through what I have went through. 
 
Adrienne explained that because she was not exposed to poverty during her formative 
years, she did not fully appreciate what it means to live without resources until her health 
took a turn for the worse and her marriage simultaneously dissolved.  While certainly 
having a more compassionate perspective on redistribution, Adrienne‟s account seemed 
to directly associate tax levels with welfare rates. 
     Janet seemed to hold perspectives that were more informed than the ideas embedded in 
public discourse, 
It‟s not going to make much of a difference.  I have actually 
seen bumpers stickers that say „Get up and go to work 
today.  Thousands of people on welfare depend on you.‟  I 
don‟t agree with all that.  You are going to be taxed 
anyway.  Your money is just going to go somewhere else.  I 
think that if you look at the piece of the pie, the government 
pie, it is actually very little of that money goes to welfare.  
We have our school.  We have our roads.  We have our 
military system.  It [welfare] is a very small piece of the pie 
really. 
 
An “Oxford County 2007 Expenditure Distribution” analysis from the municipal 
publication “What‟s On Woodstock” (City of Woodstock, 2007: 16) confirmed Janet‟s 
views were quite informed in that many of services were funded by taxation (i.e. public 
health, public works, the library, planning, information systems, Woodingford Lodge, 
grants, and miscellaneous along with social services and housing.  Interestingly, 
according to “What‟s on Woodstock” (City of Woodstock, 2007: 16) the average county 
cost per household in 2007 to fund both social services and municipal housing was 
$258.50 (or significantly less than a dollar per day).   
Other Questions that Induced Culturally Sanctioned Responses 
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     The predominance of cultural narratives (that “take place within moral and symbolic 
orders” Steensland, 2008: 232) also made their way into the subjectivities when they were 
asked to address a variety of other questions throughout the interview.  For example when 
Alice was asked what she would do for social assistance recipients if she were the 
minister of community and social services or the manager of OW, her treatment 
suggestions medicalized and pathologized welfare receipt (Schram, 2000: 59-88), drew 
upon the worthy / unworthy distinction, and yet concurrently offered a strong critique of 
current practices, 
I would especially start counselling and support group for 
people who are on social assistance.  I also believe that 
they should treat older OW applicants differently than they 
treat the younger ones because their conditions and 
situations are different and the younger ones should be out 
working.  And I would make counselling completely 
mandatory for people on OW.  The staff with OW now are 
not mandated to do counselling.  They are mandated to get 
you off assistance.  That‟s their goal.  They are not there to 
help you in your life.  They do not know your struggles or 
your difficulties. 
 
When detailing her personal story, Alice suggested that a better material standard of 
living and stronger health supports would be of tremendous value to her, but her 
suggestion for program reform started with the suggestion to provide counselling, divide 
the caseload into the worthy (old recipients with employment barriers) and the unworthy 
(younger ones who “should be out working”).  Interestingly, Alice went from reproducing 
public discourse to offering a critique of OW service delivery, “They do not know your 
struggles or your difficulties.”   
     I also asked people how they felt about the “perversity thesis” (without using that term 
directly) by posing the question,  
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Some politicians and some people feel that having very low 
social assistance rates and restricting access to social 
assistance forces people to work and is therefore helping 
them.  Could you comment?  Is that idea fair or unfair, and 
why? [Interviewer] 
 
Alison‟s views were not uncommon, and like on several other occasions during data 
analysis, it was quite possible to hear remnants of conservative political campaigning, 
I think that they should be working if they are able to.  If 
they are emotionally and physically able to work, then 
yeah, of course they should be working.  If they have 
problems with drinking or anything like that then they 
should get help for that.  And then do small jobs even.  Like 
just helping out with anything, to make themselves feel like 
they are useful. 
 
 When Diane was asked the same question about the “perversity thesis” she reproduced a 
common refrain and an illustration of the (worthy) self / (unworthy) other dichotomy, 
Well you know what?  In some ways it is fair and in some 
ways it definitely isn‟t. 
 
Can you explain what you mean by that? [interviewer] 
 
Because I know that there is people on welfare and they 
take the system for every dime they can.  And there is no 
reason why they are not working.  They are healthy and 
they could be out working but they are just too lazy to be.  
But when it is somebody like in my case who wants to work 
but couldn‟t work – it makes it hard.  It makes it hard for 
the honest person to get welfare because they are so nit-
picky because of the lazy ones. 
 
       Janet was critical of OW, yet at the same time spoke in a familiar narrative about  
 
training, empowerment, mental illness, and self esteem, 
 
The OW Act claims that one of its aims is to effectively 
serve people on social assistance.  How do you feel about 
that? [Interviewer] 
 
No, I would say that they are not serving people.  I think 
that they are just putting a band-aid on a bad situation. 
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Can you explain what you mean by that? [interviewer] 
 
Well I think that there are so many sick people and mentally 
ill people.  It‟s just hopeless.  And the worse things get, the 
worse their lives get they just keep digging a hole deeper 
and deeper and burying themselves in it.  People need 
positive workers.  They need positive things going on in 
their life.  They need training that is going to empower them 
to feel good about themselves.  I think that a lot of people 
on welfare are often people who are suffering from low self 
esteem. 
 
Nietzsche (2004: 84) once suggested “there arises a certain habituation to a certain causal 
interpretation which obstructs and even prohibits an investigation of the cause” and went 
on to argue that mistaking the effect for the cause is a common problem in everyday 
reasoning.  Janet‟s insights seem to have mistaken some of the effects of impoverishment 
for its cause.  The observation that it is common to mistake effects for causes becomes 
even more profound when alloyed with Dean‟s (1999: 64) assertion that “we should not 
underestimate the role of language in constructing worlds, problems and persons as 
governable entities.”   
Conclusion 
 
     In “Welfare Mothers:  Discourse, Discipline and Resistance” (McCormack, 2002: 15)  
 
demonstrated that, 
 
At the same time that the narratives of welfare recipients 
construct their identity as different from the stereotype of 
the „welfare mother‟, they re-inscribe those dominant 
meanings by telling stories about women who take 
advantage of the system and are lazy.  The space in which 
stories are told is not open, unencumbered by institutional 
structures.  Rather narratives, like all social actions, operate 
within these structures.  Because narratives operate like all 
social practices, they are as likely to bare the imprint of 
dominant cultural meanings and relations of power than any 
other social practices. 
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Notably, other research (Copeland, 2003; McCormack, 2002; Kingfisher, 1996; Hays, 
2003) has also pointed to comparable findings in that single mothers on social assistance 
would distance their identity from the dominant cultural meanings of “welfare mothers” 
yet also re-inscribe and reproduce that identity with what Kingfisher called the “bad-
people-exist-but-I-am-not-one-of-them” strategy.  
     Conversational partners who participated in this research frequently posited views 
reflecting dominant cultural meanings with respect to various issues.  In particular, the 
most indelible imprints of the cultural logic of neoliberalism were clearest in respondents‟ 
poverty attributions for “Others” and their perspectives on excessive taxes.  Specifically,  
87.5% of respondents (n=21) cited some form of personal deficit as their explanation for 
why poor people are poor.  Virtually all of these attributions were some variation of the 
culture of poverty perspective:  people were born and raised on the system and nobody 
ever taught them any different, some simply won‟t defer gratification, others just love 
their drugs and alcohol too much.  The notion that poverty was a systemic or structural 
problem was all but non-existent in the perspectives of respondents.  Incredibly, almost 
every respondent ignored the route that had personally brought them to OW when talking 
about the impoverishment of others. 
     With respect to taxes, 87.5% of people (n=21) who participated in this research posited 
views suggesting that taxes were too high and reproduced the view that the “taxpayer” is 
getting stiffed.  Even respondents who acknowledged that they did not know much about 
the tax system claimed that they knew enough to assert that high taxes are definitely a 
problem.  Many conversational partners held a favourable prejudice towards “the 
taxpayer” and felt that the welfare system would be much stronger if other people using it 
would just stop scamming the system.  Not one person suggested that the amount of fraud 
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in the welfare system is grossly overstated.  Virtually everyone in this research reported 
that they had to secure additional resources from family and friends in order to survive 
given the inadequacy of their income support from social assistance.  Yet stories about 
“Others” on welfare living too extravagantly were common.               
     The findings from this chapter with respect to a pronounced “self / other” dichotomy 
confirm those of McCormack (2002), Copeland (2003), Hays (2003) and Kingfisher 
(1996).  My analysis, however, will conclude with adding two unique dimensions to what 
previous studies have established and this research has confirmed.  First, I suggest that the 
stigma that respondents in all of these studies were trying to avoid, and the public 
narratives taken up when respondents presented their perspectives (particularly when 
explaining poverty), are grounded in a publicly unnamed phenomenon of classism.  
Second, I suggest that this form of prejudice is replete within welfare policy and welfare 
discourse acts as a latent conduit of classism.  In the final chapter we will return to, and 
assess the merits of, the central argument of this monograph.     
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Discussion:  Understanding the “Survival of Classism” 
 
“Mysterious are the cases where the individual is hopelessly barred from assimilation 
and yet mentally identifies himself with the practices, outlook, and prejudices of the 
dominant group” (Allport, 1954: 151). 
 
     This dissertation asked, “How does Ontario Works, its accompanying discourse and 
cultural logic of neoliberal welfare reform, impact the subjectivities of OW recipients?”  
The threefold purposes of this research were to examine the impacts of predominant 
mainstream discourse on subjectivity and perception, explore the counter discourses of 
respondents in the wake of “new right” social policies and cultural beliefs, and explain 
the consistent pattern of a self / other dichotomy that resonated through the research 
literature and was confirmed in the qualitative data gathered for this work.  In this final 
chapter, I posit a concluding synthesis discussing my contribution to the scholarly 
research literature which was carried out analyzing qualitative interview data through the 
lenses of social psychological theory on prejudice grafted with poststructural theory on 
discourse.   
     Synthesis begins by returning to – and assessing the merits of -- the central argument 
of this monograph that was laid out in the opening chapter, and proceeds to a concluding 
review discussing the larger significance (beyond just welfare policy) of what was 
discovered throughout the process of fulfilling the threefold purposes of this research.  
The mysteriousness noted by Allport in the epigraph above should become less enigmatic 
by the conclusion of this work.  Increasing an understanding of how prejudice operates, 
however, is most useful and practical when it is coupled with a heightened awareness of 
the functions categorical prejudgment serves.   
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     Increasing material inequality is legitimized by the institutionalized prejudice of overt 
and covert classism.  Ultimately, lean state and tax restructuring mean that wealthy 
people are made wealthier while poor people are made poorer.  Culturally, everyone is 
made to believe that they are the authors of their own fate.  Perhaps more importantly, 
everyone is made to believe that others are the ultimate authors of their own fate.  This is 
the “meritocratic” sine qua non of the cultural and market based logic of neoliberalism, 
ultimately translating into punitive welfare policy and regressive tax policies.  Legitimate 
barriers to employment (i.e. child care responsibilities, health, incapacitating 
impoverishment, and a lack of work paying a living wage) languish on the sidelines of the 
discursive field.  One apostle of the neoliberal view, Peter Drucker, concisely summed up 
the cultural logic and reasoning for policy shifts, “No more salvation by society” 
(Bauman, 2000: 3).  Notwithstanding this reasoning, neoliberal society does now offer 
salvation to the saintly (in-grouped) “taxpayer”, who has been unduly crucified by the 
evil and slothful forces of the welfare state for far too long.  In this context, considering 
systemic forces larger than individuals is perfectly acceptable.          
     Punitive welfare policies, regressive tax policies, and even the criminalization of the 
poor (Bezanson, 2006: 44) have clearly played a role in reproducing the cultural logic.  
As Soss and Schram adeptly reminds us, 
Policies do more than satisfy or dissatisfy; they change the 
basic features of the political landscape.  Policies can set 
political agendas and shape identities and interests.  They 
can influence beliefs about what is possible, desirable, and 
normal.  They can alter conceptions of citizenship and  
status.  They can channel or constrain agency, define  
incentives and redistribute resources.  They can convey  
cues that define, arouse, or pacify constituencies (Soss and 
Schram, 2007: 113). 
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My research shows that policies not only “can” do all of these things – they clearly do, 
and those espousing progressive social change in our current era of neoliberalism must 
become more cognizant of this.  Whatever else dominant discourses do, they clearly limit 
and define the scope of the issues and options that people are likely to perceive.  The 
overwhelming majority of participants in this study were not able to channel their 
disenchantment with the material and social realities of disenfranchisement into any form 
of collective agency because they were constrained by the perception that most others on 
social assistance were irresponsible, ipso facto, because they were on social assistance.  
Thus, attempting to collectively support others who really don‟t deserve support would 
not be considered normal or desirable.  If there is just one point I would like the reader to 
add to their knowledge about welfare policy in the contemporary era of neoliberal 
globalization, it would be concisely stated thus, 
We must recognize that the constitution of subjects in 
discourse and the structural arrangements that leave so 
many behind go hand in hand  (McCormack, 2002: 253). 
 
While this argument may have had merit even prior to reforms, it is more relevant today.  
The natural corollary of this view is that a counter discourse to the currently predominant 
“new right” rhetoric is a prerequisite to halt the policies and “structural arrangements that 
leave so many behind.”  As Weber initially posited, for authority to remain authoritative, 
it has to be made to appear legitimate (Morrison, 1995).  Understanding how power has 
operated is a prerequisite for de-legitimating inhumane social policies and exposing them 
for precisely what they are.  If one can step back from the discourses of neoliberalism, 
and step into an understanding of what has happened, and is happening, in the everyday 
lives of people being governed, it becomes much easier to see the inhumanity and the 
injustice in the reality that being out of work “became rhetorically synonymous with 
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stealing from a hard working, taxpaying Canadian public” (Bezanson, 2006: 44).  A very 
real difficulty lies, however, in stepping back from the dominant discourses of 
neoliberalism.  This is much easier said than done.  It would not be fair to “blame the 
victim” for “blaming the victim” in analyzing the qualitative data in this report.  The 
discursive field itself is the problem, and “for any single individual to work himself out of 
the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature is very difficult” (Kant, 2007: 
30).  Even highly educated people who have been afforded the opportunity for a critical 
education, myself included, often fail to work themselves “out of the life undertutelage 
which has become [seemingly natural].” 
     Given Mills‟s insight that explaining “Just how and why I decided to do such a study 
may suggest one way in which one‟s life experiences feed one‟s intellectual work” (Mills, 
1959: 200), I conclude with a brief epilogue that details “why I decided to do such a 
study” and posits directions for future research.  Incorporating the “sociological 
imagination” (Mills, 1959), situating my biography within my historical era, I point out – 
with as much honest introspection as I can -- that if I had materially endured the 
draconian nature of welfare policy that started in the mid-nineties, (instead of enduring a 
less draconian but still inadequate system of support during my formative years) I believe 
that I would never have attained a Ph.D.  My epilogue closes explaining why I believe 
this to be the case and asks the reader to assess the merits, and consider carefully the 
implications, of my reasoning.   
  Returning to the Central Argument about “The Survival of Classism” 
 
“Culture is not only received by people . . .  it is produced and reproduced by the same 
people in everyday life.” (Mullaly, 2002: 72) 
     In A Brief History of Neoliberalism David Harvey (2005: 39) has argued that, 
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Common sense can be profoundly misleading, obfuscating 
or disguising real problems under cultural prejudices.  
Cultural and tradional values and fears can be mobilized to 
mask other realities.  Political slogans can be invoked that 
mask specific strategies beneath vague rhetorical devices. 
 
The common sense revolution, then, disguised the true sources of poverty and 
unemployment under the cultural prejudice of classism.  The traditional value of 
“personal responsibility” was mobilized to mask an inhumane decline in public 
responsibility.  The political slogan that people should be given “a hand up, not a hand 
out” was a remarkably successful rhetorical device. 
      A central contention of this monograph is that the “regimes of practice” (Foucault, 
1991: 73-86) associated with Ontario Works and the public “words of welfare” (Schram, 
1995) that were integral to the success of the conservative “common sense revolution” 
operate on a “discursive field” that exacerbate a latent and under researched institutional 
form of “prejudice” (Allport, 1954) called classism.  By examining the “workings, 
effects, and the „how?‟ of power” (Foucault, 2003: 274) I showed that both overt and 
covert classism survive in, and are reproduced by, the dominant public discourses – and 
signifiers -- of welfare reform which create uncritically accepted binary and disembodied 
“cultural categories that undergird the [neoliberal] social order” (Schram, 2000: 1):  
namely, that of “the lazy and immoral welfare recipient” and “the hard working and 
exploited taxpayer.”  The connotations, inferences, and meanings, culturally inscribed in 
the term “dependency” (Handler, 1995), had clearly gained a prominence in the 
subjectivities of many of the participants in this research.  Likewise, respondents 
overwhelmingly held views on taxes suggesting a favourable prejudice for “the taxpayer”.   
Adopting, and paraphrasing, Foucault‟s seminal insights on power, this research showed 
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that classism, via the discourses of personal responsibility and excessive taxation, 
insidiously “passes through the individuals it has constituted” (Foucault, 2003: 30).     
The verisimilitude (Denzin, 1997: 10) of my central argument hinges on 
empirically demonstrating a notable and pronounced disjuncture between the “subjugated 
knowledges” (Foucault, 2003: 7) respondents utilized to articulate their embodied 
experiences about coming to, living on, and attempting to exit social assistance, and the 
cultural influences of the mainstream public discourses that were invoked to describe (and 
attribute causation to) the poverty and unemployment of disembodied “other” welfare 
recipients.  Respondents would frequently detail their personal circumstances and push 
back against the dominant narratives to buttress their image, yet would just as frequently 
take up the images they had earlier resisted.  In sum, the challenges in the daily living 
realities embodied in the experiential knowledge of research respondents, curiously, did 
not rise to the level of visibility when those same respondents spoke of the disembodied 
“other” coming to, living on, and “not” attempting to exit social assistance.  Power 
operated, as Foucault (2006: 27) assured us that it will, through “the repressive presence 
of what it does not say” and concurrently passed through the individuals it had 
constituted.   
To thoroughly understand this intriguing phenomenon of a marked self / other 
dichotomy, one must merge the strengths of Foucault‟s theorizing with those of Allport:  
the signifiers of welfare discourse acted as labels of primary potency and emotionally 
toned labels so that the challenges faced by “others” were de-emphasized and lost to 
sight, while cultural presumptions of personal irresponsibility frequently came to the 
forefront of meaning making.  Antipathies were grounded in categorical group 
membership sealed by signifiers such as “welfare recipient” and “poor person.”  
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Following Schram‟s (2000: 3) allusion to “cultural software”, it became evident that the 
subjectivities and perceptions of conversational partners had, to a very large extent, been 
effectively programmed by the symbolic order that is invariably constituted in discourse.  
In mapping this symbolic order, I contend that classism survives by stealth and remains, 
to borrow the words of Schram, “hidden in plain sight” (Schram, 2000: 28).  To fully 
appreciate and assess the merits of this claim, it is necessary to further discuss what was 
discovered throughout the course of fulfilling the threefold objectives of this study. 
Examining the Impact Of Dominant Discourses on Subjectivity 
 
“What specific phenomena do they reveal in the field of discourse?” (Foucault, 2006 
[1969]:29) 
 
     The first and second chapters of this work provided numerous empirical examples of a 
recurring phenomenon that has accelerated since the formative years of neoliberalism.  
New right “poor bashing”, as Baxter (1997) calls it, reached new heights during the 
political campaigning of “common sense revolution” (see also Bezanson, 2006).  When 
OW was successfully being sold to the Ontario electorate, it was common for, 
Stern-faced politicians [to] face TV cameras and point the 
finger at poor people, saying no more welfare fraud, no 
more lazing around on welfare, no more free rides for 
people who don‟t want to work, no more free money for 
drug addicts and alcoholics (Baxter, 1997: 40) 
  
Further, we reviewed examples – from people like Harris, Reagan, Thatcher, and 
Limbaugh – of the hyper-individualist cultural logic of neoliberalism that transcended 
Ontario,   
Politicians at all levels assure taxpayers that they are being 
taken advantage of [and suggest] that poverty, 
homelessness and addiction are just lifestyle choices made 
by those who simply choose not to pull their weight in 
society (Capponi, 1999: ix). 
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This scapegoating is made possible by the semantic illiteracy fostered by “the tyranny of 
words” (Chase, 1938) and the symbolic images and meanings embedded in the process of 
classification (Bowker and Star, 1999). 
     The theoretical linchpin I adopted and utilized in constructing my argument about “the 
survival of classism” was concisely articulated by Neysmith et al (2005: 170), 
While experiences have a material reality, once they are 
communicated and continue to be retold, they take on a new 
shape.  Discourses also operate at an institutional level.  
The meanings and values of an institution [like OW] are 
expressed in systematically organized sets of statements.  
These are also picked up [and repeated] by participants. 
 
My analysis of the qualitative data showed that the systematically organized sets of 
statements uttered by the most outspoken proponents of neoliberalism were frequently 
picked up by the participants in this study who, in invoking culturally sanctioned 
discourse unwittingly reproduced “the casting [of] suspicion on „special interests‟, 
notably the poor” (Bezanson, 2006: 41).  These recurring institutional statements 
frequently met the threshold of prejudice (categorical judgment coupled with a feeling 
tone) in general, and classism in particular.  Power (2006: 5) reminds us that classism is 
composed of three components:  1)  stereotypical thinking that entails a set of beliefs 
about poverty and the poor that are widely shared a socially validated; 2) prejudice, or 
negative attitudes and emotions felt toward the poor; 3) discrimination, distancing from, 
or vilifying the poor.      
     A review of the research literature suggests that this (self / other) phenomenon was not 
unique to this research, but rather that similar discourses (about welfare, the poor, and 
taxes) do, in fact, operate at an institutional level.  In other words, there was much more 
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to the subjectivity and perceptions of respondents than just 24 different “self” and “other” 
perspectives.  As Denzin astutely reminds us, 
Humans live in a second-hand world of meanings. . . 
Reality as it is known is mediated by symbolic 
representation . . . stand[ing] between the person and the so 
called real world (Denzin, 1997: xvi).  
 
The symbolic representation embedded in the words of welfare produce a meaning 
making that constitutes and evokes prejudice, as Allport (1954) defined it, in the form 
classism as delineated by Homan (2007) and Power (2006).  This patterned meaning 
making was frequently discernable, to greater and lesser degrees, when exploring the 
subjectivities and perceptions of virtually all respondents.  Overt classism resonated 
through the outright in-group hostility posited by several respondents, and covert classism 
was even more prevalent, particularly when examining conversational partners‟ 
attributions for impoverishment.  While asking the question “Why do you think poor 
people are poor?” seems reasonably open ended, perhaps the question – as it was phrased 
-- is more culturally loaded than a cursory analysis suggests. “A term “such as „the poor‟ . 
. . reflects a view of people that is depersonalized and dehumanized because the words 
used are impersonal adjectives or descriptors” (Mullaly, 2002: 89).  Then again, if I had 
asked “What makes people available for work and work available for people?” (Clement, 
in Duffy et al, 2006: vii) it is unlikely that the substantive content of the answers would 
have been much different.  The cultural logic of neoliberalism is pretty clear about the 
causes of impoverishment.   
     Aversive and hostile attitudes towards “poor people”, the “unemployed”, and “welfare 
recipients” are spawned by their group membership: once people are linguistically 
categorized, they are “presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group” 
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(1954: 7).  The power of classifying predominates and the very act of classification 
“forces us to overlook all other features” (Allport, 1954: 178) that should not be 
overlooked.  The stereotypes and fixed ideas embedded in the cultural logic of 
neoliberalism appear too firmly ingrained right now for most people to answer, let alone 
consider the significance of, Clement‟s question in a thoughtful way.  Both forms of 
prejudice (overt and covert) exhibited by respondents are latently institutionalized in 
welfare policy and discourse.   
     Remarkably, almost every respondent‟s perspective (there were a few exceptions) held 
a favourable prejudice (Allport, 1954: 6), and expressed sympathy towards, the culturally 
designated victim in “new right” neoliberal discourse --“the taxpayer.”  Capponi (1997: 
72) has demonstrated that “this burning sense of the taxpayer as the true victim” was 
exploited by politicians and has not been adequately questioned.  Again, a close 
examination of the qualitative data reveals that it is possible to discern the indelible 
imprint of the dominant cultural meanings spawned by a linguistic tag.  Allport reminds 
us that “scores of everyday phrases are stamped with the flavour of prejudice, whether the 
user knows it or not” (Allport, 1954: 182).  The contempt many expressed for the “other” 
on “welfare”, was frequently matched by a concern for “the taxpayer” who was clearly, in 
the minds of many, being ripped off (see also Bezanson, 2006).   To directly answer the 
question posed by Foucault in the epigraph above:  the phenomenon of classism is 
revealed in the field of welfare discourse, 
Language may be oppressive simply by the choice of words 
used in communication.  And some words that reflect and 
maintain oppression are so well established that their usage 
is taken for granted and their oppressive connotations not 
recognized.  (Mullaly, 2002: 89) 
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The taxpayer (in-group) / welfare recipient (out-group) binary that is written into policy 
and prominent in public discourse is significant.  “Until we label an out-group, it does not 
exist clearly in our minds” (Allport, 1954: 183), but once an out-group is labelled the 
linguistic tag often has a predominant salience.  “To have enemies, we need labels” 
(Allport, 1954: 183).  Culturally, perhaps one of the best things we could do for welfare 
recipients is to stop referring to them as welfare recipients.  And surely answering 
Foucault‟s call to question the categories with which we have become so familiar could 
assist in realizing that just because one is a “taxpayer” does not mean that one has been 
given a raw deal by our system of resource distribution.  Merging Foucault with Allport, 
“any program for the reduction of prejudice must include a large measure of semantic 
therapy” (Allport, 1954: 187).  Pre-dating Allport, Chase (1938) initially posited that 
demagogues thrive on semantic illiteracy.  Part of that semantic therapy would entail 
naming classism.  The logic of this academic analysis, however, was not readily apparent 
in subjectivities and perceptions of most respondents.  
Exploring Subjugated Knowledges    
 
“Given that the stereotypical image of the welfare mother is such a powerful force in 
shaping public welfare policy, it is critical that research make alternative discursive 
practices visible, as well as to suggest alternative directions for welfare discourse and 
policy making” (Copeland, 2005: 13). 
      
     In “Welfare Mothers:  Discourse, Discipline, and Resistance” McCormack (2002: 3)  
 
noted, 
 
Making ends meet with a welfare check is virtually 
impossible.  Welfare payments are not generous enough to 
sustain a family through a month . . .  This difficulty is 
compounded by the stigma attached to welfare through the 
discursive practices that constitute welfare Mothers as 
immoral, dependent, and lazy. 
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The subjugated knowledge that was de-subjugated in chapter 5 by considering the 
perspectives held by the respondents in this research (and by examining the subaltern 
literature written by others who have experienced impoverishment) is remarkably 
consistent with the findings of McCormack.  Coming to, subsisting on, and attempting to 
exit social assistance were, overwhelmingly, not experiences reportedly resulting from 
personal irresponsibility.  Virtually all respondents pointed this out in graphic detail.  
Further, the daily living realities of these experiences were not reported as being anything 
remotely close to enviable.  Running directly counter to the ungrateful and mercenary 
image of “the welfare bum”, several respondents were thoughtful enough to point out that 
some countries have absolutely no form of assistance and listed the mere existence of any 
form of support to be one of the strengths of OW.   
     Perhaps the most bullet proof logic posited by respondents held that their harshest 
critics should be forced to “walk a mile in their shoes.”  The public perception, an image 
flamed by the new right, that too many people unduly have the freedom to “sit at home 
and do nothing”, ran counter to accounts specifically detailing the material and social 
constraints inherent in “the unfreedom of being the „other‟” (Power, 2006: 643).  The 
significance of material constraint cannot be overstated.  The “perversity thesis” – the 
notion that providing aid has perverse effects on the poor and making benefits levels 
exceptionally low and hard to access thus is a desirable „tough love‟ that helps people 
escape poverty (Block and Somers, 2003) – has a long historical lineage, starting with 
Speenhamland (Polanyi, 2001) and reincarnated with the conservative scholarship of 
Murray (1984).  Suggesting that it defies logic to truly believe that making poor people 
poorer is helping them, Block and Somers note „In the Shadow of Speenhamland‟,   
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the contemporary lesson is obvious.  It is time to reject the 
ideological claim that the best way to fight poverty is by 
imposing stringent conditions on ever shrinking transfer 
payments to poor households (Block and Somers, 2003: 
314). 
 
The detailed particulars of each respondents story, and the subaltern literature written by 
several authors would certainly lend credence to Block and Somers claim, yet “their 
voices are rarely heard or adequately appreciated in society” (Little, 1998: 166) and 
equally subjugated in the formation of social policy.  Copeland (2005: 188) suggests that, 
Policy formation must be grounded in the voices of those 
who have lived and / or working knowledge of welfare 
reform – those who have direct knowledge of these policies. 
 
     The one question that solicited more consensus than any other among respondents 
pertained to the amount of material support they received from OW:  benefit levels were 
consistently described as woefully inadequate, and specifics were provided detailing the 
deleterious consequences this had on various aspects of respondents‟ well being.  Further, 
not one respondent reported receiving meaningful training for OW, and only three 
acknowledged ever having received any training at all.  Yet welfare discourse makes 
certain “truths” (Schram, 2006) predominate even when lived experience defies what is 
made to appear real in discourse. 
     While most of the resistance during interviews was posited in relation to respondents‟ 
personal stories, there were also some more totalizing rejections of the dominant narrative 
when conversational partners would suggest that the dominant narratives of neoliberalism 
are wrong-headed.  One respondent, Dorothy, told more than one story whereby she 
emphasized that an esteemed person in a prominent position (i.e. her Doctor and an OW 
Manager) supported her when she experienced patently degrading treatment as a result of 
her impoverishment.  Dorothy not only was positioning herself as worthy, she claimed 
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that others were worthy too.  The impact of neoliberal discourse was strong, but certainly 
not total or all encompassing.     
Explaining the worthy Self / unworthy Other Dichotomy   
 
“In their words, we can begin to uncover the constitutive nature of the dominant 
discourse in the formation of identity and the possibilities for resistance, in the mundane, 
quotidian practices of daily life”  (McCormack, 2002: 10). 
 
    Writing about three different axes of domination (based on race, sexual orientation, and 
religion) in The Survival of Domination, Adam (1978: 106) noted,  
Differences may be exploited to pass the „composite 
portrait‟ onto other inferiorized  people in an attempt to 
„exonerate‟ oneself.  
 
This phenomenon, then, was not unique to my study of social assistance recipients. There 
is much to suggest that “in-group hostility” (Adam, 1978: 106-114; Bishop, 1994) often 
tends to manifest itself for people dealing with social exclusion of various forms.  Perhaps 
one of the most crucial insights offered by a discourse analysis, is understanding how a 
discursive field constitutes, constructs, and reproduces domination – all the while 
escaping critical public scrutiny.   
     Consider the following political exchange I participated in shortly after the data 
collection stage in this research.  Momentarily, I will contextualize this exchange utilizing 
Schram‟s (2006) conceptualization of “truth” which is grounded in Foucault‟s 
foundational insights in The Politics of Truth (2007).  During the 2007 provincial 
election, I attended the Oxford County riding leaders debate and posed the following 
question to the incumbent conservative MPP, Ernie Hardeman, who was seeking (and 
received) re-election for a fourth term in office, 
Mr. Hardeman, we began this evening with our moderator 
stating that he hoped we could have an informed and 
constructive debate.  I think that we can all agree that 
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informed and constructive debates are a good thing.  My 
question has to do with social policy, and specifically social 
policy as it pertains to our poorest and most vulnerable 
people.  Mr. Hardeman, I would suggest that the welfare 
policy shifts your party enacted 12 years ago – that 
ultimately amount to making poor people poorer -- have 
been very uninformed and destructive.  I could cite research 
showing that as the depth of poverty grows deeper, it 
becomes more difficult for people to escape poverty.  But it 
is unlikely that I can get my point across by citing work that 
policy makers repeatedly choose to ignore.  So what I am 
going to do instead to get my point across is issue a public 
challenge.  If you are re-elected, would you personally 
commit to trying to live, for just one month, on a social 
assistance income?  Now, if you are willing to accept this 
challenge, I‟ll do it with you and then together we can 
report back to the people of Oxford County what that 
experience was like.  If you are not willing to accept this 
challenge, will you please explain to the people of Oxford 
County why you are not willing to accept it? 
 
My question evoked an unsolicited applause from the audience.  Mr. Hardeman initially 
appeared upset by this question and had a pronounced look of flustered concern on his 
face.  For a brief moment, he appeared like the proverbial “deer in headlights.”    He 
began his answer with the predictable political response to difficult questions by thanking 
the questioner.  To his credit, and to my surprise, Hardeman then stated that he did not 
want to pretend that social assistance incomes were anywhere close to adequate and that 
living on an income that low would be very difficult on anyone.  Maybe that look of 
concern I had seen on his face a moment earlier was sincere?  I was pleased that 
Hardeman at least had the decency to acknowledge what I was hoping – at minimum – 
would be acknowledged in the reply to my question.  It is not very often that a 
Conservative politician, or any politician for that matter, acknowledges openly that 
welfare incomes are woefully inadequate.     
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     But my initial satisfaction with the beginning of Hardeman‟s reply quickly dissipated 
when he declined to accept my challenge by arguing that “it wouldn‟t accomplish 
anything”29, and then proceeded to invoke a public discourse about welfare that is not true 
in the sense of being factually correct, but was made to appear to contain “truth.”  
Hardeman argued that the caseload numbers of people on social assistance were down as 
a result of his government‟s policies and that he would support initiatives to have 
workfare expanded to get people the training that they need to get back to work.  The 
“truth” of welfare discourse – and this is my primary point in analyzing this political 
exchange -- is that declining caseloads are uncritically seen as positive and workfare as 
undeniably successful.  If most people exiting social assistance were escaping poverty 
and meaningful training was provided to people, the rhetoric would cease to be rhetorical.  
But this is not the case.    
     The same audience that applauded my question also applauded Hardeman‟s reply – 
and equally loudly.  What passed for “truth” was patently misleading rhetoric:  
meaningful training is virtually non existent in Ontario welfare policy (i.e. according to 
OW Oxford during the months of this research was carried out the number of training 
placements taking place in all of Oxford County ranged from 30 – 40) and declining 
caseload numbers do not correspond to escaping poverty for many leaving the system.  
Clearly this political exchange could be considered a quintessential example of “the 
politics of truth.”  Unfortunately, the nature of this political forum was such questioners 
had no opportunity for follow up statements after the candidate‟s reply.  Mr. Hardeman‟s 
“truth” stood with most members of the audience while the harsh realities of social policy 
                                                 
29
 Had this challenge been accepted and carried out in good faith, it would have brought some attention to 
what is thoroughly subjugated in welfare discourse:  an inadequate material existence undercuts one‟s 
capacity to function.  Meeting material needs has been abandoned as an aim of welfare policy.    
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were off the agenda in this election.  The “politics of truth” as Foucault (2007b) described 
them were clearly in operation here.  In reflecting upon Hardeman‟s counter argument 
that having a welfare policy maker actually try living on a social assistance income would 
not accomplish anything I could not help but considering the seemingly timeless merit in 
Mydral‟s (1944: 1029-1030) claim that, 
It is an experience of every social scientist, who has been 
working on problems of social policy and has taken some 
interest in people‟s reactions, that the strongest psychic 
resistance is aroused when an attempt is made to teach the 
better situated classes in a society about actual lower class 
standards of living and what causes them.  This particular 
type of moral escapism works, sometime with extraordinary 
effectiveness. 
 
In fairness, Hardeman did not attempt any form of escapism when he openly 
acknowledged that social assistance rates were very low and would be difficult for 
anyone to live on.  But like has happened every time the Conservative proponents of 
welfare reform are challenged to “walk a mile” in the shoes of the people they are trying 
to reform – a suggestion endorsed by many in this research – there is an underhanded 
psychic resistance and a moral escapism.  I recall, very clearly, during the early days of 
the common sense revolution that Harris denied the challenge of trying the “welfare diet” 
for himself by stating that he would be hard at work cutting people‟s taxes and that his 
critics can rest assured that he will cut their taxes too.  Hays (2003: 9) has argued that “in 
the case of welfare reform it is clearly important to consider the power and financial 
resources of the politicians primarily responsible for designing the law relative to those 
who are its central targets.”   
     The point of recounting Hardeman‟s reference to lower caseloads and workfare 
training is to point out that new right “truths” also stand with people whose life 
274 
 
experience should indicate to them that there are many untruths that pass for sound 
policy.  Making poor people poorer is not helping them, and people who possess 
enormous material wealth have not been given a raw deal by our system of distribution:  
what should seem patently obvious is badly obscured.  While respondents made it clear 
that poverty was frequently disabling in reference to their personal circumstances, many 
of those same people still bought into the “common sense” and “tough love” policy 
approaches with others and expressed sympathy for “the taxpayer”.  How this happened 
warrants further discussion.    
The Legitimizing Functions of Prejudice in the Context of Neoliberalism 
 
“One major way in which the dominant group reinforces its position of power and 
privilege and, coincidentally oppresses subordinate groups is through the use of 
stereotypes.”  (Mullaly, 2002: 84) 
 
     In chapter 2 we noted Cruikshank‟s (1999: 106) contention that “the stereotype does 
not justify or legitimate welfare practices; rather, those practices justify the stereotypes.”  
One could certainly argue that there is probably a more symbiotic relationship between 
welfare stereotypes and the OW regimes of practice in that each functions to justify the 
other.  But leaving aside this „chicken and egg‟ conundrum, stereotyping and welfare 
policy can, and should, be seen in a larger context in the contemporary era of neoliberal 
globalization, because the impacts are significant both materially and culturally.   
     Jost and Hamilton posit what they suggest is the most important, yet under-
appreciated, achievement of Allport‟s classic work, but also perceptively note that Allport 
did not extend his social psychological analysis into a larger socio-political understanding 
of the role prejudice plays in systemically justifying and legitimizing structural inequality.  
Their thoughtful critique suggests that Allport had an, 
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uncanny ability to meaningfully link societal and cultural 
levels of analysis to a psychological investigation of the 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of individuals and 
groups.  This is perhaps the most important achievement of 
The Nature of Prejudice, although it is underappreciated.  
At the same time Allport did not integrate his ideas 
concerning rationalization, the internalization of inferiority, 
prejudice and ideology and the deleterious consequences of 
inequality in society into a comprehensive theoretical 
framework.  In short, he did not recognize that system 
justification (in addition to ego justification and group 
justification) is an important motive for individuals . . .  In 
retrospect, we can say that the justification function of 
stereotyping was incomplete [because] stereotypes are used 
– implicitly and explicitly – to justify much more than „love 
prejudice‟ and „hate prejudice‟.  They imbue existing forms 
of social arrangements with meaning and legitimacy; they 
preserve and bolster the status quo (Jost and Hamilton, 
2005: 220). 
 
Jost and Hamilton‟s insight is crucial to understanding how material inequality (and 
gender imbalances) has been exacerbated – or the status quo bolstered – in the era of 
neoliberalism.   In Challenging Oppression, Mullaly notes “Questions of need among 
poor people are seldom considered because they are portrayed as the architects of their 
own fate” (Mullaly, 2002: 10).  Extending this insight, the legitimacy of prosperity and 
affluence, even when it reaches what should be considered outrageous proportions, is 
seldom considered because they too are portrayed as the architects of their own fate.  In 
short, as we reviewed in chapter one, the cultural logic of neoliberalism suggests that 
everyone is responsible for their own fate and “there is no such thing as society.”     
     Pimpare (2004: 214) offers a powerful rejoinder that languishes in political obscurity, 
“the Iron Lady‟s famous foolish dictum notwithstanding, there is such a thing as society, 
and none of us exists apart from it.”  The anti-sociological claims of Thatcher are 
infinitely more prominent than the sociological insights of Pimpare.  Understanding the 
culturally sanctioned meaning making of the ingroup (taxpayer) / outgroup (welfare 
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recipient) binary offers a compelling explanation as to how the neoliberal perspective 
dominates,    
This way of constituting „us‟ and „them‟ is not a reflection 
of real differences in the choices or lifestyles of the two 
groups, rather, it is a means of legitimating the dominant 
social order (McCormack, 2002: 251)  
 
Conclusion 
 
“Critical sociology ought to analyze „power language‟, whose abstractions mask the 
humanly constructed domination currently in play and screen out the realities of peoples‟ 
lives” (Burman, 1996: 17) 
 
     In The Survival of Domination:  Inferiorization and Everyday Life (Adam, 1978: x) 
suggested, 
The story of how people survive domination through 
resistance, accommodation, and compliance tells us much 
about how domination survives and an inequitable social 
order is reproduced. 
 
Examining how these people make sense of the objectively 
constricted life possibilities of their social situations throws 
light upon the mechanisms of perpetuation of domination 
(Adam, 1978: 4) 
 
Applied to the context of this study, this observation assists us in understanding the 
mechanisms and perpetuation of classism.  Returning to Power‟s (2006:5) definition of 
classism, it is suggested that this form of prejudice entails three components:  1) 
stereotypical thinking that entails a set of beliefs about poverty and the poor that are 
widely shared and socially validated; 2) prejudice, or negative attitudes and emotions felt 
toward the poor, and 3) discrimination, distancing from, or vilifying of the poor.  Allport 
reminds us that prejudice can also manifest itself in favourable views that are made prior 
to due consideration of all the facts.  The categorical label “taxpayer” as frequently used 
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in neoliberal discourse predisposes one to see a hard working and harshly treated victim 
who clearly deserves more than what they have. 
     Classism, then, is insidiously embedded in the neoliberal signifiers of welfare policy 
and political discourse.  This research, like previous scholarship examining the view 
points of people on social assistance found that respondents, 
clearly understood the language of „personal responsibility.‟  
And many of them said that they thought it was about time 
all those other welfare mothers they were hearing about, the 
ones who just „sit on their butt all day,‟ were reminded of 
their responsibilities to their children and to hard-working, 
tax-paying Americans (Hays, 2003: 8). 
 
The discursive strategies used by respondents in this, and other, research were consistent 
in exhibiting widely shared and socially validated cultural perspectives about the nature 
of impoverishment, welfare fraud, and taxes.  Virtually all respondents invoked 
compelling exceptions to the stereotypes (which they seemed to know quite well) and 
portrayed themselves as deserving and truly in need of assistance, yet most felt that their 
legitimate stories were the exception rather than the rule.  The public narratives, about the 
“lazy bums” and the “welfare queens”, are institutionalized and clearly meet the 
definitional threshold of classism.               
     Welfare discipline (Schram, 2006) works by ensuring that the logic of market 
competition and the morality of work is inculcated and diffused through the social order.  
Combining Adam‟s insight‟s with those of Mullaly in Challenging Oppression, harsh 
anti-welfare sentiment means that, 
These groups become the Other and are marked by negative 
stereotypes that, in effect, reinforce notions of dominant 
group superiority.  These stereotypes permeate society and 
become so ingrained that they are seldom questioned by 
members of the dominant group or by some members of the 
subordinate group  (Mullaly, 2002: 85). 
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The resistance offered by the respondents of this (and other) research suggests that dissent 
was usually limited to their personal story but also accompanied by compliance in the 
sense that the dominant narrative was rarely challenged.  In fact, ideas concerning the 
causes of impoverishment were clearly reproduced in the narratives of most of the people 
who participated in this research.  When new right perspectives on poverty, welfare, 
unemployment and taxation uncritically work their way into the perceptions of people 
whose life experience should suggest alternative views, classism is ensured survival and,  
Such irrationality stains the whole process to such an extent 
that it is difficult to hold in perspective the core problem 
that cries for solution (Allport, 1954: 88). 
  
Directions for Future Research. 
 
Governmentality itself is a mixed substance and one that only works well when alloyed 
with others (Dean, 1999: 7). 
 
     While this research examined Ontario welfare reform through the theoretical lenses of 
poststructural theory on discourse and social psychological theory on prejudice, I would 
suggest that future research should define and operationalize Gramsci‟s (1977) 
conceptualization of hegemony (in a more detailed and comprehensive manner than I 
have) to measure the extent to which the power of welfare discourse (Schram, 2006) 
serves a hegemonic function, facilitating numerous power imbalances along several axes 
of domination.  While academic proponents of Marxism and those espousing Foucault‟s 
conceptualization of governmentality have been at odds over exactly how power operates 
– i.e. taking the state out or putting the state back into the analysis (Rose and Miller, 
1992) – Gramsci‟s view of hegemony and Foucault‟s take on governmentality are not as 
far apart on understanding how power works as the present debate in the academy has 
suggested.  Specifically, both feel that state power matters, but a thorough understanding 
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of domination must transcend a monolithic view of the state and delve into the conduits 
of power in civil society.  Combining the analytical strengths of Gramsci‟s view of 
hegemony, Foucault‟s insights on discourse, and Allport‟s conceptualization of prejudice 
could posit that the hegemonic class prejudice of state institutions operates through the 
discourses of civil society – and these discourses advantage some groups over others.  
The qualitative data in this research could lay the groundwork to justify a study to 
examine the merits of this hypothesis with a more comprehensive analysis of what 
hegemony is, who it serves, and how it operates.  From a practical activist standpoint, 
there would be much merit to the realization that a counter hegemony Gramsci deemed 
necessary for progressive change must be facilitated by a counter discourse that puts 
meeting human needs back on the policy making agenda with the realization that market 
distribution – by itself – does not adequately provide for everyone.  But for the proposed 
study to generate as much useful knowledge as possible, it‟s usage of the concept of 
hegemony would have to expand on its traditional association with class dominance – as 
important as that issue is.   
     Given that the literature on intersectionality has both analytical and humane merits in 
explicitly recognizing the finite limits of single analytic categories, “the complexity of 
intersectionality” (McCall, 2005) warrants further investigation, and a more direct 
application, in future research.  The investigation could begin by doing what neither this 
research nor the literature informing this research was able to do:  secure a sample of 
respondents that is representative of caseload demographics.  After a representative 
sample is secured, a qualitative investigation could systematically explore the 
commonalities and differences experienced by the respondents with different 
demographic traits.  Once a thorough review of what those commonalities and differences 
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are is established, the theorizing on intersectionality could be advanced by a direct 
application exploring the extent to which single analytic categories capture lived 
experience.   The examination could then address the question of the extent to which 
hegemonic discourses impact subjectivities of different respondents in different 
demographic / social locations, who share the one commonality of having to endure a 
culturally ascribed level of worth below what the social order considers acceptable.                      
Epilogue:  A Final Link Between the Personal and the Cultural 
 
“Often I sit at my desk wondering how I got here when the odds seemed so stacked 
against me” (Malarek, 1984: 234). 
 
     Now that I have reached the conclusion of my formal schooling, I feel that it is 
apropos to cite a passage that probably has impacted me, intellectually and affectively, 
more than any other, 
We see Caples [pseudonym for one of Munger‟s research 
respondents] through a narrow lens.  This is how she looks 
now when her children are small, at a point where she faces 
choices that are extraordinarily difficult for most women, 
whether poor or not.  The particular material conditions that 
brought her to this moment are more or less hidden.  
Defined as she is, though, we think we know her.  She‟s a 
welfare Mother who lives on hand outs.  This snapshot is 
reductive, one dimensional.  Truly to know Opal Caples 
and [people] like her and thus to deepen our discussion of 
poverty scholars must focus their attention across their life 
courses (Munger, 2002: 2-3). 
 
A familial archaeology of what brought me to this research, and ensured that I saw it 
through to completion, probably has to go back to at least 1939.  That is the year that my 
Mother, at twelve years old, dropped out of school to assist in care giving for her younger 
siblings.  Care giving was not really valued then, and it is not really valued now.  The fact 
that my sister and I ended up doing pretty well in life is a direct reflection of the fact that 
our Mother did a lot of things right -- and made many responsible decisions under some 
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very undesirable circumstances.  Like Robin Kelley‟s (1997) Yo Mama‟s Dysfunktional:  
Fighting the Culture Wars in America I wrote this work out of a sense of visceral disgust 
over what was happening to people who were experiencing comparable challenges that 
were once faced by my family of origin.  Like Pat Capponi (1997: 19) I too “had watched 
in stunned silence as Ontario declared war on the poor … declared itself open for 
business, for the taxpayer, for the banks.”   
     But bracketing the affective components of my legitimate contempt, and zoning in on 
my more analytical side, when some enormous challenges arose in getting to the finish 
line of a PhD, I refused to throw in the towel on this project precisely because I 
recognized, and agreed wholeheartedly that,  even in a progressive doctoral program 
espousing social justice
30
, 
The growing divide in wealth, life chances, and basic 
security that has become so pronounced in our country in 
recent decades increasingly distances university based 
poverty researchers from some of their most important 
subjects (Munger, 2002: 245). 
 
As I make the transition from being a student to teacher, I pledge to try to continue to 
bridge that gap.  It is far too big.  This view necessitates a personal context. 
     I truly believe that I never would have been able to enter the academy if I had endured 
impoverishment as it is endured today, by countless people who chances for escaping 
poverty are being lowered.  When the “new right” was again engaging in a “politics of 
truth” by problematizing a “brain drain” (suggesting that Canada was losing its smartest 
people to the US because of lower American taxes), there was invaluable research being 
                                                 
30
 When guest speaker Bill Carrol gave the inaugural address launching the University of Windsor‟s 
program in sociology (with a thematic emphasis on social justice) he argued persuasively that critical 
throerists, if they are to be effective, cannot be afraid of their own conclusions and they cannot be afraid of 
conflict with the powers that be.  
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carried out in neuroscience.  “The Early Years Study: Final Report” was adeptly subtitled 
“Reversing the Real Brain Drain” (McCain and Mustard, 1999).  The inference of the 
subtitle was clear:  the youngest victims of spending cuts were having their capacity, and 
thus their future, undercut.  The argument was grounded in the neuroscientific finding 
that “nutrition, care and nurturing directly affect the wiring and pathways of the brain in 
the early period” (Mustard and McCain, 1999: 5).  When I read this finding, I thought 
about what my life would look like had I experienced impoverishment, particularly as an 
infant, under the Harris regime.  Much like in Susan Scruton‟s powerful editorial letter 
(see appendix #5) “I thank my lucky stars that I was poor in the 1980‟s, and not today.”     
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Appendix #1:  Recruitment Letter 
 
 Are you interested in expressing your views on Ontario Works ? 
 
If you are a social assistance recipient in Ontario I would like to provide you with a 
confidential opportunity to express your views on social assistance.  I am a student in 
sociology at the University of Windsor (www.socialjusticeuniversity.org) and this 
research is a part of my thesis.  I am not affiliated with Ontario Works.  The purpose of 
this research is, ultimately, to hear what social assistance recipients have to say about 
what is and is not working at OW. 
 
Should you choose to participate you would be asked to give your opinions and 
perspectives on the everyday operations of Ontario Works.  This would involve 
participating in an interview with me (or a female colleague if you so desire) and / or 
focus groups with others who will be expressing their perspectives.  You would have the 
option to choose to interview individually, participate in a focus group, or both. 
 
For every interview or focus group you participated in you would receive a payment of 
$15.00.  It is anticipated that each interview would run approximately one hour and focus 
groups will likely take closer to two hours. 
 
If you would like more information please contact me at (519) 536-6837 or 
mikebratton1@yahoo.ca 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Mike Bratton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 
 
Appendix#2: Interview Guide 
 
Name: (Pseudonym): _____________________ 
Age: _____ 
Race: ________ 
Marital Status: ________  
Any Children: ________     # _________ 
Contact Info: _____________ 
 
a.)  Personal Background: “To begin with I would like to ask you some basic questions 
about your recent past and about your more distant background.” 
 
1. Could you tell me about your recent background in terms of: 
i.) what factors prompted you to apply for social assistance? [potential probes: 
employment history / employment barriers /  relationship issues / care-giving duties]   
ii.) What was happening in your life at that time? [Probes: expand on what respondents 
deem important]   
2.  Were the factors that prompted you to apply for social assistance new to you ? 
i.)  Some people feel it is necessary to understand peoples’ past to make sense of their 
present.  Do you feel comfortable telling me about your background? [Probes:  Who did 
you live with growing up?  Where did you live?  Can you tell me about your schooling?] 
ii.)  was your standard of living better, worse, or the same as it is now?   
ii.)  are there similarities or differences between your life then and now?  What are those 
similarities and differences?                    
a.) Work Placement/Community Participation : 
1. Could you tell me about your OW work placement? 
2. What kind of job-training activities do you engage in during placement? 
3. Do you feel that you have met important contacts through placement? 
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4. Could you tell me about the relationships you have with your supervisor at 
placement? 
 
5.         How would you describe your experience with the welfare system?  
 
b.) Relationship With Worker: 
1. Could you tell me about your Ontario Works worker(s)? 
2. How often do you have contact with your OW worker? 
3. Have you ever brought questions or concerns to your worker's attention? 
4. If so, how did they respond?  
5. Would you describe your worker as either helpful or unhelpful, towards you and / or 
your job search.  How so ? 
6.  Do you have any strategies for dealing with your worker or the welfare system in 
general?   
c.) Daily Living Realities: 
1. How do you feel about the amount of your monthly social assistance cheque? 
2.         Do you manage to find other ways to supplement your income? 
3. How do you get to and from placement? 
4. Who looks after your child[ren] when you are placement?  
5. Could you talk about any financial or social supports you use outside of OW? 
6. Can you tell me about some of the ways you manage to get by on such a modest 
income? 
7. If you had to choose just one or two factors that you feel would truly assist you in 
gaining meaningful employment and attaining financial independence, what do 
you believe those factors would be? 
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8.        Are you able to secure assistance from family, friends, or partners?    Are you 
able to access any informal work to supplement your income?  Do you ever have 
to access assistance from a food bank? 
9.         How is your physical health?  Do you have health supports?    
d.) Demographics:  
1.         Did you have any experiences with social assistance prior to Ontario Works? 
2. How long have you been involved with the Ontario Works (OW) program? 
3. How many people are you supporting via OW? 
4.         Different people feel that different factors affect one’s ability to secure decent 
work.  What factors do you feel have affected you? 
e.) Program Participant Input. 
1.                        1.         What do you perceive to be the strengths and/or weaknesses of the OW 
program?  The Ontario Works Act claims that one of its aims is to effectively 
serve people on social assistance.  How do you feel about this? 
2. If you were the manager of OW, or the Minister of Community and Social        
            Services, what would you do to improve the program for participants?  
3. Some politicians and some people feel that having very low social assistance 
rates, and restricting access to social assistance, forces people to work and is 
therefore helping them.  Could you comment?  Is that idea fair or unfair?  Why? 
4.        The Ontario Works Act pledges to be fair to taxpayers.  Could you comment? 
5.         How do you feel about the general public’s views on welfare? 
6. Why do you think that poor people are poor?  
7.          What are your goals for the future ?  (.... & Children’s future) 
8. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about any aspect of the program? 
9. Is there anything else you would like to add to our conversation today? 
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Appendix #3 [Sample Consent Form] 
 
 CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
 
Title of Study:  “Ontario Works Through the Eyes of Its Participants” 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Mike Bratton from 
the sociology department at the University of Windsor.    
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact 
Dr. Barry Adam (519) 253-3000 extension 3497 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
To assess the social assistance from the perspectives of people who are 
directly impacted. 
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following 
things: 
 
Answer questions about your views on social assistance and the factors 
that have influenced your views.  You would be afforded the opportunity to 
answer questions in an individual interview, a focus group with other 
people, or both.  You would be afforded the opportunity to assess and re-
assess my analysis of the interviews after they have taken place. 
 
Interviews would take approximately one hour and focus groups will likely 
run closer to two hours.  If you would be interested in providing more than 
one interview to more fully articulate your views, this interest would be 
readily accommodated and my contact information will be readily available 
to you.  Interviews and Focus groups will commence in the Fall of 2006 and 
conclude in the Spring of 2007.  The location of interviews can be at a 
venue most convenient for you.  Focus groups will take place at mutually 
convenient meeting place for those participating.  Transportation and child 
care costs will be covered.   
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POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
In talking about your assessment and opinions of Ontario Works there may 
be the risk and discomfort of discussing personal issues.  Your 
contributions to this study will be held in strict confidence and you will not 
be able to be identified when I write about your story and your contribution 
to this research. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
You will be afforded the opportunity to express your views. 
 
This study will aim to heighten awareness about the many latent power 
imbalances that inform social policy. 
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participants will be paid $15.00 per interview. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be 
identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your 
permission.  Pseudonyms (false names) will be used, and features that could 
identify you altered, so that you will not be able to be identified. 
 
The data will be kept in the strictest confidence and recording locked in a box that 
will only be accessible to you and to me.  You will have the right to hear and 
erase any part of any recording at any time.  Recordings will be destroyed at the 
end of the project. 
 
 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this 
study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.  You 
may also refuse to answer any questions you don=t want to answer and still 
remain in the study.  The investigator may withdraw you from this research if 
circumstances arise which warrant doing so.  
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
 
You can choose to access and audit the findings of this report at any time you 
choose and a final copy of this research will be made available to you if you so 
desire.  A website will post the results of the study. 
 
289 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
  This data will be used in subsequent studies. 
 
Do you give consent for the subsequent use of the data from this study? □  Yes
 □  No 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without 
penalty. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario 
N9B 3P4; telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3916; e-mail: lbunn@uwindsor.ca. 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
I understand the information provided for the study Ontario Works Through the 
Eyes of Its Participants@ as described herein.  My questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study.  I have been 
given a copy of this form. 
 
______________________________________ 
Name of Subject 
 
______________________________________  
 ________________
___ 
Signature of Subject       Date 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
_____________________________________  
 ________________
____ 
Signature of Investigator      Date 
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Appendix #4: CONSENT FOR AUDIO/VIDEO TAPING 
 
 [SAMPLE CONSENT] 
 
Child=s/Research Subject  Name:    
 
Title of the Project:  “Ontario Works Through the Eyes of Its Participants” 
 
ID# Number: 
 
Birth date: 
 
            I consent to the audio/video-taping of interviews and focus groups. 
 
I understand these are voluntary procedures and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time by requesting that either the taping be stopped or the viewing 
be discontinued.  I also understand that my name will not be revealed to 
anyone and that taping and viewing will be kept confidential. Tapes are 
filed by number only and store in a locked cabinet. 
 
I understand that confidentiality will be respected and the viewing of 
materials will be for professional use only. 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________   
 
______
______
______
___ 
(Signature of Parent or Guardian)                  
(Date) 
 
                    Or 
 
_______________________________   
 
______
______
______
___ 
        (Research Subject)          (Date)  
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Appendix#5:  The Letter 
 
The next time the Ontario government boasts about reducing the number 
of welfare recipients in the province, we should remember Kimberly 
Rogers of Sudbury (See Perception, Vol.25, No. 3 and 4, 2002). 
Ms. Rogers [The woman who committed suicide while eight months 
pregnant after being sentenced to house arrest for simultaneously collecting 
student loans and welfare and failing to report the latter] was condemned for 
collecting student loans while on welfare – the very thing that made it 
possible for me to get a marketable education, get off welfare, and become 
a taxpayer.  Without student loans, a child care subsidy, and affordable 
housing, I couldn’t have done it. 
I collected student loans and social assistance from 1986 to 1989.  Not only 
was it legal then, it was seen as a sign of initiative and good character.  
The government did the fiscally sensible and socially decent thing by 
providing me with the resources necessary for me to get off welfare. 
By contrast the current Ontario government has demonstrated time and 
again that [people on] welfare should not expect help, compassion, or even 
indifference from their government, but rather open and aggressive 
hostility. 
This government stigmatizes, degrades, bullies, and punishes welfare 
recipients somehow believing that they can simply choose another way to 
live. 
I know from experience that people need more – not less – in order to 
extricate themselves from poverty:  more money, more resources, more 
support, more reason to hope and believe and try.   
I borrowed money for an education while on social assistance, just like Ms. 
Rogers.  I was applauded, she was criminalized.  I escaped poverty; she 
died trying.   
I thank my lucky stars that I was poor in the 1980’s and not today. 
         (Scruton, 2002:122). 
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